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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Thesis 
According to Berdyaev, the chief concerns of his philosophy are 
1 
freedom and man's creatiVity. His philosophy is based upon a religious 
world-view, emphasizing the concepts of God and of man. From these he 
elaborates his metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of history, philosophy 
of religion, and social philosophy. Berdyaev describes his philoso phy 
as subjective, spiritual, freedom-emphasizing, dualistic, creatively dy-
2 
namic, personalistic, and eschatological. His philosophy expresses his 
emotional concerns for man and freedom; it is not a neatly conceived or 
3 
produced "system." As Dean Iilge says, Berdyaev does not merely indulge 
in philosophical exercise, but it "is mainly as a prophet of personal ani 
4 
social courage that he shows his real power and • • • contribution." 
Beginning "With a summary of Berdyaev 1s philosophical method and posi..-
tion, this study will proceed to a consideration of freedom as experienced 
1. Nicolas Berdyaev, The Russian Idea, trans. R.M. French (N.Y.: 1ac-
millan, 1948), p. 242; and Nicolas Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom, 
trans. R.M. French (N.Y.: Scribner's, 1944), p. 16. Because this 
thesis is based mainly on works by Berdyaev, all subsequent footnote 
references to his writings will be given by title alone. 
2. The Beginning and the End, trans. R.M. French (N.Y.: Harper, 1952), 
PP • S0-$1. 
J. Ibid., p. v. 
4. w:R: Inge, "The Philosophy of Berdyaeff." Philosophy, 21(1946), P• 
201. Spinka gives the same interpretation When he speru{S of Berdyaev 
as a "flaming reformer" rather than an "objective philosopher. 11 See 
Matthew Spinka, Nicolas Berdyaev: Captive of Freedom (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1950), P• 69. 
2 
by God and man. · In View of this discussion, man's creative use of free-
dom in his social life will be examined, i.e., Berdyaev 1s social philos-
ophy will be presented. Because Berdyaev had a "passionate interest in 
1 
social justice and social responsibility," and because much of his writ-
ing criticizes social institutions and types of social organization, his 
social philosophy was chosen as an excellent example of his application 
of his general philosophical principles to the pressing problems of life. 
1Vhile this study considers Berdyaev 1s total philosophy, his concept of 
freedom and its role in his social philosophy are given most detailed 
attep.tion. 
2. Sources for the Thesis 
English translations of twenty-one of Berdyaev 1s books were used 
as the major source for this study. These included all of those which 
he mentions in his autobiography as his most important writings, namely, 
The Meaning of the Creative Act, The Destiny of Man, Solitude and Society, 
2 
Spirit and Reality, and Slavery and Freedom. Numerous articles by Ber-
dyaev were consulted, as well as articles about him and SJme reViews of 
his books. A few books about Berdyaev helped to give a general perspec-
tive of his position. The most systematic and complete of these was 
Spinka's Nicolas Bergyaev: Captive of Freedom. Clarke's Introduction to 
3 
Berdyaev was also helpful. 
1. Dream and Reality, trans. Katherine Lampert (London: Bles, 1950), p. 134. 
2. Ibid., P• 101. 
3. Oliver Fielding Clarke, Introduction to Berd,yaev (London: Bles, 1950). 
• 
3 
3. Methodology of the Thesis 
Chapter II outlines Berdyaev 1s general philosophical position, 
beginning with his philosophical method. The influences of some im-
portant philosophers on his thought are considered. His existentialism, 
personalism, and philosophy of religion are noted as fundamental atti-
tudes and approaches to his total position. Chapter III is devoted to 
Berdyaev 1s concept of freedom, the central concern of his philosophy. 
In Chapter IV, Berdyaev 1s social philosophy, which seems best to exem-
plify the significance of freedom for man 1s life, is outlined in detail, 
beginning with its ethical basis and continuing with its relationship 
to Russian history and philosophy. Berdyaev' s philosophy of history, 
his evaluations of various types of social philosophy, and finally, the 
elements of his own social philosophy are given. Chapter V contains 
some critical evaluations of the issues raised by Chapters II, III, and 
IV. 
4. A Brief Biography of Nicolas Berdyaev 
Nicolas AlexandroVich Berdyaev was born in 'Kiev in 1874 of an 
upper class family (members of the Russian gentry). His father was of 
a family of military men, and was himself an officer of the Guards and 
later Marshal of the Nobility before 11retiring 11 to banldng. His mother, 
partly of French blood and French education, felt her~elf more French 
1 
than Russian. 
Berdyaev entered the Kiev military school as a young boy, but he 
1. DR, PP• 2-3. 
• 
• 
4 
disliked his "coarse ••• and stuPid" fellow-students and the regi-
mented kind o.f study required. Even at this early age he was individ-
ualistic and philosophical as a student, interested and adept in crea-
l 
tive work rather than in memorizing or summarizing. Even as a youth, 
Berdyaev was often ill at ease with others, not accepting nor being 
accepted by groups. He seemed unable to belong entirely to the out-
side world and speaks of himself as anti-social and shy in the midst 
r. 
of "every day affairs, 11 yet very confident in more intellectual dis-
cussions. His breaks with groups in society were significant to him, 
for he calls the early break with his aristocratic relatives and his 
later split from the revolutionaries "two of the most fundamental events 
2 ' 
in my ••• biography." Not always at home with other people, he had 
a great love for nature, particularly forests which he calls "nature 1 s 
3 
symbol of the primeval mystery of life. 11 
4 
He also loved animals, es-
pecially his pet cat, Mura. 
Though he remained in the Orthodox Church, took an active interest 
in ecumenical affairs, and had a religious orientation to life and 
thought, he was not from a strict Orthodox background. Though Orthodox 
by name, his mother was Roman Catholic at heart, while his father is 
5 
described as a 11Vol tarian rationalist. 11 
Berdyaev calls the search for meaning one of the "initial motives 
6 
in man 1 s inner life," and says that, conscious of his vocation as a 
l. Ibid.' pp. 10-12. 36. 2. Ibid., p . ~1. See also pp. xii, 20, and 
~: ~., P• • 1l5Ia.' pp. 28-29. ITB, "P • 18. 5. Ibid.; pp. 172-174. Cf. Clarke, 
6. DR, p. 78. 
• 
philosopher, he was "dedicated to the search for truth and for the 
1 
revela.tion of' meaning in lif' e. 11 He read Kant and Hegel early, arid 
soon became confident of' his calling to be a philosopher, regardless 
of' the nature of such a life. Vfriting of this, he says, 
I did not actually anticipate becoming the object of 
any definite persecutions on account of rolf ideas or 
activities. But as it happened I was imprisoned, de-
ported, tried and eventually exiled • • .-in fact a 
rather eventful life for a philosopher, who, according 
to the current notion, uses his brains as an excuse 
for doing notlung. No doubt professional revolution-
aries had to suffer far more than I; but then revolu-
tionaries and philosophers may have the same fiery 
intensity of' aim, yet their ways and means are dif-
ferent, and, for better or for worse, the philosopher's 
lot is to lead a rather quieter life.2 
5 
With his interest in philosophy and passion fur social justice, 
Berdyaev became a kind of' Marxist in 1894. He was active in the Social 
Democratic Party, was friendly with Lunacharsky and other Marxists, and 
liked Marxism 1 s appreciation of the dynamic of history. However, he 
felt 11 stif'led by the lack of inner freedom, by the bigotry and prosi-
3 
ness which seemed to pervade the whole atmosphere" at Marxist lectures. 
Writing of his first arrest, which came when he was in a student demon-
stration; he notes a lack of freedom when he calls the affair "too 
4 
strict ly organized." 
In 1898, Berdyaev was arrested and expelled from the University 
of' Kiev as a result of his participation in the "first big Social-Demo-
1. Ibid.' P• 37. 
2. Ibid.' p. 119. 
Cf. P• 13. 
Cf. PP• xiii and 86. 
). Ibid.:, P• 117. 4. Ibid., P• 119. Cf. Spinka, NBCF, pp. 13-14 and Clarke, ITB, P• 57. 
• 
6 
1 
cratic affair. 11 He was then exiled to Vologda where he was not 
treated too badly and wrote his first article, 11F .A. Lange and the 
Critical Philosophy. in Its Relation to Socialism, 11 which was pub-
lishes in 1899 in German in Die Neue Zeit, a Marxist journal edited 
by Kautsky. In 1900 he published his first book, Subjectivism and 
Individualism in Social Philosophy. In this book he attempted, (and 
at the time thought that he easily and adequately expressed) a syn-
2 
thesis between "critical Marxism" and Kantian idealism. "Critical 
Marxism" was Berdyaev's brand of Marxism, distinguished m.a.im:ly by 
its idealistic metaphysics. As he writes: 
As I was never a materialist I could not be an ortho-
dox Marxist: philosophically I was an idealist, and 
When I got over Schopenhauer I nurtured myself on the 
theories of Kant and Fichte. I looked on truth, good-
ness and beauty as absolutes, for I had seen that they 
are rooted in transcendental consciousness and that 
only the degrees in which we apprehend them are rela-
tive.3 
With . the publication of this book, he found himself one of the lead-
ers, along with Bulgakov and others, in the "from-Marxism-to-Idealism" 
4 
movement. 
Soon after his return from Vologda, Berdyaev studied with the 
neo-Kantian Windelband, read Ibsen, and became friends with Leo Shes-
1. DR, P• 120. 
2. Ibid., pp. 121-122. Cf. The Origin of Russian Communism, trans. 
R.M. French (London: B1es, 1948), p. 109, and Spinka, NBCF, pp.l4-15. 
3. Christianity and Class War, trans. Donald Attwater (London: Sheed 
and Ward, 1933), p. 19. Cf. DR, pp. 121-124, where Berdyaev summa-
rizes Subjectivism and Individualism in Social Philosophy, mention-
ing many of the same ideas and adding some, e.g. the messianic call 
of the proletariat, the only class free from the "original sin of 
exploitation. 11 
4. DR, P• 132. 
•• 
tov. An unorthodox and sometimes distrusted liberal, he continued 
his political activities, now separated from the orthodox revolu-
1 
tionar,y Marxists. 
Moving to Petersburg, he also began to write for journals, an 
occupation 1mich continued throughout most of his subsequent life • 
7 
.Among these journals were Novy Put 1 (The New Way) and Voprosy Zhizni 
(Questions of Life), the latter being a publication of the Religious 
Phil oro phi cal Society. Their aim was "to bring rapprochement between 
2 
the cultural and social movements" and to combine "leftist" social 
and political ideas with a religious emphasis. Berdyaev and others 
were often excited with ''ecstatic creative experiences" as they had 
"great Visions" of original thought in philosophy, religion, and mys-
ticism; yet only a few persons were involved in these inspiring ex-
periences, and the atmosphere was plagued by ambiguity and imitation. 
Berdyaev himself felt that he wrote little of lasting value during 
3 
his time in Petersburg. 
In 1904 he married Lydia Yudifovna, who, like himself, was aris-
tocra·tic by birth but revolutionary in sympathy. She was a poetess, 
contemplative and mystical in temperament, and apparently very well-
ed h . . f 4 suit as lS W1. e. 
1. Ibid., pp. 124-128, and Spinka, NBCF, P• 19. 
2. DR, p. 153. Cf. PP• 139-1~0, 153-154; RI, P• 246; and Spinka, 
NBCF, PP• 19-20 • 
3. DR, pp~ 143 and 162. Cf. the discussion in RI, P• 247 and Clarke, 
ITB p. 64 of the "Wednesday meetings" in Vyacheslav Ivanov's 
"to..:Ver" (apartment) where the cultured elite gathered to discuss 
their radical ideas on philosorhy, r~ligio~, ~ystic~sm, etc. This 
was good talk, but as typical lntelllgentsla, they lndUlged more 
in words than in action. 
4. DR, p. 139. See also Clarke, ITB, P• 63 and Spinka, NBCF, P• 19. 
• 
8 
In 1907, Berdyaev left Petersburg for Moscow, where, joining the 
1 
Religious Philosophical Society, he widened his contacts and outlook. 
During this period, while stimulated by intellectual and socio-politi-
cal excitement, he wrote the book he later considered to be his first 
2 
important one, The Meaning of the Creative Act, published in 1916. 
i~en 1917 came, he was, of course, deeply affected by the October 
Revolution. He had foreseen it as bringing the end of freedom and of 
3 
the intelligentsia. Before the Revolution broke, he had been ap-
pointed by Kerensky as a member of the Council tSoviet) of the New 
Republic, a position which he describes as 11 almost grotesque" in i'bs 
futility, but which gave him a chance to see the "revolutionary cur-
4 
rents" in action. After the Revolution he remained in Moscow, forced 
to do hard labor, existing on very little food, and living in his old 
flat, which, though unheated, was filled with the fine old family 
furniture and portraits of his ancestors. For a time he received the 
special consideration of an extra food allowance, given to "the better-
known >"lriters, irrespective of their ideological position, ••• jok-
5 
ingly called 1 the immortals. ' 11 
In 1920 he became Professor of Philosophy at the University of 
Moscow, where, as an unhindered public critic of Marxism, he lectured 
6 
to large audiences • He was also instrumental in founding the Free 
l. DR, PP• 164-165 and Spinka, NBCF, P• 32. 
2. DR, PP• 100-101. 
3. Ibid., PP• 137 and 229. Cf. Spinka, NBCF, P• 50. 
4. DR, P• 226. Cf. Clarke, I'rB, P• 66. 
5. DR, P• 230. 
6. Ibid., _ P• 232. Cf. Clarke, ITB, P• 66. 
• 
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Academy of Moral Science which replaced the pre-Revolutionary Reli-
1 
gious Philosophical Society, and lasted until his exile in 1922. 
The intense spiritual and cultural concerns of Berdyaev and his col-
leagues are vividly portrayed in the following passage: 
In the years 1919 to 1921 the entire cultural life of 
anti-BolsheVist Russia was concentrated in the Free 
Philosophical Society and the 1House of Authors' in Pet-
rograd, and in the Religio-Philosophical Academy in Mos-
cow. When one thinks back, in the peace and comfort 
even of the agitated Europe of today, to Soviet Russia 
in the first years, it seems hard to believe that half-
starving men could assemble in great numbers several 
t:ilnes a week in badly lighted ani unheated rooms, to 
debate philosophical problems for three or four hours 
or listen to poems. And yet there can be no doubt that 
the Spirit, in its highest forms, was never so much man's 
daily bread as in the winter of 1920-21, when Berdyaev 
directed the lectures at the Religio-Philosophical Aca-
demy he had founded.2 
But soon his freedom was curtailed, and, arrested by the Cheka 
in 1920, he had the 11honor 11 of being questioned by Dzerzhinsky, head 
of the political police. When Berdyaev replied to Dzerzhinsky 1s first 
question w.ith a half-hour speech on his philosophical, religious, and 
moral opposition to communism, he was allowed to go free-(he was even 
escorted home by a motorcycle guard). As an ideological rather than 
3 
political opponent of communism, he was not persecuted at this time. 
But in 1922 the communist government began anti-religious persecution, 
and Berdyaev waa arrested by the G.P.U., successor to the Cheka. After 
1. DR, PP• 234-2}6. 
2. Stepun, T.he Russian Soul and Revolution (N.Y.: Scribner's, 1935), 
pp. 150-1.51. Cited by Bert Charles Williams_, 11Berdyaev 1 s Philosophy 
of History~' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University Grad-
uate -SChool , 19 49), P• S. 
3. DR, PP• 23i, 236-238. 
• 
• 
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a short period under surveillance, he was banished from Russia on ideo-
logical grounds. While he hated and dreaded exile, he saw in it his 
1 
only hope of any sort of freedom. Writing later of his exile, he says: 
The experience was, indeed, more agonizing than I would 
myself ever have thought possible. But, though at the 
moment life in exile appeared to me as a mysterious and 
unwelcome Unknown, it proved in fact intensely signifi-
cant for me and full of creative possibilities. And, 
maybe, I would not have fulfill~d my calling without 
this proVidential displacement. 
Upon arrival in Berlin, Berdyaev became a spokesman for personal-
istic socialism and an opponent of the "white- hdgre"s, 11 a very anti-
left-wing group whose attitude toward BolsheVism was one of irrational 
terror and complete opposition. While Berdyaev by no means favored 
BolsheVism or totalitarianism, he tried to rise above the mere rancour 
3 
felt by most of the ~gr~s against them. 
In 1924, he moved from Berlin to Paris, where he lived for the 
rest of his life. He continued his active participation in the Y.M.C.A. 
and became active in the Russian Student Christian Movement. In this 
latter organization he emphasized the values of Russian religious tra-
dition and tried to foster a concern for freedom, but he was unsuccess-
ful in achieVing acceptance, being regarded as a radical freethinker. 
As he writes, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
ley" name became a symbol of disgrace, and a new term 
was coined: Berdyaevshchina, denoting all the most 
hateful things a Russian ~:igr6 could think of, such 
as love of freedom, heresy, modernism, Bolshevism, 
and what-not.4 
Ibid.' P• 239. 
Ibid., P• 240. 
Ibid~, PP• 241-249. 
Ibid., PP• 256-257. 
• 
ll 
He was active in beginning and writing very controversial articles for 
the monthly journal of Russian religious and philosophical thought en-
titled Put 1 • Another journal which received his attention was Esprit, 
1 
organ of 11personalisme connnunautaire 11 (personalistic socialism). 
With the coming of World War II, Berdyaev spoke out boldly against 
Nazism and Fascism, but he was not badly treated by the Germans when 
they conquered France. He jokingly wrote afterwards that 11 apparently 
2 
nothing could wipe out the Germans 1 respect for philosopey. 11 
When he died in France on March 23 ~ 1948, he was buried in Cla-
mart, on the River Seine • 
1. Ibid., PP• 247-256, 274-275. Cf. Clarke, IT.B, P• 67. 
2. DR, P• 318. Cf. P• 317. 
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CHAPTm II 
BERDYAEV 1 S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION 
1. Hlilosophical Method 
i. The meaning and function of philosopb;r 
Berdyaev understands philosophy not as scientific or logical anal-
1 
ysis but as a "function of life," "spiritual experience," a "creative 
2 
knowing act, 11 or "the love of wisdom and the unfolding of wisdom in 
3 
man ••• -neither religious faith or science, ••• [but) itself'." 
4 
Neither its source nor its purpose is a 11sy-stan. 11 It begins with 
man's experience as a whole: 
Philosophical apprehension is a spiritual act which in-
volves not only intellection but also the concentration 
of the totality of man's spiritual forces, both of' his 
voluntar,y and sentient being.~ 
Philosoph;y is an intensely individual discipline, as contrasted with 
6 
science and religion which have more of a social function. Berdy-aev 
is emphatic in differentiating philosophy from science, particularly 
1. DR, P• 104. Cf. Ibid., p. 89, 'Where the folloWing statement appears: 
"Ib:i.losophy signifies the love of wisdom, and love implies emotion 
and passion. Hlilosophical knowledge, then, springs from the inte-
gral life of the epiri t; it is • • • spiritual experience." 
2. The Me~ of the Creative Act, trans. Donald A. Lowrie (N.Y.: 
HarPer;$), P• 53. · · · 
3. The DestinY of Man, trans. Natalie Duddington (London: Bles, 1945), 
P• S. . 
4. MCA, PP• 52-53. 5. Solitude and Society, trans. George Reave;y (N.Y.: Scribner's, 1938), 
P• lS. Cf. Ibid., p~ · 17. 
6. ~., p. 22. 
13 
in The Meaning of the Creative Act, where he identifies science With 
necessity and obedience as contrasted to the freedom and creativeness 
1 
of philosophy. Science allows communication of generally valid truths 
to occur among those of conflicting philosophical and religious· views, 
2 ·. 
but it fails to establish any real "community" among them. Philosophy 
and science, then, are quite different in their functions: 
P.hilosopny is not syno~ous with science; it is not 
even the science of essences; its function is to endow 
the spirit with a creative consciousness of the mean-
ing of human existence. 3 
The goal of philosophy as defined by Berdyaev is modification and 
improvement of the world-"not merely ••• the enrichment of it by 
4 
new and expensive books. 11 
ii. Theory of knowledge 
Though Berdyaev does not develop a systematic epistemology, the 
5 
nature and process of knowledge is important in his philosophy. For 
him, knowledge is not a passive reflection of "objective reality," but 
6 7 
a "creative act" or "creative possession" · by an active subject. Ber-
dyaev recognizes two types of knowledge 'Which he relates to one another. 
l. MCA, pp. 21-27, and 51, where he states: 11 .Fhi.losophy is the power of 
man by means of creativeness; science is his power by means of obedi-
ence. Creative philosoplzy" is anthropologic philosophy, pres_upposing 
a creator and his purpose. 11 
2. ss, pp • 80-82. Cf. Freedom and the . ttiri t 1 .. tran~ . . Oli. ver Fiel.ding 
Clarke (N.Y.\ Scribner's, 193Sh P• • · 
3. SS, P• 16. 
4. BE, P• 161. Cf. ss, p. 8. In this idea, Berdya.ev shows his Marxian 
tendency, clo.seJ..y following Marx' belief that it was the duty of 
himself and his followers to change the world 1Vhich had been inter-
preted by the philosophers. 
5. DR, P• 96. 
6. SS, P• 59. 
7. DR, P• 287. 
1 
One of these he characterizes as ''rationalization" or 11objectiviza-
2 
tion." This type of knowledge cannot penetrate the "mystery and mean-
ing of existence," thus it must be superseded by philosophical or exis-
tential knowlErlge. With this advance, man "is enabled to apprehend the 
:3 4 
irrational~" or 11to achieve • • • existential communion. 11 On this 
second level, lmowledge reveals not only' facts but also meanings about 
5 
the world--"not (onlY'] reality but the truth about it. 11 This meaning 
is known because of the subject's ability to participate in it. 
To know the creative activity of the person means being 
a creatively active person. Like knows like. The inner 
relationship between the subject of knowing and the ob-
ject of knowing is a necessar,y condition of true knowing. 
Only the microcosm knows the microcosm. To know anything 
in the 110rld is to have this in oneself. Knowing is a 
creative act and we cannot expect to have knowlgige of 
freedom from a slavish submission to necessity. 
The knowing process is not confined to receiving impressions of 
"ideal non-human entities (Wesenheiten) ," but the knower grasps truth 
7 
through his "spiritual creative activity." The est~lisbment of a 
''community" among knowers depends on each man's consciousness on which 
knowledge itself depends. Knowledge, in symbolizing "the relationship 
1. SS, P• 66. 
2. See infra, Chap. II, Sec. 1, Sub-Sec. ii, Par. (1), on "Objectifi-
cation." 
3. SS, p. 66. Throughout this and other books by Berdyaev, the transla-
tors use "irrational." almost exclusively llb:Ue hardly ever ueing the 
term "non-rational. 11 At times there seems to be no distinction made 
between these terms, 'When such a distinction might be helpful in un-
derstanding Ber~aev's meaning. 
4. Ibid., P• 78. 
5. BE, P• 42. Cf. ~:, P• 72. 6. MCA, p. 155. Cf. Dll, p. 11: 11 0nly an existent can know existence." 
Cf. also BE, p. 4, where Berdyaev states that man "can recognize 
light, meaning, and freedom for the sole reason that light, meaning 
and freedom are there n thin his very self. u 
1. DM, p. 8 (italics mine). 
'·· 
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1 
between one being and another" helps to develop community-community 
2 
does not precede it. Here the subject and subjective are primary. 
Ihilosophical knowledge begins with the self' 1 s knowledge of itself, 
and embraces "the primacy of freedom over existence, of spirit over 
nature, Subject over objeot, personality over the universal, crea-
3 
tiveness over evolution, dualism over monism, love over law." Ber-
dyaev summarizes the nature and meaning of knowledge in the following 
passage: 
Knowledge is a creative activity, not a passive re-
flection of things, am every act of creation includes 
knowledge. Intuition is not only the perception of 
something; it is also a creative penetration into 
meaning; and more than that, the very existence of 
meaning presupposes a creative condition of spirit.4 
(1) Cbjectification • .. Berdyaev often uses the term "objectifi-
cation" to suggest the "general validity" which is scientific know-
ledge. Through it communication but not real communion is possible. 
He distinguishes between the "objective" and the "real," the former 
implying the relation of an "I" to a 11not-I 11 as contrasted to the 
6 
5 
relation of an 11! 11 to a "Thou." On the objectified level the "I" is 
isolated and exterior to the world. This mV" occur through estrange-
ment of the object from the subject, the absorbing of the personal in 
1. SS, P• 44. 
2. Ibid., P• 69. 
3. SF, P• 10. 
4. BE, P• 38. 5. ~·, p. 215. Berdyaev distinguishes between "comnnmion" and 
"comnrunieation, 11 stating that communion requires "community" or 
reciprocity and occurs in a deeply shared experience of an "I" 
and a "Thou. 11 Comnnmication occurs when objects intervene and 
the relationship is between separated rather than integrated par-
ticipants. See SS, pp. llQ-111, 184-185. Cf. Martin Buber, l 
and Thou (Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1953), P• 115. 
6. BE; PP• 53, 60. 
. •· 
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the common, the freedom-crushing rule of necessity, or the adjust-
, 1 
ment of a person to the average and general. Here spirit is sub-
2 
jected to law, and the real is overshadowed by the "symbolical." 
This may happen to varying degrees, but if objeetivization is ear-
ried to the limit Berdyaev claims that there would be a 
turning of man into an ant and society int6 an ant-
heap. Objeetivization rests upon law and the nonn; it 
is unaware of the mystery of the individual. If law 
alone existed the life of man would be intolerable. 
There must also exist a sphere "Which lies outside law, 
a sphere which is unrepeatedly individual. 3 
(2) Symbol. It seems that since one must contend both with 
"objeetivized" knowledge and the knowledge attained in "communion," 
a more flexible and inclusive approach to the knowledge of reality 
4 
than either materialism or abstract idealism must be sought. The 
link between the objective and subjective levels which "sees a spirit-
ual reality behind this visible reality" is called symbol by Berdyaev. 
He quotes Solovyev1s statement that "everything visible to us is only 
5 
a flash, only a shadow from -what cannot be seen by the eye. 11 
1. Ibid., p. 62. 
2. 'SP'i:rit and Reality, trans. George Reavey (London: Bles, 1939), 
pp. L.9-53. Cf. Matthew Spi.nka, "Nicolas Berdyaev, 11 in Christiani~ 
and the Existentialists, ed. Carl Michalson (N.Y.: Scribner's, 19 ) , 
pp. 65=66, where he stat.es ·that 11<l>jectifieation ••• consists of 
loss of personality, a catapulting the person from his own spiritual 
center and integral unity into the exter~al world, ani thus alien-
ating his spirit from itself; the process results in enslavement to 
the external, be it the mores of society, the compulsion of the 
state, or individual. vices. " 
3. The Divine and the Human, _trans• R.M. French ,(LOndon: Bles, 1949), 
p. 122. 
4. FS, P• 53. 5. Cited in The Russian Idea, p. 229. Cf. The Realm of the Spirit and 
the Realm of Caesar, trans~ t)onaid. A. Lowrie (London: Gollancz, 
1952) , p. 101, and FS, ·p. 86, where the following statement appears: 
• 
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This symbolic link is of different quality and greater depth than 
an abstract concept. It is a kind of mythical "pointing beyond" this 
world rather than an objectifying and dragging into the world of what 
1 
is beyond. Through symbol man may be free from bondage to what he 
2 
sees as external, but symbolism itself is not direct communion. Though 
it is a strong and indispensable step on the best approach to tre "real, 11 
it is but a step-not the 11 real 11 itself. 
In t he process of objectification to which the historical 
and social life of man is liable Spirit is symbolized and 
not realized. • • • Symbolization loads men with chains 
when it is regarded as being already realization. In a 
deep sense of the word both worship and culture are sym-
bolical, but in them a way towards realization is provided 
if t hat ~bolism is not regarded as static, as though it 
were a final consummation.3 
2. Important Influences on Berdyaev 1s Thought 
Berdyaev mentions many philosophers· who have influenced his thought. 
Though many more might be included in this section, the follo·wing three 
were chosen because of their frequent mention in Berdyaev's writings and 
their i ndividual stature as philosophers. 
i. Kant 
Particularly in The Beginning and the Eni, Berdyaev rates Kant as 
11A t rue symbolic mental approach gives a meaning to life because it 
also permits of our being freed from the bondage and misery of this 
vain world. Nothing absolute, nothing sacred, can be fettered by 
this 1rorld which is in itself incapable of anything like a complete 
comprehension of the spirit ual. • • • Only the symbols of other 
worlds are possible." 1. FS, :P• 70, and Truth and Revelation, trans. R.M. French (N.Y.: Harper, 
1953); P• 146. 
2. FS; P• 81. 
3. TR, p. 146. Cf . infra, Chap. IV, Sec. 6, Sub-Sec. v, Par. 3. 
4. DR, Chap. IV, PP• 86-107. 
4 
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one of the greatest philosophers of all time, speaking of him as "the 
1 
founder of the philosophy of freedom, 11 and "the philosopher of freedom 
2 
par_ excellence." Berdyaev recognizes that Kant is a primary influence 
on his thought, but one whose philosophy needs to be modified because 
of its failure to be consistent or "radical" enough. 
For Berdyaev, Kant's greatest contribution is his dualism between 
the phenomenal and the noumenal, wherein the noumenal is primary. Here 
free:iom is separated from nature am is powerful over nature rather 
g 
than caught in it. The free subject is conf'ronte:i by apparently un-
solvable contradictories 'Which may symbolize the dynamic vastness of 
freedom which differs very radically from the "one-track" freedom of 
4 
the philosophy of the enlightenment. Such a metaphysics,. based as it 
is on a free subject rather than one bound by rationalism, makes possi-
5 
ble existential metaphysics, which express "the order of freedom. tt 
The only problem with Kant 1 s interpretation is that he separates too 
sharply the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. As the noumenal is cut 
off from the phemmenal, it becomes a mere object rather than an ex-
perience in the spiritual life of the subject. It is, for Kant, "de-
6 
void of experience and knowledge." The phenomenal cannot participate 
in the freedom of the noumenal if it cannot interact 1d. th it. Thus 
1. BE, P• 111. 
2. DR, P• 49. 
3. BE, P• 27; SF, P• 11; and Sp:inka, NBCF, P• 74. 
4. DR, P• 93; SR, P• 2; and RI, P• 46. 
5. BE, p. 9; SS, P• 64; and SR, p. 12, where Berdyaev writes of Kant: 
"In his philosophy are laid the foundations of the only true meta-
physics: a dualism of the spheres of freedom and nature; voluntarism, 
indeterminism, personalism; ••• the avowal of another manifest, 
deeper reality hidden from the ·world." 
6. SS, P• 37. Cf. FS, P• $6. 
1 
real freedom in the life of man seems impossible. 
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Kant makes another contribution in his opposition to psychologis-
tic ani rationalistic confusion of real lmowledge with the "physiology-
of the organs of sense. 11 He also opposes the "confusion of the logical 
predicate 1li th reality, 11 as is demonstrated in his rejection of the 
2 
ontological proof for the existence of God. 
The primary value of man as an end in himself and the importance 
of man's use of reason arrl creativity are other positive values of 
3 
Kant's philosophy. Both a trace of existentialism and the idea of 
the nature and importance of man 1 s freedom and power are shown in the 
following statement of Berdyaev 1 s: · "The philosophy of Kant places man 
on the brink of a bottomless void and demands that man subjectively re-
4 
create the objectively lost being." 
Bereyaev sees the most glaring inconsistency in Kant 1 s thought in 
the idea that while man is free and an end in himself, the ''moral la:w" 
in which his ethical system is centered is based on 
man 1 s moral and rational nature which is the same in 
all; it is not in the least interested in the concrete 
living man as such, in his destiny, in his moral experi-
ence and spiritual conflicts.5 
It is the non-personal moral law rather than man which is autonomous 
6 
for Kant. 
1. BE, PP• 155-156. 
2. Ibid., P• 10. 
3. TR, P• 76 and BE, P• 13. In TR, P• 76, Berdyaev interprets Kant 1 s 
concept of freedom as being based on creatiVity rather than on mere 
moralism, but he also thinks that Kant failed to recognize the full 
significance of creativit.Y's relationship to freedom. 
4. Filosof~a svobod:r .. (untranslated), P• 23. Cited by Spinka, NBCF,p. 73. 
5. DY, P• 9 • 6. Ibid., P• 81. Cf. George Seaver, Nicolas Berdyaev: An Introduction 
toliis Thought (N.Y.: Harper, 1950), PP• 29-30. 
20 
There is also the criticism that Kant substitutes philosophy for 
religion or that he makes religion "arid (and] abstractly moralistic 
••• substituting for the living saviour a dead categorical impera-
1 
tive. 11 
ii. Hegel 
Hegel is mentioned many times in Berdyaev's writings, often with 
negative criticism, but sometimes with approval. Berdyaev considers 
the dialectical method as Hegel's finest contribution. In this going 
beyond the stiff concepts of formal logic, he transforms idealism into 
2 
a kin1 o:f realism. In Hegel 1 s O'Wil terms, logic moves on the level of 
reason ani not only that o:f understarrling. In a dialectical philosophy, 
such as Hegel's or Berdyaev's, as the laws of logic are subsumed under 
3 
the dialectic, they become dynamic. In both o:f these philosophers, 
4 
the dialectic is not only logical but existential. Developnent comes 
through contradiction and resolution on a higher plane than the original 
5 
contradicti on. Though Berdyaev is critical o:f the monism which he 
:finds in Hegel's thought, he notes that it is "redeemed by his vision 
6 
o:f a dialectic and a struggle o:f opposites at the heart o:f ~stance." 
Berdyaev also admires Hegel's emphasis on the central place of 
spirit in his philosophy. Berdyaev credits Hegel w.ith the first formu-
7 
lation of a true philosophy of spirit. For both, spirit is dom~nant 
1. Sub specie aeternitatis (untranslated), P• 291. Cited by Spinka, 
NBCF, P• 73. 
2. MCA, p. 50 and BE, P• 23. 
3. BE, p. 24. 
4. Ibid., P• 77 • 5. Ibid., P• 24; FS, P• 312; and DH, PP• 196-197. 
6. DR, P• 87 • 
7. SR, p. 26. 
21 
over nature and is the point of synthesis for nature and reason. 
"Spirit is the unity of subject and object, of the self and nature, 
1 
of the process of thinking and the outlook which results from it. 11 
Yet Berdyaev criticizes Hegel's concept of freedom, stating that 
Hegel's spirit, as the logos penetrating all relationships, does not 
give man true freedom ~om other men a:nd/or God. For Hegel spirit is 
universal and monistic; for Berdyaev it is personal and pluralistic, 
having its reality in separate persons. For Hegel relationship is 
2 
within; for Berdyaev it is between or among. 
One of the major categories of spirit for Hegel is "objective 
spirit, 11 but Berdyaev c81J.s this a contradiction in tenns. He com-
plains that 
in objective spirit there can be no communion with God, 
no love, no freedom, no fathomless impulse. It is essen-
tially deterministic~ • • mistakenly identified with an 
independent reality.J 
In his concept, Hegel objectifies that Which by nature is subjective. 
For Berdyaev, "spirit can be incarnated and symbolized but it never 
5 
becomes objective." 
1i 
Hegel is right in his connection of spirit with history, but he 
is wrong in his relation of freedom to spirit and history. Spirit 
does not develop consistently either in general or in histor,y--indeed 
consistent development precludes freedom, which for Berdyaev is the 
1 .. BE, p. 24.. Cf. excellent summarizing discussion of Hegel's thought 
in FS, P• 17. 
2. SR, pp. 26-27. On p. 27, Berdyaev writes: "Hegel is a universalist 
who fails to apprehend the mystery of the personality and of the 
relationship of one personal spirit to another. 11 
3. Ibid., P• 4$. 
4. DH, p. 129. Cf. SF, P• 77. 
$. SR, p. 38. 
• 
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1 
essential element of history. The problem here goes back to the co~-
flicting interpretations of spirit as monistic or -pluralistic. For 
example, in Hegel's concept of the "cunning of reason11 which operates 
in history, it is not the indiVidual man who possesses freedom, but a 
larger force such as the "Universal Spirit 11 or the "Spirit of History." 
This "Universal Spirit" is not static but dynamic, but individual men 
do not possess freedom and power within the movement. For Hegel his-
tory 11is a conflict in which human beings are moved by universal forces, 
2 
by the universal spirit, and freedom is the child of necessity." 
Hegel's characterization of freedom as a derivative of necessity 
is a major point of disagreement for Berdyaev. Freedom is simply not 
3 
freedom if it is contained in universal process or if it arises from 
necessity. Berdyaev states that "freedom is not, as Hegel maintained, 
the creature of necessity; just the reverse, necessity is the creature 
4 
of freedom." Freedom is primary for Berdyaev, and in his thinking, 
life, history, and knowledge arise from it; for Hegel freedom is sec-
ondary. 11With Hegel freedom is not a cause of development, it is a 
1. FS, P• 312; SF, p. 12; SR, PP• L.6-47; DH, P• 130. 
2. BE, p. 145. Cf. the following statement, from SF, p. 256: "Hegel 
was, so to speak, a philosophical incarnation of the spirit of 
history •••• To him history was the conquering march of the spirit 
towards freedom. And although the category of freedom played an 
immense role with Hegel and he even defined spirit as freedom, his 
philosophy was a consistent and radical determinism. • • • Hegel 
wanted t.o instil into man the judgment that slavery to history is 
freedom. The influence of Hegel 1 s historiolatry was immense, in a 
notable degree it determined Marxism too, which al~?o has been seduced 
by historical necessity. To history, Hegel subordinated not only 
man, . but God-God is the creation of history--there is such a thing 
as diVine becoming. At the same time this means that it is necessary 
to bow down before the conquerors of history, to acknowledge the 
rightness of everyone who triumphs. 11 
3. Towards a New Epoch, trans. Oliver Fielding Clarke (London: Bles, 
1949), P• 10. . 4. DR, P• 47. In SF, p. 60, Berdyaev writes: "In the objectivized world 
result of development. Freedom is the outc0me of necessity, it is 
1 
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recognized necessity." Freedom for Ber~yaev is deep and chaotic, giv-
ing rise to all sorts of possibilities. Using Hegel's terms, for Ber-
2 
dyaev non-being precedes being, while for Hegel being is primary. 
3 
After being and nothing, the synthesis of becoming is possible. Though 
Berdyaev accepts the idea of "becoming" as arising out of contradic-
4 
tions, it seems that his concept of contradictions is different from 
Hegel's. Berdyaev agrees that there must be non-being in order for 
5 
becoming to arise, but for Hegel the step from non-being to becoming 
6 
is, according to Berdyaev, logical rather than creative. 
Referring again to freedom, Hegel and Berdyaev find another point 
of agreement in that one may be free even though he is bodily captive 
and subject to physical violence and imprisonment. It is inward, not 
outward freedom vmich is essential freedom. As Berdyaev states: 
A man who is put in prison or executed, although submit-
ted to material violence can, after all, remain in an 
inner sense mentally free and independent. A martyr 
is a free being, but a man who has consented to having 
his personality moulded by psychological pressure ends 
man can be only relatively, not absolutely free, and his freedom 
presupposes conflict and resistance to necessity, ~mich he ought 
to overcome. But ' freedom presupposes a spiritual principle in man 
which offers resistance to enslaving necessity. The freedom which 
is the result of necessity will not be real freedom, it is only an 
element in the dialectic of necessity. Hegel in actual fact knew 
nothing o:f real :freedom. 11 C:f. TNE, p. 78 and SF, p. 79, where Ber-
dyaev says that 11Hegel's philosophy is absolutely hostile to freedom. 11 
1. DH, P• 52. 
2. See infra, Chap. III, Sec. 2, Sub-Sec. i. 
3. G.Vf.F. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel Translated from the Encyclopedia of 
the Philosophical Sciences, trans. W. vVallace (2nd ed., rev.; London: 
Oxford University Press, l}89gJ 1950), PP• 166-169. 
4. DH, p;, 195. 
5. Ibid. ' p. 64. 
6. BE, PP• 161-162. 
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by being a slave. Material violence deman:ls no assent 
on the part of him who suffers it and still permits the 
existence of interior freedom. If a tyrant, for example, 
condemns me to be shot I am in no vray forced to aliandon 
the freedom of my spirit, but the dictator, who worships 
force, desires above all else to do psychological violence 
to the souls of men, physical viol~ce being only the 
weapon of psychological constraint. 
As a personalist, Berdyaev gives the greatest significance to the in-
dividual person. He criticizes Hegel's emphasis on the primacy of the 
2 
conmiuni ty over persou. In Hegel's thought, man 1 s freedom seems to 
3 4 
be denied and his individuality crushed. In the Hegelian concept of 
the state "the pernicious effects of ••• impersonalisrn are particu-
5 
larly manifest." Berdyaev sees this antipersonalist trend in phi-
losophy as begun by Hegel, to be carried on by Marx, Feuerbach, and 
6 
others. 
Berdyaev also levels at Hegel the typical~ existentialist criti-
cism of "system-building, 11 stating that 
a philosopher cannot create a philosophical system with-
out reality, without the word. To do so he would have 
to be God, the Creator of the world. This is what Hegel 
ventured to do. 7 
iii. Nietzsche 
Nietzsche is often mentioned in B~aev 1 s writings, and it is 
1. TNE, p. 3. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind~ trans. J.B. 
Baillie (2nd ed., rev.; London: Allen and Unwin, 1931), pp. 244-
246. Here Hegel says that the stoic is free inasmuch as he has 
inward self-determination. 
2. BE, pp. 134-135. Cf. DM, p. 58 and The Fate of Man in the Modern 
World, trans. Donald Lowrie (Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co., 
1935), pp. 3-4. 
3. SS, PP• 39-40. 
4. DH, P• 32. 
5. SS, P• 168. 
6. ccw, p. 42; and "Marx Versus Man. 11 Religion in LifeL ~(1938), P• 486. 
7. DM, P• 66. 
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interesting to note how Berdyaev often speaks of him and Yarx com-
paratively, stating that very often they stand on opposite sides of 
1 
a question. Both Mar.x and Nietzsche are considered as humanists, 
and for both the ordinary man 1a a se(:Ondary value. While Marx 
places the collective above man and loses the significance of man 
2 
within the collective, Nietzsche places superman above man. Ordi-
nary man is weak and degraded. Man at his best aspires to become 
superman a.rrl to conquer his "lower self. 11 Here the value of human 
personality as such is lost sight of. The 11super-humanism11 which re-
places God as ultimate power and value is degraded into its opposite, 
3 
antihumanism. AB man strives to become superman, he is driven by 
the will to power, which Berdyaev characterizes as "insatiable imperi-
. 4 
alism. 11 He does not know "free w:Ul nor • • • the will to freedom. 11 
In its scorn for sympathy, the will to power does not improve man, 
but enslaves him, opposing his freedom and dignity, and causing him 
5 
to do violence to others. 
But there are ptiints at which Berdyaev agrees with Nietzsche; 
6 
for example, both emphasize creativeness and aristocratism. Be~aev 
1. A friend of Berdyaev 1s, Dr. Nils Ellrenstrom, relates the story of 
Berdyaev's tryptych, containing pictures of Jesus, Marx, and Nietzsche--
"those who had greatest influence on Berdyaev''-which Berdyaev kept 
at his desk. Marx is not discussed here because he will be included 
in the later section on communism. 
2. "The Crisis of Christianity." Christendom, 2(1937), P• 239. 
J. n The End of the Renaissance. 11 Slavonic Review, . (1925) • Cited by 
Spinka, RBCF, P• 77. 
4. SF, P• 6). 
5. FMMW, P• 24 and SF, P• 64. _ 
6. DH, pp. 34-40. This section develops !3erdyaev 1s most extensive 
single analysis of Nietzsche. cr. Bert Charles Williams, "Berdyaev's 
Ihilosophy or History' II P• 147 rn. 
• 
• 
J, 
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says that for Nietzsche, as for himself, truth is 11 a creatable value 
1 
••• rather than a merely passive reflection." Truth is not, for 
Nietzsche, as for Marx, based on general well-being; it is aristocratic. 
Both Marx and Nietzsche emphasize man's creativeness; Marx stresses 
man's creating of goods, while Nietzsche is concerned with his creating 
3 
of values. Values are created by the aristocrat or the superman. At 
his creative best, man may become an "aristocratic radical." Berd.yaev 
4 
claims that he and Nietzsche may be so designated. 
3. Berdyaev 1s Existentialism 
5 
Berdyaev often speaks of himself as an existentialist. At the 
core of his position is the idea of man as subject with priority over 
objects. Subjection to the general or necessary is interpreted as loss 
of freedom, freedom being the greatest attribute and value for the sub-
ject. According to Berdyaev, the most authentic knowledge of the world 
is obtained through an existential 11 antinomic-paradox:ical type of think-
ing [whic~ truly corresponds to the structure of the world, and even 
6 
to the final depths of being. 11 In the expression "existential dialec-
7 
2 
tic" the idea of a dynamic struggle through unsolved and perhaps unsolv-
able polarities is emphasized. Rejecting the primaqy of the objectified 
1. TR, P• 37 • 
2. Ibid., P• 35 • 
3. RSRC, P• 89. 
4. BE, p~ vi. 
5. FS, P• 70 and TR, P• 146. 
6. "Christian Optimism and Christian Pessimism." Christendom, 1(1936), 
P• 417 • 7. DH, p. vii. The "existential dialectic" is more a "symbol" for the 
movement of life than a method of logic for Berdyaev. 
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lmowledge given in rationalism an::l empiricism, Berdyaev finds that 
knowledge at its most significant level "expresses the existentiality 
of the cognitive mind rather than being something abstracted from that 
1 
existentiali ty. 11 The basis of reality as interpreted by the exist en-
tialist is not essence or substance but freedom and existence. 
i. Truth 
As an existentialist, Be~aev interprets truth as subjective 
rather than objective. It is said to be "created in the subject; • 
2 
not given objectively from without." Since it is "not given in a 
ready-made and finished form," nor is it "an objective state, nor can 
3 
it be apprehen:ied like an object," knowledge of it necessitates man's 
spiritual creative activity. 11It is given only in the creative act. 
4 
Truth is not being and being is not truth. Truth is life. 11 As dynamic 
rather than static, truth may be symbolized by movement toward an ever-
5 
infinite infinity. 
Since it is not an object, an attribute of an object, nor reality, 
Truth is better characterized as the meaning or Logos of that which 
6 
exists. It is not necessa.ri.ly easily useful; it mq be difficult, 
7 
"revolutionary, 11 "anarchical," or "destructive." The pragmatic inter-
pretation of truth is said to be over-optimistic and to lead man to 
8 
"accept the useful lie as truth." For Berdyaev, truth is not some-
L. TR, P• 12. 
2. DH, P• vi. Cf. DR, P• 54 and FS, P• 143. 
3. SS, P• 203. 
4. SF, P• 81. 
5. TR, P• 22. 
6. Ibid., P• 23 and BE, P• 43. 
7. SR, P• 62 and BE, P• 48. 
8. TR, P• 30. Cf. RSRC, P• 21. 
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thing which is of merely "practical" service to the world; it is the 
1 
supreme value, and its usefulness iRq be somewhat obscure. 
The identification of Truth With the truths established by general 
2 
validity or objectification as in science is to be avoided, but the 
relative value of truths is not to be overlooked. An excellent B1lDIDlary 
of Berdyaev 1s differentiation between knowledge and truth is given in 
The Beginning and the Ehd: 
Knowledge within the objectified world does admittedly 
reveal truths. 'lhere is a reflected light in it which 
helps us to take our bearings in the darkness of this 
world, but it does not reveal the pri.mary and original 
Truth which is the beginning arrl the end. It is science, 
not philosopny, which is the discoverer of principles 
and lalt"S which give men their bearings within reality. 
But supreme Truth is eschatological and by this TeJ:T 
fact exposes the conventional lie of pr~tism, the 
falsehood of an optimistic cult of life. . 
ii. Freedom-Being dualism 
There is an emphasis on dualism in BerdyU1,'ts thought, but rather 
than a dualism of spirit and matter it is a dualism of freedom and 
4 
necessity. Berdyaev notes that a spirit-matter dualism may recognize 
an independent existence of matter, while he sees matter exists only 
because it can and must be dependent on spirit. As an existentialist, 
he also rejects "ontological metaphysics, 11 sqing that such a meta-
5 
physics "freezes ••• everything it touches. 11 He makes several criti- . 
cisms of such philosophT: 
1. TR, P• 31. 
2. RSRC, PP• 21-30; BE, P• 46; and SF, P• ll6. 
3. BE, P• 49. 4. TNE, P• ll. Of. the following statement in SF, P• 249: liThe funda-
mental anti thesis is not between spirit and matter, but between 
freedom and slavery." 
5. DR, p. 287. Of. TR, P• 68. 
Spirit exercises a primac,y over being, the primaa,y of 
freedom. An ontologically oriented Weltanschaaung is 
static, whereas a pneuma. to logically oriented one is dy-
namic. Existential philosophy is not ontological philo-
sophy in the traditional sense of the word.l 
Ontological philosophy is not a philosophy of freedom. 
Freedom cannot have its source in being, nor be deter-
mined by being; it cannot enter into a system of onto-
logical determinism. Freedom does not suffer the de-
termining power of being, nor that of the reason. When 
Hegel says that the truth of necessity is freedom he 
denies the primary nature ~f freedom and entirely sub-
ordinates it to necessity. 
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3 
Freedom, which is characterized as "not ontic but meonic" is the 
primary basis of reality, while being is secondary. Berdyaev points 
out that if being is pri.m.a.ry while freedom is derivative, then freedom. 
is limited, and determinism (disguised though it mq be) holds ~ 
4 
over freedom. For Berdyaev, it is being which "comes to light after 
the division between subject and object; [as] ••• the product of 
5 
rationalization." Being is derivative from freedom. 
It has been noted that objectification suppresses personality and 
freedom; it may be said that freedom and objectification are antitheti-
6 
cal. Being is also identified with objectification; it is called "the 
1 
objectivization of existence." An "ontol<bgical. metaphysics" suggests 
a more or less "finished" reality, one in which potentiality is con-
tained within or derived directly- from what is given as actual. For 
1. SR, P• 31. 
2. BE, P• 104. 
3. Ibid., P• 111. 
4. 'ibid., PP• 104, lll. 
5. Dlr,""p. 15. 
6. TR, P• 14. 
7. RI, P• 244. Until this point, "objectification" has generally been 
used. It seems that Berdyaev (or his translators) use "objectifica-
tion" and 11objectivization" interchangeably. 
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Berdyaev, Whose philosophy is based on freedom and creativeness, neither 
the world nor man exist w1 th the stabilized order which a "thorough-go-
1 
1ng ontologism" would postulate. For him, man is furrlamentally free. 
"To admit the free agency of the existential subject in the intellectual 
2 
sphere is to uphold • • • the primacy of freedom over Being. 11 
iii. Ontology 
Though Berdyaev claims that he opposes "ontological philosophy," 
he has his own kind of ontology. He does not interpret phenomena either 
as mere illusion or as a smooth and regular revelation of' noumena. For 
him phenomenal and noumenal are related, but it is a kind of 11eschato-
logiea111 relation, 'Where spirit and. freedom "break into 11 the phenomenal 
3 
in an interrupted and often startling fashion. 'lhere is a kiDI of be-
ing "behind" the world we see--a being which is "action and not sub-
4 
stance, movement and not immobility, life and not thing." Berdyaev 
speaks of the "thing-in-itself" not as the cause of appearance behind 
. 5 
an object but as freedom behind the subject. Knowledge of the "thing~ 
in-itself" is not possible through reason only, but through the existen-
6 
tial nature of the subject. Nothing can be known per se as an abstract 7 -
concept, but eve:eything is known in relation. 
Though Berdyaev would agree that there may be a logical (i.e. 
"generic, universally conunon, objective") basis of reality, he would 
see this logical foundation as proceeding from subjective action. As 
1. BE, PP• 159-16o, 171.. · 
2. SS, P• 76. 
5. BE, p. 16. 
6. Ibid., P• 15; SS, P• 58. 
3. :BE;: P• 28. 7. BE, P• 77 • 
4. FS, P• 2. 
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he states it: "Deeper than the ideal logical foundations of 110rld reality, 
1 
lies the act through which all reality exists." 
4. Berdyaev's Personalism 
For Berdyaev, who often speaks of himself as a personalist, the 
person is at the center of all his philosophy. The most significant attri-
butes of any person, regardless of the "metaphysical inequality among 
2 
human beings in accordance with their individual gifts, 11 are freedom 
and creative··pow-er. The individual, possessing these in himself, gives 
3 
"the very possibility of a personalist philosopcy. 11 
Berdyaev is a pluralist rather than a monist, as he sees freedom 
and creativeness as prim.ary" attributes of persons. He repudiates monis-
tic philosophy: 
In all monistic, optimistic and rationalistic types of 
thought man is, in fact, suppressed, and becomes a mirror 
and a victim of 'objective' UI1J1ealtty. My whole philos-
ophy may be put in relief w.i. th references • • • towards 
all monistic tendencies, on the one hand, [nhich I oppose] 
and to my radical personalism on the other. 
For him, the individual is not a part of the universal; he includea the 
universal. "I cannot live within a 'great whole, 1 the 'great whole' 
5 
ought to l i ve in me," writes Berdyaev. For him, as an existentialist 
and a personalist, individual "personality is more primary than (univer-
6 
s aJ.J being." In Berdyaev 1s personaLism, the person is not an isolated 
1. Ibid., P• 125. 
2. Ibid., P• 226. 
3. ss,-p. b9. 
4. DR, P• 96. 
5. BE, P• 229. 
6. SF, p~ 75 and Clarke, ITB, PP• 79-84. Cf • SS, P• 31. 
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atom, but a being who exists in community. One does not see all others 
as objects and only himself as subject; others are also recognized a.s 
l 
subjects. The true person goes be,yond his ego in his quest for value: 
Personality is empty unless it is filled With supra-per-
sonal values and qualities, unless by means of creative 
acts it moves outwards and upwards be,yond its own confines, 
unless it triumphs over itself and in so doing realizes 
itsel£.2 
For Berd.yaev, personalism is not so much a system as 
an attitude or theme expressing a search for the trans-
formation of the objective world into a personal uni-
verse-an attitude in 'Which the human person is the 
principal object and the irreducible subject of knowledge.3 
i. The nature of personality 
Writing of Berdyaev's personalism, Seaver states that personality 
4 
"is the man himself" rather than a mere attribute of man. As such, 
personality "is not a co-ordination of parts: it is an original unity." 
As Stern's unitas complex, to which Berd.yaev refers in Solitude and 
Society, personality is an integral whole, an end in itself, and a 
6 
center uniting change and changelessness. Personality as the unity 
of spirit, soul, and body rises above the determinism of the natural. 
1. a:. Seaver, NBIT, p. 45 and Clarke, ITB, P• 91. 
2. BE, P• 130. 
3. DR, P• 274. 
4. Seaver, NBIT, P• 73. 
5. "Marx Versus Man," p. 484. 
6. ss, p. 164. Berdyaev criticizes Stern for being a rationalist rather 
than an existentialist, though he finds that he expresses a valuable 
concept. cr. Berdyaev's statements in "Marx Versus _. Ma.n," P• 484; 
RSRC, p. 163 ("Personality implies a union of change nth changeless-
ness. " ) ; and SF, p. 8 ('Personality is changelessness in change. ") 
A very similar statement in Borden P. Bawne 's Metaphysics . (2nd ed. , 
rev.; N.Y. : Harper, 1898), p. 63, indicates how basic this premise is 
for personalistic philosophy: "In personality, or in the sel.f-con-
seio"-s spirit, we find the only union of change and permanence, or of 
identity and diversity." 
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world. Each personality, though primary' in itself, is not completed 
merely as an "I," but must transcend the "I" and meet others in com-
munity. Personality, which exists in community, is different from 
2 
indiViduality which exists in itself. 
In community, personality brings about a "union of the one and 
3 
the m8D7.~· n Personality is neither simply the sum of parts, nor is 
4 
it onlY part of a whole. In a sense a person is complete within him-
self, yet he must seek relationships with others in order to be fully 
5 
realized. 
6 
There is no such thing as a "collective personal! ty, n for per-
sonality cannot be characterized as ''being" or "object." There is a 
rational element w.i.thin personality, but this rationality is worked 
out within the person rather than being his obedience to or determina-
7 
tion by an impersonal reason. Personality interrupts the given order: 
Personality is like nothing else in the world. • • • 
When a person enters the world, a unique and unrepeat-
able personal! ty, then the 110rld process is broken into 
and compelled to change its course, in spite of the 
fact that outwardly there is no sign of this. Person-
ality finds no place in the continuous complex process 
of world life; it cannot be a moment or an element in 
the evolution of the world. The existence of person-
ality presupposes interruptBon; it is inexplicable by 
any sort of uninterruption. 
1. SF, P• 32. 
2. Ibid., p. 32 and ss, pp. 159-160, 174. Note especially Berdyaev's 
reference to Maritain (SS, P• 159). Buber, I and Thou, P• 62, makes 
the same distinction between the person and the indiVidual. 
J. SF, P• 49. 
4. BE, pp. 129, 136. 
5. SF, PP• 20-21 and SS, P• 173. 
6. SF, P• 27. 
7. Ibid., PP• 24, 94. 
8. Ibid., P• 21. 
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If it were not for this power springing up in persons, civilization 
would grow into conformity and enslavement. "The completely socialized 
and ci vilized man may be entirely impersonal; he may be a slave and 
1 
not notice that he is. 11 
2 
Thus creativity is an essential attribute of personality. Crea-
tivity springs from man, as he must work in order "to realize person-
. 3 
ality. 11 God creates man as personality, willing that .man is to be 
4 
creative himself. 
ii. The nature of spirit 
Berdyaev seems to consider spirit as nearly synonymous with per-
sonality. Like personality, spirit is identified with freedom and 
creativity rather than with beings 
Spirit is not being, but the existent, that Which exists 
and possesses true existence, and it is not subject to 
determination by any being at all. Spirit is not a prin-
ciple, but personality, in other words the highest form 
of existence. 5 
Spirit is not to be characterized as an overriding power in which in-
dividuals are absorbed, or an energizing force whieh unites individuals 
1. Ibid., p. 26. 
2. See the following statements in the article, "Marx Versus Man, 11 
p. 485: "Personality postulates the creative nature in man. It 
postulates freedom, since true creativeness is that wrought in 
liberty. Creativeness is the opposite of evolution which is deter-
minism •••• The basic paradox lies in this, that to arrive at the 
creativeness which is personality, it must both exist alre~ and 
be eternally created." Cf. SF, p. 24, Where Berdyaev writes, "Per-
sonality is not substance but ••• a creative act." 
3. SF, P• 246. 4. See ss, P• 162, where Berdyaev says, "The personality is the reali-
zation within the natural individual of his ~~ of the divine pur-
pose concerning him." Cf. DR, P• 303 and FS, P• 16. 
5. BE, P• 103. 
1 
(e.g. "the spirit of a nation"). 
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Spirit is one in kind, but exists in many centers. As Seaver 
states, "Spirit is all, but its manifestations are as many as the en-
2 
tities which embody it." The integrated personality as spirit con-
3 
flicts with external determinism; it embodies freedom rather than 
being. 
Spirit is revolutionary in the world; it is revealed 
in freedom, justice, love, creativeness, intuitive 
knowledge rather than in objectified structures-in 
short, in existential eubjectivity rather than in ob-
jectivity.4 
Spirit cannot be completely characterized rationally; it cannot 
be defined as "an immediately perceivable phenomenon, an object among 
5 
other objects." It must be known subjectively and existentially in 
6 
personal existence and is best expressed in s,ymbols, not concepts. 
7 
Though enslavement to a social system is a "spiritual phenomenon, 11 
inasmuch as it is a failure of man's spirit in its struggle against de-
terminism, spirit at its creative best opposes 11social stagnation or 
8 
any lifeless tradition." As the "divine element in man ••• insepa-
9 
rable from the human element, 11 spirit symbolizes God existing in man 
1. SR, p. 38. Spirit for Berdyaev is not "objective" or "absolute. 11 
This would imply a renunciation of per sonality. In Berdyaev's 
thought, spirit "transcends • • • objectification. 11 (See SR, p. 199) • 
2. Seaver, NBIT, P• 44. 
3•. SF, P• 248. 4 SR, P• 188. Cf. SR, P• 33. 
5. Ibid., p:p. 1 1 afui. 32. 
6. Ibid., p. 12 and DH, P• 16. Spirit as defined by vitalism is too 
iiUcli a ''biological n concept according to Berdyaev. He would sa;y that 
spirit is life, but more than biological life. (See SR, P• 14.) 
7. SF, P• 96. 
8. SR, P• 52. 
9. ~., P• 41. Cf. FS, P• 12. 
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and man reaching toward God. It is more like 11Heracli tean fire and 
1 
energy" than "Parmenidean substance.n 
iii. Man as a prima.ry reality and value 
At the core of Berdyaev' s philosophy is the person who lives his 
2 
"own integral existence," beyond and independent of social process. 
Man is called the 11noumenalJ" he is 11no fragment of ••• the objec-
tive world, but ••• a being in his own right, situated in the extra 
3 
objective ••• 110rld, in the very core of his own existence. 11 Putting 
the free person rather than "Being" at the center of Reality, Berdyaev 
states that 
Reality in its primordial character and originality 
cannot ••• be described as undifferentiated Being 
or essence or ousia. Ort·ginal reality is creative act 
and freedom, and the bearer of original reality is the 
person ••• rather than Being.4 
The indivildu.ally personal is most real, most existential and most uni-
versal. This is often better understood by mystics than by philosophers, 
as the latter, particularly those of naturalistic, positivistic, or mate-
rialistic bent seem to lose the integral image of man in his acts and/or 
5 
surroundings. Personality is the supreme value for Be~aev. He writes 
that ''personality is a wholeness and unity possessing absolute ani eter-
6 
nal worth, 11 and that "personality has unconditional value •••• No ab-
1. FS, PP• 12-15. 
2. "The Crisis of Christianity, 11 p. 237. 
3. SS, P• 43. Cf. BE, P• 249. 
4. DR, p. 286. Cf. the statement in BE, P• 98: "Being and becoming must 
have a living carrier, a subject, a concrete living entity. That 
which concretely exists is more profound than value and comes before 
it, and existence goes deeper than being. " 
5. F.MMW, P• 30; BE, P• 45; and SF, P• 75. 
6. DY, P• 55. 
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1 
stract idea of the good can be put above personality. n Each person 
has not only "equal value'' (which would be attainable on the purely 
social level), but each has absolute value on an extra-social level. 
There is no greater value than a person. Personality, then, should 
3 
never be a means to an end. 
(1) The complex nature of man. Because man's spiritual nature 
2 
lacks the "objectiveness" of his corporeal nature, it is difficult to 
know and to express exactly man's essential nature. As non-objective, 
the spiritual man cannot be interpreted as dualistically opposed to 
the corporeal man. Berdyaev thinks of man as three-fold, including 
4 
spiritual, psychic, and corporeal natures, but these several natures 
are not in separated "lumps" but are in and through each other. Seaver 
makes a compact summary of Berdyaev 1s widely scattered discussions: 
Man is spirit, incarnate in a fleshly vehicle of soul 
and sense. Spirit, the dynamic principle in man, is 
divine; it is the reality ••• of man. All that is 
psychical in man is the manifestation of that divine 
principle in human guise; it is the vesture and vehicle 
of spirit. So, too, all that is sensuous and physical 
in man is the integument and instrwnent of soul. There 
is no more antithesis between spirit and soul than there 
is between soul and sense, or than there is between life 
and the matter which it animates • .5 
(i) The meeting of the natural and the spiritual in man. Hav-
ing a complex nature, man is characterized by Berdyaev as 
the point where two spheres intersect, ••• and he 
belongs to two different orders •••• For this reason 
••• human life is infinitely complex and difficult • 
• • • The same individual is both spiritual and natural.6 
1. Ibid., p.l07. Cf.SS,p. 176 • 
2. MCA, P• 289. 
3. SF, P• 39. 
4. SR, P• .5 • 
.5. Seaver, NBIT,p.21; S~p.6; SF, P• 3.5. 
6. FS, P• 27. 
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Though he is, as it were, created in the image of God, man is also im-
. 1 
mersed in the natural 'WOrld. He cannot escape this natural entangle-
ment, but he can bring the spiritual to bear upon it, thus transf'igur-
2 
ing and freeing it. Man cannot be fully understood or realized if he 
stays only within the natural or social dimension. 
The complete realization of the personality can only 
take place on an extra-natural plane--on a plane of 
spiritual freedom, of communion and love.3 
(ii) Man as microcosm and microtheos • . Berdy'aev often uses the 
expressions microcosm and microtheos in referring to man. Through his 
lmowledge of man, the philosopher moves on to knowledge of the nature 
4 
of the cosmos and of God. Man starts with himself and then comes to 
5 
know the world; he cannot reverse the process. This is particularly 
t.rue in philosophy, for lVhile in scient.if'ic knowledge the world may be 
analyzed apart from man, "philosophy UJ t.he inner perception of the 
6 
world through man." It follows that 
comprehension of the mystery of the world in human exis-
tence is a possibility only because man is a microcosm 
and mierotheos. There is no cosmos in the object world 
of phenomena. There is no God in the objective world 
order, but there is a cosmos in man. God is in mSJt, and 
through man there is a way out into another world. 
1. The Meaning of Histo~, t.rans. George Reavey (umdon: Bles, 1945), 
P• SO. Cf. MCA, P• ·ane DM, PP• 21, 58. 
2. FS, P• 62 and SS, P• 23. 
3. SS·, P• 260. Cf. MCA, P• 61 and SF, P• 37. 
4. See Berdyaev 1s st.atement in MCA, p. 59: "Man is a small universe--
that is t.he basic truth for knowing man, and the basic truth which 
precedes the very possibility of knowing. 11 Williams, in "Berdyaev 1 s 
lh.ilosophy of History, 11 p. 218, makes a similar point, stating that 
"man is a part of u1 timate reality, and by a study of his inner be-
ing the clue to the meaning of everything else can be discovered." 
5. MCA, p. 57. 
6. Ibid., P• 60. 
7. ~p. 40. 
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1 
''An irmer kinship between the knower and the lmown11 makes knowledge 
possible. 
Moving through self-knowledge to knowledge of God and the cosmos, 
man finds that he strives towards infinity 'Which seems potential yet 
always beyond reach. He comes to think of God as working through the 
2 
same process. He comes to see in God's activity the same conflict 
between freedom and slavery and the creativity he knows in his own ex-
3 
perience. 
It is man's duty to ureveal 11 God to the world through his own 
4 5 
creativity. He thus becomes the "center of reality," for without 
him the vital link between God and the world would be missing. If the 
image of the world rather than the image of God is dominant in him, 
man fails in his crucial role. 
(2) Man as creative. In his first major work, 'lhe Meaning o:f the 
Creative Act, . Berdyaev pointed to man's creativeness as his primary 
duty and way to realization. Man as dynamic and creative is of a higher 
6 
order than the perfect but static angels, and creativeness is of :far 
7 
greater value than happiness. Berdyaev writes that "true life is crea-
8 
tion and this is the only life which is liOrth the living." With free-
dom comes man's ability and duty to create. Man as creative is man as 
microtheos; he creates through his own power an::l initiative, and does 
1. DM, P• 13. Cf. MCA, P• 52. 
2. BE, P• 76. 
3. SF, P• 131 and MCA, P• 156. 
4. MCA, PP• 69, 321. 
5. Ibid., P• 76. 
6. lbici., P• 73 
1. DM, P• 82 and MCA, P• 90. 
8. DR, P• 284. 
1 
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not merely re.flect something "given from above." Explaining the re-
lationship between God as Creator and man as creator, Berdyaev writes, 
11 llie Creator gives to man, to his own image ani likeness, free creative 
power. Man's creativity is like that of God-not equal and not identi-
2 
cal, but resembling it." In his creativity man participates in the 
work or God, mt in obedience, but in freedom. In "the free power to 
reveal himself in creative action, (there] is placed within man • • • 
a • • • sign or his likeness to God, • • • a mark of' the Creator • s 
3 
image." 
(i) ihe creative act~ . What does man's creative act presuppose? 
Most importantly, it presupposes a depth of' freedom within the one who 
is creating. Berdyaev states that "creatiVity is inseparable from Free-
4 
dom. 11 '.Ibis freedom is not limited to a given framework within which 
s 
man m~ operate, but it is deep and mysterious. With the creative act 
6 
comes a sense of power and a sense of' bringing into being something 
absolutely new. Creativity is mastery of' the given, but it is not only 
"an 'insertion' in the finite ••• rather it is a flight into the in-
7 
finite. 11 It includes eschatological elements or breaking into the pre-
sent and of going beyond it so that a break with life here and now seems 
8 
possible and/or imminent. Besides this pointing to the "beyond, 11 the 
1. MCA, P• 95. 
2. ~., P• 136. 
3. Ibid., P• 99. 
4. Ibid., P• lLh. 5. Clarke, ITB, P• 96; MCA, P• 145; DM, P• 66; and DM, P• 32, where he 
writes that a 11prior-to-being.D freedom "springing from the pre-exis-
tential abyss is present in every creative act of' man." 
6. MCA, P• 13. 
1. DR, P• 209. 
8. Ibid., P• 214. 
1 
creative act brings an "ecstasy of the moment." 
Man as creative depends not only on the depths of freedom just 
mentioned, but also on his "gifts from the Creator" and on nthe world 
2 
as a field for activity. 11 Berdyaev would say that nothing man does is 
a 11 pure 11 creative act, but the creative element of any act is its prop-
3 
erty of not being wholly determined by its medium or envirornnent. For 
example, creativity, •mich by its nature derives from freedom and per-
4 
sonality, is incompatible with evolution or emanation, both of which de-
rive from necessity or the "give~' and are not creativebut determined. 5 
6 
Creativeness penetrates and predominates all of life and culture. 
It stands alone as a primary value, 11neither permitted nor justified 
7 
by religion-creativeness is itself religion." It symbolizes the 
priority of subject over object, showing man not only as rebelling 
negatively against nature, but as positively transcending it. 
The creative act reveals the absolute priority of ~he 
1self, 1 the subject, over the 'non-self,' the object; 
but at the same time, it strikes at the root of the ego-
centric, for it is eminently a movement of self-trans-
cendence. • • • Creative experience is not characterized 
by absorption in one's own perfection or imperfection: 
• • • it is individual and indeed rebellious in nature, 
involving conflict between man and his environment, yet 
it is ••• at the opposite pole of self-sufficiency, 
raising man to a vision of • • • infinite reality. 8 
1. SF, p. 2.53. 
2. DM, p. 127. Cf. Fichte's concept of man's freedom as primary, but 
operating within the objective sphere of nature. Fichte sees the 
~o as limited by the objective world~ yet the Ego is realized in 
if;s interaction with the natural worla. 
3. DR, P• 213. 
4. Here evolution is meant in a strictly natural and material sense, 
therefore, for Berdyaev, whatever results from emanation or evolu-
tion comes about through natural processes, and thus remains on the 
natural level. 5. DR, P• 217 and MCA, PP• 130, 132. 
6. MCA~ P• 337. 1. Ibia., p. 110. 
8. nn;-p. 210. Cf. BE, PP• 173, 177 and SR, P• 68. 
(ii) The gap between the vision and the created. Creative 
man is man ~. man at his best. But even with its power and ecstasy, 
the creative act misses the mark set by the original vision. Within 
the finite, perfection is impossible, the attem,te of classicism not 
1 
withstan:ling. There is an antithesis between perfect being with its 
static "non-creativity" and creativity with its dynamic "non-perfec-
2 
tion. 11 Each work of art in its so-called 11finished11 or "objectified" 
state falls short of the artist's original dream. As Berdy"aev writes, 
There is a painful inconunensurabili ty between our in-
most thoughts and their outward expression. • • • If 
I were consistent I would not speak or write at all. 
But I have the courage to be inconsistent: and I can-
not be silent. No one has more poignantlY expressed 
the tragedy of the spoken word than Tyutchev: ••• 
How can the heart expression find, 
Or one man read another's mind, 
Another know llhat you live by? 
A thought that's spoken is a lie; 
And if you stir, you cloud the well. 
Feed on your dreams, and so be still. 3 
The problem of lack with the creative arises as man, who "wants eter-
nity and the eternal, 11 because of his limitations "produces the tem-
4 
poral. u With his complex nature, man struggles between the eternal 
and the temporal. He exercises freedom or follows a given pattern. 
He must use given materials, thus his activity as a creative being is 
1. DR, P• 214. 
2. MCA, P• 322. J. DR, P• 305. The poem, entitled 11Silentium," is also found (noted 
in the translator's footnote in DR) in Poems from the Russian, col-
lected and translated by Frances Cornford and Esther P. Salaman 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1943), P• 45. 
4. DM, P• 136. Cf. DM, p. 76, where he writes that the tragedy of crea-
tiveness is that "the results never correspond to the original concep-
tion and can never give satisfaction. This is the bitterness of all 
creative work." 
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1 
complicated. 
(3) The relationship of man to the world • . )3erdyaev says that 
typologically man has advanced through four stages in his natural-
spiritual relationship with the cosmos. As primitive man, undeveloped 
as a personality, this relationship was interpreted as one of magic. 
As he became civilized, learned agriculture, and evolved an elementary 
ruler-serf economy, man began to work with given cosmic forces, coming 
to depend less totally on these forces. As he harnessed and mechanized 
nature and began to sell his labor for wages, man was even less depend-
ent on the cosmic forces. Finally, with his discovery of the infinite-
ly large and the infinitely small and his disruption of the cosmic 
order, man finds himself unable to escape from its grip. He is caught 
2 
and enslaved by his own discoveries. In the natural or social realm, 
3 
to some degree at least, man can govern and change the 110rld, but he 
cannot possess and control all of it. His is only a small and some-
times elusive part whieh, as Berdyaev puts it, "is capable of entering 
4 
into me and of being my own." To a degree, man must bend before the 
vast impersonal "Dionysian" principle--"that original element without 
'Which man has no source of life, 11 but he must not let himsel.f' go in it 
entirely. Some of the "Apollonian" principle of individuality and aris-
5 
tocracy must be realized. Neither side is to dominate completely. 
The social dimension allows communion and helps man to realize 
1. MH, PP• 202f, cited by Williams, "Berdyaev's Philosophy of His-
tory, II P• 184. 
2. RSRC, P• 46. 
3. BE, P• 234 and DR, PP• 31Q-311. 
4. DR, P• 308. 5. FS, pp. 227-228. 
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himself as a person, but it may also objectify and destroy him as a 
1 
person. In social relations each man wears a mask which protects him 
from the world and gives him an identity as a part of it. But if he 
relates to others exclusively through the mask, he becomes cut apart 
and solitary. There must also be comnrunion on the deeper "I-'lhou" 
2 
level, not only the speaking through the mask as 11 I" to "he. 11 
(i) Man in soli tude._ Particularly in his book on the relation 
. 
of the self to the objective world, entitled Solitude and Society in 
3 
the English translation, ani in his philosophical autobiography, Dream 
and Reality,_ B_erd.yaev examines man in solitu*e and man in community. 
He states that both "solitude and connnunion ••• are fundamental to 
4 
life." Each man has an inborn sense of isolation and lack of rela-
5 
tion, a "metaphysical loneliness" undispelled by social contacts. 
Even today's man, living "in the great universe, in the perspective 
6 
of a boundless horizon, 11 has a sense of isolation. 
This solitariness is not only that of egocentric isolation from 
7 
the social and the cosmic, nor is it solipsism, which Berdyaev calls 
"no more than an intellectual exercise is philosophy, • • • synonymous 
1. BE, pp. 213-214. 
2. ss, pp. 164-165. Of. Martin Buber, I and 'lhou, passim, and Carl G. 
Jung, Two Essa,ys on Analytical Psychology~ ~rans. R.F.C.Hull (N.Y.: 
Meridian Books, 1956), p. 167. The term "persona, 11 used by Berdyaev 
in Soli tude and Society~ _ i~ discussed by Jung as one of' the arche-
types. 
3. The literal translation of the Russian title would be I and the World 
of Objects, suggesting more directly its 11 I-Th.ou" theme. 
4. DR, P• 33. 5. Ibid., P• 39. Cf. DR, p. 264, where Berdyaev discusses his personal 
sense of isolation from others. 
6. SS, P• 89. 
7. MCA, P• 158. 
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1 
in psychology w:i. th the negation of personality. 11 In this sense of 
2 
11 apartness, 11 man is aware of himself as personality. First aware of 
himself as alone, man then becomes aware of his "not-self, " another 
3 
self t o which he may be related. The relationship he seeks is not 
an "objective 11 one, for related as object to object man "WOuld still 
be isolated. Man seeks relationship in the social realm. The social 
"we" which is achieved may be an external collective imposition, ''but 
it has also another aspect, that of community and communion, wherein 
4 
each person is not an It but a Thou. 11 Some isolation may be overcome 
5 
''between Uli and man" through art, through knowledge, or best of all 
through love and friendship. Love is said to be "the very summit of 
6 
life, ••• the only effective way of transcending solitude." Yet 
even this relationship does not altogether break the bounds of man 1 s 
loneliness: 
It is surprising that not only social bonds but even 
love between man and woman fails to attain comnnm:ity 
and man remains locked 'Within his ow.n solitariness, 
unable to un:ierstand the other or to make himself un-
derstood. Love may break the silence between lovers, 
but do they not speak across an impassable gulf which 
no intimacy can redeem? '!he person of ever:r other 
human being must needs remain an impenetrable and un;-7 trodden my8tery, which even love is unable to fathom. 
Beyond all human relationships, there is the longing for the re-
8 
lationship w.i. th God, "the 'lhou that by its nature cannot become It." 
1. ss, p. 167. 
2. Ibid., P• 92. 
3. Ibid., P• 94. 
4. ibid., PP• 106-107. 
5. Ibid., PP• 95-96. 
6. Ibid., p. 123. Cf. pp. 119ff. 
1. DR, P• 278. 
8 Bub I and Th 75 See Cont~~·ed discussion in I and Thou, • er, ou, P• • ~·~ 
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Man's original solitariness m~ be a creative channel to his 
strengthening, as through solitariness he may become more aware 
1 
of himself and the universal. Or the original loneliness may go 
no further than isolation and withdrawal, resulting in weakness 
2 
arrl emptiness. 
(ii) Transcending the ego. _ Looking again at the first of 
these two possibilities, one notes that working through solitude 
3 
to self-transcendence, man's personality is realized. Here, in 
the "emergence" of the subjective into the trans-subjective there 
is an "existential meeting with God, with other people • • • : the 
path not of objective comnnmication but of existential communion." 
With self-transcendence, the personal and spiritual emerge into 
the social. Though this occurs in the social dimension, "the aims 
of human. life are not sociaJ., but spiritual; they are spiritual 
5 
4 
life and spiritual culture. 11 Man as personal and spiritual experi-
6 
ences both "I" and "We." His ''We" is based not only on that which 
he has in coDD!lon with others, but on the personal and unique which 
7 
he shares, thus bringing it to universality. The affirmation of 
one's personality is not made in his identification with the gen-
PP• 75-81 and SS, p. 97. In a footnote on this page, Berd.yaev 
refers to I and Thou, but he feels that Buber gives too much re-
cognition to the relationship with God and not enough to the im-
portance of the 11We 11 relationship of man with his fellow men. 
1. SF, P• 136 and MCA, P• 1$8. 
2. SF, P• 136. 
3. SR, P• 193. 
4. SF, P• 29. 
5. TNE, p. 11. 
6. Ibid., p. 52. 
7. SF, P• 22. 
h7 
eral and abstract but in co.IIU!lunion and in his venture into the uni-
1 
versal and concrete. 
Be~aev analyzes several possible relations of man with soci-
ety. Man may be purely a "social animal, 11 unaware of his solitude. 
Or he may be indifferent to society, or aware of it but aloof. At 
this point he is "conscious of solitude, but ••• has no social 
2 
interests;" thus he does not overcome his solitude. On the high-
est level, man is aware of both solitude and society, and acts pro-
:roundly in relation to both. The prophet who denounces society 
does so because of his tremendous concern for it as well as his 
3 
ability to rise above it as he sees the need for its denunciation. 
The ego which remains egocentrically isolated fails to develop 
into a per sonality, but it is a potential personality. Continually 
4 
isolated, the self without an outlet will perish. One risks the 
loss of some self-initiative by entering into "comnrunion" or "com-
munity." But from this giving comes a greater gift than would have 
been possible otherwise. The self emerges "baad entirely on its 
5 
aspiration to commune with the 'lhou and the We." From un:lifferen-
tiated unity with the universe, the ego moves through isolation 
and opposition to the non-ego to "the concrete union of every Ego 
with the Thou, a union which preserves plurality in a transfigul!ed 
6 
form." 
(iii) Sex. Berdyaev's discussion of sex seems related to 
1. SS, P• 117. 
2. Ibid., pp. 101-102. 
3. Ibid., P• 103. 
4. Ibid., p. 91. 
5. Ibid., P• 167. 
6. Ibid., p. 88. Cf. pp. 166-167. 
48 
man's solitude and his relations with others. Generally his atti-
tude toward sex is pessimistic-in sex he sees a slavery to elemen-
tal forces as man is "reduced • • • to a plqthing of biological 
1 
arrl physiological processes. 11 Sex breaks down personal! ty, for 
thrmugh it one person disintegrates as others are born. There is 
a strange interrelationship of birth and death in sex. Because of 
2 
sex, "the genus lives forever, the person dies. 11 Man finds lrlln-
self in solitude, and seeking to transcend this solitude, he es-
tablishes a family, but he often finds more slavery than freedom 
3 
in this relationship. There may be no love, an1 without love, 
4 
familY life fails to enable man to transcend his loneliness. 
5 
There is no necessary spiritual link between sex and love. Ber-
~aev also points out the antithesis between birth and creativeness 
6 
as the tragedy of sex. 
Sex implies a relationship between two incomplete beings, and 
represents the meeting of the personal and the cosmic and impersonal 
w1 thin human life. Woman represents the natural, the cosmic, the 
7 
dark-she is closer to "primary elemental forces" than is man. 
Man is more personal; through sex, he, the microcosm, is joined to 
1. DR, P• 69. Cf. SF, P• 222. 
2. DR, p. 292. cr. BE, P• 243; DR, P• 75; and MCA, P• 193. In 
this last reference there appears this sentence, "Birth and death 
are mystically bound together in sex." 
3. DR, p. 50. . 
4. SS, PP• 118-ll9 and SF, P• 234. 
5. SF, P• 224. 
6. DM, P• 33. 
7. "The New Middle Ages," in The End of Our Time, trans. Donald 
Attwater (N.Y.: Shead and Ward, 1933), P• ll7. cr. MCA, PP• 
218-220. 
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1 
the cosmos. Sex is a diffuse "meeting point of two worlds in the 
2 
human organism, 11 and at best it provides a fleeting and illusory 
3 
meeting of two polarized beings. It is "unwholesome, unchaste: 
4 
it is evidence of the divided nature of man." 
Yet for all this, from its broken longing may come creativeness. 
A sexless being can neither procreate nor create. 
The moral task is not to destroy the power of sex 
but to sublimate it. • • • Man generates and cre-
ates because he is an incomplete being, divided in-
to t wo and striving fgr the completeness and whole-
ness of the androgyn. 
The androgyn mentioned here is no sexless and neutral hennaphrodite, 
but the wholly integrated man-humanity penetrated by divinity. Ex-
cept for the Absolute Man (Christ), this is apparently an unrealiz-
6 
able ideal. 
5. Philosophy of Religion as Basic to Berdyaev's POsition 
In his History of Russian Philosophy, Lossky points out that 
many Russian philosophers have a specifically Christian 1rorld-v:i.ew 
underlying their philosophical systems, and it is evident that Ber-
L. MCA, PP• 183-184. 
2. Ibid., PP• 180-181. 
3. Ibid., P• 191. 
4. DR, P• 43. 
5. DM, p. 67. Cf. SF, p. 231 ani MCA, pp. 198-201. The tenn "an-
drogyn" seems to be taken from Plato's Symposium, where it denotes 
a "third sex" which is complete in itself, not needing the compH~­
ment of another as 1rould male or female. See Symposium, in The 
Works of Plato, ed. Irwin. Edman (N.Y.: Modern Library, 1928), PP• 
353-357. In the Symposium, the idea of love as inspiration for 
creation is particularly clear in the discourse on the creativity 
of wisdom and virtue by the souls of poets, artists, etc. (See P• 376.) 
6. MCA, PP• 202-203; DM, P• 64; and Vladimir Lossky, A History of 
Russian Philosoph.y . (N.Y. : International Universities Press, 1951), 
P• 237. 
1 
5o 
dyaev is in this group. Bert Williams, in his study of Berdyaev r s 
philosophy of history, also indicates that Berdyaev was essentially 
a religious thinker. 
All of life is to be understood as under the aegis of 
religion--religion so conceived includes labor, art, 
science, philosophy, love, friendship, recreation--
all the values of life. For Berdyaev, then, neither 
religion nor the church is relegated to a corner of 
life, but is rather 'the whole plenitude of being r 
as that all is transfigured and related to the divine. 2 
Therefore, it seems essential in concluding this chapter to outline 
Berdyaev•s philosophy of religion. 
i. ~sticism as the approach to religious knowledge 
Berdyaev was well acquainted with the mystics, as is seen in 
3 
his references to many of them and his emphasis on Jacob Boehme. 
He identified mysticism with spiritual experience which is available 
to anyone with sufficient insight and sensitivity to know it. 
Mysticism may be considered as life at its deepest, 
as a form of consciousness which includes the whole 
universe. • • • On every side we are surrounded by 
mystery and we are consciOUIP of symbolism everywhere. 
The feeling which possesses us as we contemplate the 
profound mystery of' surrounding life is also a kind 
of mysticism. • • • '!here are not only men who are 
favored with mystical gifts, but there is also a 
mysticism inherent in human nature in general, for 
man is a spirijl?ual being who does not belong merely 
to this world. f.!. 
1. Lossky, HRP, p, 40.5. Of. DR, pp .• 17Q-171. 
2 • Williams, BPH, p. 301. 
3. There are references too numerous to mention supporting this state-
ment. A summary of the influence of the mystics is found in FS, 
PP• 244ff. On Boehme, see infra, Chap. III, Sec. 2, Sub-Sec. i, Par. 
(1). Berdyaev says that Boehme's thought embodies "real genius 11 in 
his extended discussion of him in BE, PP• 10.5-111. There are also 
scattered references to Boehme in many other works by Berdyaev. 
4. FS, P• 251. Cf. E. Herman, The Meaning ani Value of .Mysticism_ (Lon-
don: James Clarke, 1916) and works of Rufus Jones for an interpreta-
tion of mystical experience as possible for anyone who experiences 
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1 
Berdyaev calls mysticism the source of religious consciousness· 
and says that it is "the soil on which religion flourishes and with-
2 
out which it 'Withers and decays. 11 In mystical experience man over-
3 
comes his "creatureliness" and sees past the ordinary. Here man 
4 
finds spiritual life at its heights. 
Berdyaev understands that mysticism is not limited to a psycho-
logical experience of religious fervor or satisfaction, neither does 
5 
he identify it with "romantic subjectivism." The "mystical" is not 
6 
a synonym for the "vague." He distinguishes mysticism as spiritual 
1 
from magic as materialistic. 
Berdyaev criticizes mystical quietism for denying the importance 
of freedom in man's relationship with God and in man's responsibility 
8 
for his own life. He disapproves of any type of mysticism which 
denies man's indiViduality or submerges the many in the One, e.g. 
Yogi mysticism, pantheistic mysticism, or the neo-pl.atonic strains 
9 
found in Pseudo-Dio:nysius and Eckhardt. Submergence in any collec-
tive is a !9:!!!!. of my'Sticism, but it is a false mysticism which ob-
jectifies rather than a true one which enhances the free spiritual 
10 
person. 
the ordinary as "tinged" with the "super-ordinary" or "mystical." 
1. MCA, P• 296. 
2. FS, P• 239. 
3. ·Ibid., P• 243 and MCA, PP• 296-298. 
4. FS, pp. 21ti-242. 
5. ~., pp. 240, 249. 
6. MCA, P• 299. 
1. Ibi~., PP• 316-318 and FS, P• 240. 
8. SR, PP• 154-155. 
9. MCA, PP• 300-306. Cf. Wil~iams, BPH, P• 226. 
lO.RSRC, p. 180. 
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For Berdyaev, mysticism is closely connected With prophetic 
religion; it is not its antithesis, concerned only with the perfec-
1 
tion of one's own spirit, as Friedrich Heiler supposes. Berdyaev•s 
view is that 
the supreme goal of mysticism is not only union with 
God, but also, because of this very union, a turning 
of the self towards every creature. It is the realiza-
tion ~f love and of creative energy, for love is crea-
tion. 
As opposed to institutional reiigion which may be more leveling 
than uplifting for the individual, JDY'Sticism at its best brings a 
deeper and thus more excellent spirituality and greater freedom to 
the person. The mystic, as the prophet, feels free to contradict 
that part of an institution which seems to him lifeless. Through 
his own freedom, he also gives positive impetus and life to the 
3 
church and the world. 
In his discussion of JDY'Sticism, Berdyaev refers to apophatic 
and kataphatic theology, re,iecting the latter when he states that 
4 
conceptual thinking cannot fully indicate the nature of God. The 
only way God can be known is through "negative theology," that 
1. SR, pp. 160-161. Berdyaev sees prophetic and mystical religion 
overlapping, while Heiler seems to separate them quite completely, 
especially in the theoretical sense. He spells out this contrast 
on page 144 of his book Prayer (London: Oxford University Press, 
1932), as follows: "Mysticism nees from and denies the natural 
life and relish of life in order to experience an infinite life 
beyond it; prophetic piety, on the other hand, believes in life 
and affirms it, throws itself resolutely and joyfully into the 
arms of life. On the one side we have an uncompromising deni.al. 
of life, on the other an unconquerable belief in life. 11 
2. FS, P• 266. Cf. Williams, BPH, P• 226. 
3. SR, PP• 130-131 and RSRC, P• 181. 
liS FS, p. 66. 
• 
"learned ignorance" which realizes that God cannot be objectively 
known. Reason cannot give a positive characterization of God; it 
can only realize that it cannot know. 
Natural understanding cannot grasp nor translate 
into concepts the nature of God and His relations 
with the world. The divine life, the esotericism 
of t he Divine Being does not admit of being handled 
by the reason. But reason can perceive the paradox 
and antinomw with which the Divine Being presents it; 
it can admit the existence of the supra-rational.l 
The kataphatic theologian tends to naturalize and to rationalize 
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God by thinking of Him as "The Highest Being," whereas the apophatic 
theologian recognizes the inherent mystery of the Divine and realizes 
2 
that God can be known only symbolically. Knowledge of God cannot 
be based on the law of identity, nor is it capable of logical formu-
lation. As symbolic it "presupposes the abyss, the 'groundlessness' 
3 
(Ungrund) of the divine life, infinite hidden beyoni the finite." 
But God is not totally unknowable,because there is symbolic 
knowl edge available in communion and in existential spiritual experi-
1. Ibid., P• 72. There is an essential but limited role played by 
reason in the knowledge of God, as is indicated by Berdyaev 1s 
statement in FS, p. 73, where he writes, 11 God is immanent in 
reason when it is illuminated and spiritually integrated, but He 
remains transcendent and inaccessible as far as the old reason 
of natural man • • • is concerned. 11 
2. FS, PP• 67-68; BE, p . 97; and DR, P• 68. This is also a major 
emphasis of Paul Tillich, mentioned by him in his address to the 
Boston University School of Theology Festival of Raigion and 
the Arts, presented in Marsh Chapel, April ll, 1956. 
J. FS, p. 69. Cf. SR, P• 139 and MCA, P• 304. In t his last refer-
ence, Berdyaev states that "the great truth of negative theology 
Jj..s] the inapplicability to God of any categories. Bu~ this truth 
1n negative mystical theology must be related to the Frrst God, 
to the primeval Abyss. " 
The term Ungrund will be discussed in detail later; see infra, 
Chap III, Sec. 2, Sub-Sec. i. 
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1 
ence, indicating mystery and supra-rationality. 
Eckhardt 1 s Gottheit exemplifies symbolic knowledge of God in 
the tenns of negative theology. This "non-being which is supra-
2 
being" is characterized as the "inexpressible Divine .Mystery" be-
3 
yond creator and creation or subject and object. 
ii. 'Ihe nature of God 
Berdyaev, expressing "symbolical knowledge," calls God "Spirit" 
4 
rather than "Reality" or 11Being. 11 God "does not exist as ••• 
the objeetivization of a universal idea," but in 11an existential 
5 
contact ani meeting." 
The relation between personality and God is not a . 
causal relation, it lies outside the realm of deter-
mination, it is Within the realm of freedom, God 
is not an object to personality. He ig a subject 
with whom existential relations exist. 
Berdyaev is critical of interpretations of God as "The Absolute." 
7 
Aristotle's God he calls a "lifeless object." Such a conception 
8 
is "the extreme limit of the objectivizing of abstract thought, 11 
for ".Absolutehood11 denies movement (and therefore also freedom and 
creativity) w.i thin God. This denial is a great lack and mark of 
imperfection, since for Berdyaev inward struggle has greater value 
1. SF, p. 83 and FS, P• 64. 
2. BE, P• 100. 
3. DH, PP• 27-44 and BE, P• 100. 
4. BE, pp. 28-29 and DH, P• 7. Spinka, in his chapter on Berdyaev in 
Christianity and the Existentialists, p. 62, speaks of God as 
Spirit rather than ousia or essentia, stating that nHe is not 
Being-spelled with a capital 1B 1-but the 'Ground of all being-
spelled vd. th a small 'b. ' " 
5. SF, P• 39. 
6. Ibid. , p. 26. 
7. p;s;-p. 2. 
8. SF, P• 84. 
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1 
than does static completeness. 
Venturing from negative theology to symbolism, Berdyaev writes, 
2 
11God is a Person rather than a Universal Essence. 11 As a person, God 
embodies freedom, love, sacrifice, and the need for relationship rather 
than omnipotence. 
God has no power: He has less power than a policeman. 
Power is a social and not a religious phenomenon. And 
I considered it to be one of rrr:r important tasks as a 
Christian philosopher to contribute to the purification 
and liberation of the Christian consc~ence from the 
power of sociomorphism. God can reconcile man to the 
sufferings of creation because He himself suffers, not 
because He reigns. Pure monotheism is inconsistent 
with the Christian conception of God: in fact, it is 
the supreme form of idolat:ry.3 
God conceived of as omnipcit~nt potentate is the god of idolators; only 
. 4 
a personal and sufferipg ·God is ad.equate to oppose atheism. 
' 
· I t Will' be_·, noted that in Berdyaev 1 s interpretation God· did not 
create freedom, but the freedom rooted in the Ungrund is 11give:d' for Him. 
5 
11It is part of the nothing out of which God created the world. 11 Ber-
dy'aev also notes that God does not determine, cause, or act in the 11ls;ws 
of nature. 11 He "is not in the world ••• in its given factuality and 
6 
its necessity, but in its setting of a task and in its freedom." Ber-
dyaev points out that a God who is omnipotent pantokrator must be re-
1. MH, PP• 48-51. 
2. SR, p. 45. See also the discussion of God as personality in SF, P• 39. 
3. DR, P• 179. Cf • . SF, P• 85. 
4. DH, P• 185. 5. DM, P• 25. Cf. infra, Chap. III, Sec. 2, Sub-Sec. i, Par. 3. 
6. BE, P• 52. Cf. SF, PP• 82, 248 and m, P• 112. Note also Berdyaev's 
statement in BE, p. 214, that -"God is freedom, and He desires free-
dom, just as He is love and desires love, and as He is a Mystery 
which is unlike all the properties and relations of the natural, his-
torical, and social world. n 
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sponsible for all evil md suffering. In this case, faith in Him 
as totally good and thus not at all limited by any eVil must be 
given up. But it He is Spirit, acting in freedom ani creatiVity 
, 
and opposing oqjectified necessity, not only can man believe Him 
to be good, but also man can find value in His own creative response 
1 
to God. God is present in freedom rather than in the world order: 
God acts, not upon the world order as though justify-
ing the suffering of personality, but ••• in the 
conflict of freedom against that world order. God 
created • .•• creative existential centres and not 
the world order.2 · 
(1) The relationship between man and God. .In considering the 
relationship between man and God, Berdyaev rejects a dualism which 
would comp].etely separate the divine from the human. He also re-
jects any monistic absorption of the human into the Divine Absolute 
or rationalization into the natural of the divine. Calling his 
position "theandric anthropomorphism, 11 he postulates the existence 
of two independent and freely interacting natures. This interpre-
tation 
admits the possibility of the transfusion of divine 
energy into this world, ••• binds together ani unites 
two worlds, and recognizes that the Divine Being can 
only give symbolic expression to I~self while it re-
mains inexhaustible and mysterioua.:J 
This means that 
1. BE, P• 28 and DR, P• 179. 
2. SF, PP• 87-88. In a continuation of this same discussion, on 
p. 89, Berdyaev writes, "God is not world providence ••• not 
••• sovereign of the universe, not pantolcrator. God is free-
dom and meaning, love and sacrifice; He is struggle against the 
6bjecti vi zed world order. 11 (Italics mine. ) Cf. BE, P• 152. 
3. FS, p. 62. Cf. FS, PP• 208-209. 
the divine life is revealed by a double process having 
its origin in both natures and through a change in the 
human consciousness which presupposes both the action 
of divine grace and man's freedom.l 
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Theandrism, meaning the revelation of the divine in man and the human 
in God, is Berdyaev 1 s label for this concept. He believes that 
God and man together are greater than God alone. The 
substantial multinomial being revealed in one, is 
greater than a One undifferentiated. Only the myth 
of God 1 s longing for man and for man 1 s love can bring 
us near to the final mystery. 2 
There is a "presence of the divine principle in man, ••• not ••• 
3 
monistic identity." 
Berdyaev urges a creative approach to art, science, and life, in 
which God. and man work together. This he calls theurgy, claiming that 
in such co-Operation "God and man are not external to each other, nor 
outside one another; neither. are they identified, the one nature does not 
4 
disappear in the other. 11 ~ecause of theurgy, man is able to resist the 
power of his environment which otherwise· would be all-powerful over him. 
Neither God nor man is conceivable apart from the other. First, 
it is in relation to creation that God becomes God. Following the tradi-
tion of Eckhardt and Jacob Boehme, Ber~yaev distinguishes between God 
and Godhead. He writes that 
negative mystical theology penetrates beyond the 
Creator in His relationship to creation and beyond 
God in His intercourse vd th man. The Creator is 
1. Ibid., P• 103. 
2. MCA, p. 130. Cf. Clarke, ITB, P• 160. 
3. BE, P• 36. 
4. ~., P• 101. Cf. MCA, P• 247. 
manifested at the same time as creation, God and man 
appear s:lmul taneously. It is a theogonic process of 
the divine Unfathomable which is the counterpart of 
the anthropogenic process .1 
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For Berdyaev, true humanness symbolizes the activity of the divine in 
man, i.e., man qua man exhibits divine qualities. "Natural man" is 
2 
less beast-like than God-like. "Whereas western philosophers and 
theologians tend to separate the human from the divine, in the East 
3 
and for Berdyaev, "the human element is permeated by the Divine.n 
(i) Man's need for God~ Man alone cannot be self-sufficient, 
and if he refuses to recognize the existence of God, he becomes en-
4 
slaved to his natural and social surroundings. Without God, man is 5 . 
reduced to mere nature, lacking "ontological basis." Man is always 
limited in his realization of values, but this limitation is more con-
fining if he fails to take account of that which is beyond him. There 
is a certain value and d.igni ty in humanism as it allows man to be cre~­
tive, but its problems arise when man fails to recognize the Divine be-
yond himself. 
When man thinks only of himself' h!i.s needs' his wen-
being, and human salvation, he restricts God's concep-
tion of what should be and denies his own creative 
nature. But when he thinks of God, and of God 1 s longing 
for love, and of what God expects from him, he raises 
himself to a higher plane by realizing6God
1s idea of 
him, by affirming his creative nature. 
1. FS, P• 194. 
2. DH, PP• 110-lll. 
3. SR, P• 156. 
4. FS, p. 201 and TR, P• 94. 5. BE, PP• 217-218. Berdyaev 1s statement from TNE, P• 23, is applic-
able at this point: 11 The dignity of man presupposes the existence 
of God. • • • Man is a person only if he is a free spirit refiect-
ing the supreme Being. 11 
6. FS, P• 213. Cf. "The End of the Renaissance, 11 in The End of Our T:l.me, 
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Unlike Sartre, who claims that if God exists man is a slave, Ber-
dyaev says that "if there is no God, then I am the slave of the world. 
Tile existence of God is the guarantee of my independence of the world, 
1 
of society, of the State." 
(ii) God 1 s need for man. In his emphasis on interrelationship, 
freedom, ani creativity, Berdyaev shows that besides 11man 1 s need of 
2 
God" there is also "God's nee:i of man." Rejecting the interpretation 
of Nygren, who attributes neither Eros nor a sense of lack to God, Ber-
3 
dyaev emphasizes that God needs man's creative response of love. L:>ve, 
whether it be human or divine, cannot remain shut up within itself-it 
4 
must move out to another. Man 1 s creativity is not completely a gift 
of God; it must "be brought to light by the daring of man himself, 
otherwise there would be no freedom of creative power • • • (.for] man." 
God's idea of man is an exalted one, in .fact 11the idea of man is the 
greatest divine idea. Man awaits the birth of God in himself, and God 
6 
awaits the birth of man in himself. 11 Berdyaev even agrees with 
Silesius who has expressed in his mysticism the extremely bold idea 
7 
that God cannot even exist without man. 
trans. Donald Attwater (N.Y.: Sheed and Ward, 1933), PP• 34-35; 
RI, P• 96; and "The Crisis of Christianity," P• 240. 
1. DH, P• 136. Cf. RSRC, p. 41, where Berdyaev writes, "Man's freedom 
l i es in this, that beside the realm of Caesar there is also the 
realm of Spirit. II 
2. FS, P• 210 and SR, P• 155. 
3 .• DH, P• 124. 4 FS, p. 138. 
5. BE, P• 193. 
5 
6. DR, p. 209. 
7. Berdyaev quotes in the original German and translates the .famous 
statement of Silesius in DR, p. 181. 11.!£h weiss dass .~ mich Gott 
nicht ein !:!!!. ~ leben: ~ ich !!! nicht, .~ ~ !.2!:! Noth den 
Geist . aufgeben~" "I know that without me God cannot exist for a 
6o 
God expects primarily free response and creativeness rather than 
obedience from man. 11 Is not, 11 Berdyaev asks, 11man 1s free creativity 
1 
the fulfillment of the secret will of God?" If man merely obeys a 
given law, the value of his creativity is lessened and his responsi-
bility abdicated. Since he is free, man is responsible to be creative. 
Human creativity is not a claim or a right on the part 
of man, but God 1 s claim on and call to man. God awaits 
man's creative act, which is the response to the crea-
tive act of God. What is true of man's freedom is true 
also of his creativity: for freedom too is God 1 s summons 
to man and man 1 s duty towards God. God does not reveal 
to man that wbi ch it is for man to reveal to God.2 
3 
(2) The relationship of God and evil. Berdyaev thinks of tragedy 
as an ultimate principle even for God because of His relationship to 
the uncontrolled and uncreated freedom which is the embodiment of p~ 
4 
tial good or evil. God cannot and will not use all evil for good, for 
5 
this would limit the significance and freedom of other personalities. 
If God does create or control all evil, a monism arises wherein the 
nmystery of freedom 11 disappears. This is because either, (1) God is 
all there is, thus He is constantly confronted only by Himself, as in 
emanationism or pantheism, or, (2) God causes everything, including 
6 
all evil. Berdyaev rejects these alternatives. God does work to over-
single second. If I cease to be, He too must necessarily cease to 
be." I.e., as a person, God is not totally self-sufficient, but de-
pends on interaction or fellowship With man for His self-completion. 
1. MCA, P• 112. Cf. FS, pp. xviii, 149; and MCA, p. 97. 
2. DR, p. 208. Cf. SR, P• 96. 
3. The problem of evil is considered in greater detail infra, Chap. III, 
Sec. 2, Sub-Sec. i, Pars. 2 and 3. 
4. DR, p.l7 8 : Charles Hartshorne, 11Whi tehead and Berdyaev: Is there Trag-
edy in God?, 11 Journal of Religion 37(1957), p. 74; Clarke, ITB, p. 95. 
5. DH:, P• 86. 
6. SR, p. 11.4. 
61 
come evil, but He meets it with love and sacrifice. Rather than an-
1 
nihilate it, He tolerates it "for the sake of the good of freedom." 
God the Creator has done everything to bring light into 
that [Primeval uncreatecQ freedom, in harmony With His 
great conception of creation. But without destroying 
freedom He could not conquer the potency of evil contained 
in it. This is why there is tragedy and evil in the 
world; all tragedy is connected with freedom. And we 
can only reconcile ourselves to the tragedy of the world 
because God suffers in it too. God shares his creature's 
destiny. He sacrifices Himself for the world and for 
man whom He loves and yearns for. 2 
iii. Salvation as a social implication of religion 
Be~aev 1 s concept of salvation is not only religious and other-
worldly, put social and this-worldly. He feels that from the personal 
spiritual life grows an urge toward "social and cosmic transfiguration." 
Salvation is not individually realized, but is possible only as salva-
4 
3 
tion in. anci of the community. Originally every act is personal, spring-
ing from the creativeness of the individ~al, but this does not change 
5 
the fact that "every personal human act has social consequences. 11 The 
6 
impact of any act on the community must be realized by each person. 
Salvation, then, must be cosmic and universal, not merely individ-
ual. But in a sense, absolute universalism of salvation implies loss 
of freedom for some at some point--a deprivation of man 1 s "right to 
7 
hell a II 
1. DM, P• Ll. 
2. Ibid., P• 30. · Cf. SR, P• 115; DM, P• 25; and Clarke, ITB, P• 104. 
3. TR, p. 125 and SR, pp. 167-168. 
4. BE, P• 237; TR, p. 125; SR, P• 166; FS, P• 324; and DM, p. 114. In 
this last reference, Berdyaev says that purely personal salvation 
is no better than a "heavenly utilitarianism. 11 
5. SR, p. 168. 
6. BE, P• 214. 
7. FS, P• 324. 
I£ out of pity and humanity we admit the ••• inevita-
bility of universal salvation, we must deny the freedom 
of the creature. Origen's doctrine of apocatastasis 
contradicts his own doctrine of f'reedom.l 
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In order to reconcile Be~aev 1 s demand for freedom for all with his 
ideal of salvation as necessarily universal, or at least "in community,n 
it seems that man's "right to hell" must be left as a free choice to 
be: ;made, while at the same time man is responsible for realizing his 
own salvation and that of the community through his creative act. The 
ideal of salvation is salvation in community, but because each man is 
f'ree and acts separately, this is not achieveable in aQY final sense 
within the limi. ts of time. 
· (1) Sobornost. In order to understand this concept of' 11salvation 
in connnunity, 11 it seems essential to consider Berdyaev 1s use of the 
Russian concept of sobornost which conveys an untranslatable meaning. 
As Los sky points out, this concept has been applied by various Russian 2 . 
thinkers both to religious and social life. Berdyaev seems to use 
sobornost in this dual sense. "Altogetherness'' seems aa close a trans-
lation as is possible, yet this "altogetherness" is not a gathering 
. . 3 
into a single collective but 11the dynamic life of the collective body." 
The individuals within the collective are the free and dynamic agents, 
J.. DM, p. 273. Spinka (NBCF, pp. 185-188) says that Berdyaev rejects 
Origen's universalism in salvation, but Dean Inge in his article, 
"The Fhilosophy of Berdyaeff," p. 199 and Williams (BFH, P• 311) 
s~ that like Origen, Berdyaev conceives of' salvation as necessarily 
universal. Cf. also Berdyaev 1 s article, "Unity of Christendom in 
the Strife Between East and West." Ecumenical Review, 1(1948), p.l5. 
2. Los sky, HRP, p. 407. Note his particUlar reference to · Khomiakov who 
was the first to emphasize and develop the concept of sobornost. On 
Khomiakov see infra, Chap. IV, Sec. 3, Sub-Sec. iii, Par. 4. 
3. SF, p. 4 (translator's note). 
63 
rather than mere cogs in a wheel. Sobornost is not one mass of many 
individuals, but a "togetherness inspired by love and freedom and the 
1 
grace of the Holy Spirit~ 11 Berdyaev states that it is more a together-
ness through spiritual communion than an assent to universal logical 
2 3 
validity. It is a "quality of community among men," a 11we-feeling 11 
which is immanent within all as spiritual beings rather than a 11we-feel-
4 
ing11 inspired from outside of persons. This is the substitution of 
5 
11 the idea of community for the idea of society. 11 Sobornost is a spir-
itual rather than a psychological phenomenon. It gives internally orig-
6 
ina ted rather than external or social togetherness. 
In sobornost, separate persons who have in themselves primar,y 
value and initiative for creativeness are active. 
Sobornost is not a collective reality which stands 
higher than man and issues its orders to him. It is 
the highest spiritual qualitative power in men; it is 
entering into the communion of the living and the dead. 
This sobornost can have no rational juridical expres-
sion. Each must take upon himself the responsibility 
for all. No one may separate himself from the world 
whole, although at the same time he ought not to re-
gard himself as part of a whole. 7 
The "sum" or "collective spirit" which may seem to arise is "secondary 
8 
and objectified, 11 for the spiritual community exists within each per-
son. True sobornost is subjective, not objective, for "objectiveness" 
1. Lecture by Nicolas Zernov, "Russian Orthodox Theology, 11 October 10, 
1956, Boston University School of Theology. 
2. MCA, P• 33. 
3. SR, P• 38. 
4. TR, p. 60 ani DR, p. 54. In another passage, Berdyaev says that 
sobornost is "community" as opposed to "collectivism." (See TR, P• 25). 
5. Seaver, NBIT, P• 84. 
6. FS, P• 20. 
7. BE, p. 131. Cf. SF, P• 203 and SR, P• 45. 
8. SR, P• 56. 
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subordinates man to social institutions and may lead to his enslave-
1 
ment by them. 
There is freedom for every person in sobornost, but this is not 2 ... 3 
the freedom of isolated individualism. It is "freedom in love," 
4 
the unity of freedom and love, or freedom with a widened and uni ver-
5 
sal dimension. Characteristic of Eastern Orthodoxy, sobornost embed-
ies both freedom and community, not the extreme of free individualism 
sometimes found in Protestantism or the authoritarianism of Catholi-
6 
cism. Individual and supra-indiVidual are "bound together" in sober-
~' as individual persons freely subordinate irrational desires to 
absolute values, based on love for others, not compulsion to collectiv-
7 
ism. 
(2) Salvation and creativeness. For BerQyaev, salvation is depen-
. 8 
dent on the co-operative action of man and God. To attain salvation, 
. 9 
man must respond creativelY; he cannot merely wait for God to act. 
Man must be continually creative in his struggle for completeness and 
10 
perfection. These are not to be attained in a static or legalistic 
11 
sense, for man t s goal is "not salvation alone, but creative ascent. 11 
He aims not onlY at "salvation from" sin or evil, but at "salvation for 11 
1. SF, p. 201. 
2. FS, P• 144. 
3. ~., p. 144. 
4. Ibid., P• 330; RI, P• 52; and RSRC, P• 122. 
5. DR, P• 54. 
6. TNE, P• 54. 
1. FS, P• 81 and Lossky, HRP, P• 26. 
8. FS, p. 117; DH, P• 202; and DR, P• 213. 
9. DR, P• 213 and BE, pp. 250-251. Cf. Clarke, ITB, PP• 24-25. 
lO.TR, PP• 118, 122. 
11. MCA, P• 100. 
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1 
a greater good, namely the creative life. 
Freedom, then, is essential in salvation. For Berdyaev, salva-
tion is not the traditional 11 grace given unto us;" it is "grace ex-
2 
perienced by me as freedom." S&l.vation comes not through coercion, 
3 
but through man 1 s freedom which God wills for liim. 
(3) The Kingdom of God. In speaking of "The Kingdom of God, 11 
Berdyaev places more emphasis on the process of its "realization" than 
on its "coming." He states that "the Kingdom of God is not only to be 
4 
awaited: it is also to be created." This creating is to be shared by 
5 
God and man as creative personalities. The Kingdom of God is not 
thought to be distant or other-worldly, but its creation begins on 
6 7 
earth. This is Berdyaev 1s "active and creative way" of interpreting 
eschatology. Though the Kingdom of God is actively sought on earth, 
it is not realizable in history. Man may strive for a society in which 
no man will be treated as an object, and this, if realized, 
in a sense ••• will be the coming of the Kingdom 
of God. • • • Objectification and its accompaqying 
abstraction are the result of man 1 s failure to seek 
the Kingdom of God.8 
Yet, though we may strive toward such an ideal and do not 
9 
reach it, the 
striving rather than the reaching is the essential thing. 
1. MCA, P• 105. 
2. FS, P• x. 
3. Ibid., PP• 128, 153. 
4. DR, P• 205. 
5. MCA, p. 153. (See Spinka 1s discussion of this passage in NBCF, 
p. 146.) Cf. SF, PP• 91, 254 and FS, PP• 341, 197. 
6. ''lfan, the Machine, and the New Heroism." Hibbert Journal, P. 33(1934), 
89. Cf. also BE, P• 222 and SR, P• 195. 
7. BE, p. 222 • 
. 8. SR, P• 63. 
9. MH, PP• 197-198. Cf. Lossky's discussion of Berdyaev, with special 
reference to salvation and its seeking, HRP, p. 245. 
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CHAPI'ER III 
FREEDOM AS THE BASIC CONCEPI' JN BERDYAEV'S PHILOSOPHY 
Berd~ev, who has been called "the philosopher of freedom par ~~ 
cellence," centers his philosophy around the concept of man as a free 
being, with the rest of his philosophy as an elaboration on this taeme. 
He summarizes his position in the following statement: 
I ••• love freedom above all else. Man came forth 
out of freedom ani issues into freedom. Freedom is 
a primordial source and condition of existence, and 
••• I have put Freedom, rather than Being, at the 
basis of my philosophy. I do not think any other 
philosopher has done this ia such a radical and thor• 
ough-going way. 'lhe mystery of the world abides in 
freedom: God desired freedom and freedom gave rise to 
tragedy in the world. Freedom is at the beginning 
and at the end. I might say that all my life I was 
engaged in hammering out a philosophy of freedom. I 
was moved by the basic coll"fiction that God is truly 
present and operative only in freedom. Freedom alone 
should be recognized as possessing a sacred quality, 
whilst all other things to which a sacred character 
has been ~ssigned by men • • • ought to be made null 
and void. 
He speaks of freedom as a primary concern of Russian Christian philos-
ophy am claims to be influenced by Dostoyevsky, one of its greatest 
3 
interpreters. Freedom is the basic reality, the "principle of being 
4 
prior to all organized and perfected life, 11 a "mystery belonging to 
5 
the irnnost depths of spirit, " and "the beginning and the end of all 
1. Matthew Spinka, 11Berdyaev and Origen: A Comparison." Church History, 
16(1947), 9. 
2. DR, P• 46. 
3. FS, P• 156. Cf. infra, Chap. IV, Sec. 3, Sub-Sec. iii, Par. 1. 
4. Ibid., P• 128. 
5. Ibid., p. 129. 
1 
philosophy." Freedom cannot be rationalistically defined; it must 
be understood concretely rather than abstractly". It "is not a static 
concept but a living reality to be known dynamically through the exer-
2 
cise and the experience of it. 11 In one passage, freedom is called 
3 
11an apophatic state • . • impervious to rationalization. 11 Awareness 
4 
of freedom is said to bring freedom. 
5 
It is absolutely basic to life, 
especially to creativeness, yet it cannot be grasped and set apart 
as an entity. "Freedom is Nothing, in the sense that it is not one 
6 
of the realities of the natural world, it is not a certain thing." 
It is not a "single individual power, but an analogical univer-
7 
sal embodied in many individuals. 11 
1. Man is Free as a Spiritual Being 
Freedom and spirit are inseparable concepts in Berdyaev 's philos-
ophy, and as a spiritual being man is free to transfom and transfigure 
8 
the world. Freedom presupposes the spiritual: 
1. BE, P• 23. 
2. DR, P• 52. Cf. BE, p. 23 arrl TR, PP• 68-69, 76. Freedom cannot 
be an "object of knowledge," but as the approach to or condition 
of knowledge, it cannot be objectified. 
3. SR, P• 142. 4. BE, p. 177. Here Berdyaev refers to Kant as having a smmilar idea. 
Cf. Inunanuel Kant, Fundamental Princi les of the Meta h sic of Morals, 
trans. Thomas Abbott •· Y. : Liberal Arts Press, 19 9 , p. and H. J. 
Paton, The Categorical Imperative (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1948), p. 107. 
5. FS, P• 156 and "The Religion of Connnunism, 11 in The Russian Revolu-
tion, trans. D.B. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1932), P• 89. Freedom 
is said to be, in this· article, the "fundamental condition of any 
genuine realization." 
6. DH, p. v. 
7. Charles Hartshorne, · "Whitehead and Berdyaev: Is there Tragedy in 
God?" P• 73. · 8. RSRiJ, p. 32 and SR, p. 172. 
Man discovers his freedom above all in Spirit; there-
in he is free not only from natural and social deter-
min.S.tion, but also from that of logical Universalism.1 
2 
It may also be said that the spiritual is based on freedom. 
Like freedom, spirit is not an entity set apart from natural 
reality-it is an infusion of life into natural reality: 
Spirit is not another actuality, but it informs actu-
ality with purpose •••• Spiritual states do not cor-
respond to anything, theJ simply ~ • • • more exis-
tential than anything reflected in the objective world.3 
i. Freedom and Spirit are not mere psychological concepts 
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In his assertion that spirit is known in experience, Berdyaev 
does not mean only psychic experience. Distinguishing between spirit 
4 
and soul as did Hegel and the nzy-stics, Berdyaev says that a psycho-
logical interpretation of spirit engenders a kind of naturalism. 
Spirit is not psychic nature, but "truth, beauty, purpose (ancy free-
5 
dom." While psychologism is abstract and partial, the spiritual life 
6 
is whole and concrete, not limited to space and time. 
Ber~aev finds Sartre's concept of freedom more psychological 
than basic and adequate. Sartre's man may feel free, but this does 
7 
not mean that he is free. Sartre 1s freedom seems to be mere 11free-
will11 or negative "freedom from." 
1. SR, P• 13. Cf. RSRC, P• 109 and SF, P• 247, where this statement 
appears: "A man who is free should feel himself to be not on the 
circumference of the objectivized world, but at the centre of the 
spiritual world." 
2. SR, P• 48. 
3. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
4. FS, p. 8. 
5. SR, P• 39. 
6. FS, PP• 17-18. 
7. TNE, PP• 95-lOl, especi~ P• 99. 
ii. Freedom is more than free w.i.ll 
Berdyaev does not identif.y freedom with free-will; for him, free-
will implies only a choice between alternatives and not creativity. 
In free-will man may accept or reject 'What is offered, but he does 
not create by bringing into being what previously has not existed. 
Free-will may be a step on the way, but it is only a step. "Freedom 
1 
••• comes 'When the choice is maie and I have begun to create. 11 
iii. Freedom, personality, and suffering 
Differing from the Greek philosophers, who based tragedy on man's 
ccptivity by fate, Berdyaev considers freedom as the source of tragedy 
2 
and suffering. He thinks that the Qreeks did not have metaphysical 
freedom, since for them man was naturally oriented toward the good. 
fbtentiality in the Greek sense contains the grain of that 'Which will 
3 
be actualized. It is not based on freedom. This difference lies 
in the fact that for the Greeks fate was primary to all, while for 
4 
Berdyaev freedom was primary t'o all, including fate. 
5 
Berdyaev states that "freedom gives birth to suffering. 11 Man 
at his best (i.e. as developed pers~nality) struggles through diffi-
cult and painful freedom, lVhile if he tries to escape suffering he 
gives up his freedom and becomes a slave. 11To :refuse ••• suffering 
6 
·: .: •• is to refuse personality. 11 Berdyaev cites Dostoyevsky 1 s Grand 
1. DR, pp. 52-53. Cf. DM, pp. 79-80; FS, PP• 117-118; and SF, PP• 27,48. 
2. SR, PP• 125-126; TR, P• 69; and MH, P• 79. 
3. BE, P• 144. 
4. DM, PP• .30-31. 5. DR, P• 47. cr. the following statement from ss, P• 198: 11Tile con-
sciousness of freedom is a heavy burden for man to bear; pain and 
suffering are its accompaniment, and tragedy the outcome." 
6. "Marx Versus Man, 11 p. 485. Cf. SF, p. 27. 
Inquisitor who offers happiness for the price of freedom: 
The path of freedom is difficult a:rrl tragic., more be-
set than any other with heroic responsibility and mar-
tyrdom. The paths of necessity and compulsion are 
easier., less tragic, and less heroic. • • • The Grand 
Inquisitor wishes to relieve men of the burden of free~ 
dom so that they may all be happy. • • • The doctrine 
of the Grand. Inquisitor [is] based on the fall from 
the path of freedom to that of compulsion., so that man-
kind may 
1 
be delivered from the burden of its tragic 
destiny. 
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Suffering may crush and distort life, but it may also transfigure 
2 
life. How to overcome suffering in an adequate way is "the funda-
3 
mental and most serious question of human existence." There is the 
escape via the blunted consciousness, as in the Stoic's apathy or the 
4 
Buddhist's submerging of the indiVidual in the whole. But these are 
non-creative solutions, less adequate than the facing and sharing of 
. 5 
suffering. Without the capacity to suffer, there is no capacity to 
6 
love. For Berdyaev, not suffering, but the inability to suffer, with 
its implications of loss of freedom and personalit,y, would be the great-
7 
est evil. 
The idea of suffering brings to mind Hegel's idea of the "unhappy 
1. MH, p. 203. Cf. SF, PP• 28, 66; DM., P• 158; and DR, pp. 47, 177-
178. "The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" appears in Fyodor Dos-
toyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. C. Garnett (N.Y.: Modern 
Librar,y), PP• 25$=270. 
2. DH, p. 67; DM, p. 193; and BE, P• 113. 
3. DH, P• 67. 
4. DH, PP• 74, 81; and DM, P• 118. 5. See DH, p. 67. "Everyone shares or ought to share the suffering of 
others and that of the whole world." 
6. DH, p. 84 and SF, p. 5o. This is true for the divine and the human. 
God as personality is not absolute or pure being, but through suffer-
ing he has the capacity to love. 
1. SR, P• ll3. 
• 
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1 
consciousness." For Berdyaev, "all consciousness is unhappy" because 
consciousness impltes a division between subject and object--a sense 
of lack in the self. Suffering is linked to consciousness as it is 
with creativity; in fact, Berdyaev and Dostoyevsky agree that "suffer-
2 
ing is the only cause of consciousness." 
2. Berdyaev' s 'Three Types of Freedom 
As Berdyaev emphasizes freedom, he sometimes refers to its gen-
erally accepted definitions and sometimes to those meanings peculiar 
to his own philosophy. Because the primary, dark and irrational free-
don1 which underlies creativity is most often cited by him and because 
this is not a generally accepted interpretation of freedom, this type 
of freedom ¥dll receive the greatest amount of attention in this study. 
But Berdyaev also refers occasionally to the more generally used con-
cepts of freedqm. These would include, first, "rational freedom 11 -
that freedom gained under law and practiced in the fulfillment of moral 
duty. Secondly, these would include the freedom allowed men by God in 
His love for them. Berdyaev seems to assun1e rather than to emphasize 
3 
these two concepts of freedom. 
i. Uncreated freedom 
The freedom most often referred to b y Berdyaev is that freedom 
which goes even beyond God's creation. It operates in creativeness 
which is characterized as "primeval freedom, fathomless, undetermined 
by an,ything, not proceeding from God, but ascending towards God."4 
1. BE:, P• 81. 
2. DM, P• 38. 
Cf. SR, P• 112. 
Cf. DH, p. 66. 
3. Lossky, HRP, p . 235. 
4. DM, P• 128. Cf. P• 34. 
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Through this freedom man makes a real response to God rather than a 
predetermined one: 
If we admit only the freedom which is the gift of 
truth and has its source in God, and if we reject our 
freedom to choose and to receive the truth, we are in-
evitably and fatally impelled towards tyranny, and the 
freedom of the spirit is replaced by the organization 
of the spirit.l . 
This uncreated freedom is not only non-detennined by law or act 
of God, it is even characterized as "irrational, ••• inexplicable, 
2 
non-objectifiable." This means that in attempting to describe it, 
Berdyaev does so negatively--(it is "not this, not that11 ). Here is 
a summary of his concept of uncreated freedom: 
Freedom is ••• by its very nature not susceptible 
of rationalization. When I say that freedom is un-
created, and that objectification is destructive of 
true existence and true knowledge, I mean that man 
can be free only if his freedom is not determined by 
anything that is not himself; and that he is a subject 
only if he is not a 'thing' fitted in or subordinated, 
in a caused or any other wa:y, · to other things. 'Un-
created freedom' is a limiting notion, describing 5.1-ffi-
bolically a reality which does not lend itself to log-
ical definition. • • • The objective world is acces-
sible to rational knowledge and conceptual definition, 
but the source of its objectified condition cannot be 
thus known and defined. 3 
(1) Jacob Boehme and the Ungrund •. _ Berdyaev finds the nearest 
equivalent to his concept of uncreated freedom in Jacob Boehme's con-
cept of the Ungrund. After stating that nature must be understood as 
secondary and derivative while freedom is primary and uncreated, Ber-
1. FS, p. 126. See discussion in articles by Hartshorne, "Whitehead 
and Berdyaev: Is there Tragedy in God?}' p. 73 and D.G.M. MacKay, 
"Relations of God and Man in the Writing of Nicolas Berdyaev." 
Scottish Journal of Theology, 3(~950), 389. 
2. SR, P• ll5. 
3. DR, P• 288. 
• 
• 
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dyaev says that Boehme 1 s Ungrund 11must be understood above all as free-
1 
dom, freedom in the darkness." The Ungrund precedes causality--its 
freedom is not the rational freedom of moral autonomy but a 11mysteri-
ous" and "dark" freedom, better explained by myth than by concept~ 
11 It is impossible to formulate a conception of the Ungrund: it is a 
2 
myth and symbol, the limit of any rationalization." 
The symbol of the abyss applies to the Ungrund, indicating its 
3 
darlmess and "bottomless depth" as well as its negativity as that 
L~ 5 
void which, as "more primary than being," seeks being. For Boehme 
this nothing (Nichts) is not the void of emptiness, but a nothingness 
6 
which through seeking "becomes something." For Boehme there is a 
hungry will at the bottom of all being--a "baseless will for something 
7 
must be satisfied." 
The idea of nothingness may be clarified by reference to the Greek 
) } / \ )/ ) )/ 
oul( qv and /(I'J ov. Both signify nothingness, but while ovl( ov'means 
\ )/ 
utter barrenness,~rn DV is nothingness which conceals a potentiality as 
8 
non-being which 11is only half being or being which is not realized." 
1. BE, P• 108. 
2. SR, P• 115. Cf. BE, pp. lo6, 110 and SR, P• 145. Clarke, ITB, p. 87, 
states that 11the Ungrund is not a concept, it cannot be rationalized 
or objectified. It is not something parallel to God. There is no 
question of a metaphysical dualism. I have called the Ungrund a 1pic-
ture1 advisedly. It is not part of a philosophical structure, nor is 
it a religious dogma. It is, so to speak, 'meta-theological.' It is 
a basic intuition. .Along side of existence is the fathomless abyss 
of non-being, of ••• complete freedom, limited neither by reason nor 
anything else. The abyss is • • • prior to creation." 
3. BE; P• 18 and Clarke, ITB, P• 88. 
L~. BE, p~ 108. 5. Ibid., p. 110. 
6. Ibid.; PP• 107-108, 110. 
7. Ibid., p. 106. Cf. p. 107. 
8. !i3'ici., p. 97; SR, p. 145; Spinka, 11Berdyaev and Origen: a Comparison," 
p-:-1); Spinka, NBCF, P• 120. 
74 
\ )I 
The actualization of the potential /fn Ol/ does not mean "actual.iza-
1 
tion of eternal patterns 11 in the Platonic sense, nor a kind of evo-
' J/. lution, but a true creativeness. From ,l(n iiJJ something entirely new 
2 
arises. 
( 2) Unlimited potential for good or evil of the uncreated freedom. 
\ )/ 
The /(n ov or Ungrund which precedes creativeness and being contains 
potential evil as well as good. One may not characterize the Ungrund 
per~ as good or evil, but it might be said that through its freedom 
3 
either of these may be realized. In the Ungrund, "that abyss from 
which the dark stream of life issues forth, • • • every • • • possi-
4 
bili ty is latent. 11 
(i) Evil am freedom. Neither the Ungrund nor true freedom, 
then, is prejudiced toward the good, but both allow any possibility, 
not excluding evil. There could be no real movement in the world if 
5 
freedom allowed only the good. For Berdyaev, evil is not autonomous 
in source or being, but its origin, like that of creativeness and good, 
is in the free spirit. 
Evil is initially related to freedom rather than to 
causality. It seems paradoxical, but there is an af-
finity between evil and spirit. They have a common 
attribute in freedom, although evil, of course, is d&P 
struetive to both spirit and freedom. It is true that 
evil originates from spirit rather than matter. To 
say that freedom is the cause of evil is the same as 
saying that evil has no cause. In this case freedom 
does not mean absense of cause. It is only at a later 
1. Hartshorne, "Whitehead and Berdyaev: Is there Tragedy in God?," P• 74. 
2. DM, PP• 126-127. 
3. BE, pp. 106, 108; FS, P• 165; DH, P• 91; and DM, p~ 186. 
4. FS, p. 160. 
5. DH, P• 92; MH, PP• 75-77; and DM, P• 19. 
stage, in its consequences, that evil submits to the 
power of causality. Evil may be a cause, but it has 
itself no cause. Freedom is a definite mystery, an 
irrational element. It engenders evil as well as good 
without any discrimination, content simply to engerxler. 
There can be no rational interpretation of freedom; a 
rational definition would only kill freedom. That is 
known as a definitive conception (Grenzbegriff'). Thus 
evil is born of freedom, it has neither cause nor foun-
dation.l 
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Evil cannot be destroyed except as freedom is destroyed, yet through 
evil, freedom may destroy itself by turning into its opposite, slavery. 
Slavery itself can be the child of freedom, and there 
would be no freedom if it did not carry with it this 
possibility of' giving rise to slavery; there would be 
but the servitude of good. But the servitude of the 
good is an evil thing, and the freedom of evil can be 
a greater good than the good which is a result of com-
pulsion.2 
(ii) Evil and good. Berdyaev sees that evil often involves 
a conflict between two values. Indeed, "when two equally divine prin-
3 
ciples come into conflict" there is "pure tragedy. 11 Suffering is 
caused not by an independent source of evil opposing the good buj by 
the heartrending choice which must be made between two 11goods," e.g. 
love or freedom, perfection or creativeness. The creative act demands 
that limitations be set and choices made. When there are apparently 
equ.a.lly valuable alternatives given which must be partly let go and 
partly actualized there is conflict and difficulty of decision. No 
matter which choice is made, s.ome value must be set asi.de 'While that 
4 
which is realized is realized with limitation. 
1. Sll;. ~ ll3-114. Cf. FS, pp. 161-163. 
2. BE, P• 247. Cf. FS, P• 135. 
3. DM, P• 31. Cf. DM, PP• 156-157. 
4. Ibid., P• 139 and Hartshorne, "Whitehead and Berdyaev: Is there 
Tragedy in God?," p. 73. Hartshorne quotes Whitehead as saying 
that "actual value must ••• be finite." 
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There is also the evil inherent in too great a devotion to any 
single good, with the resulting blind spots toward other values, or 
1 
the possible enslavement to the one good and exclusive pursuit of it. 
(3) God's relationship to the Ungrund. The relationship of the 
Ungnmd to God m,ay be clarified by a reference to Eckhardt's distinc-
tion between Gott and Gottheit. Like Eckhardt, Berdyaev distinguishes 
between God the Cbeator and the "Divine Nothing, 11 the "irrational and 
ineffable principle, the :mystery of the Ungrund, ••• the primary 
2 
basis of existence. 11 Berdyaev identifies the Ungrund with the God-
head, characterizing it as "the abyss, the free nothingness which pre-
3 
cedes God ani is outside God. " Here he follows Eckhardt in distin-
guishing Gott from Gottheit, while Boehme would have kept the two more 
or less united in one divine nature. For Boehme, the U,rund is both 
"in the depths of the Godhead and precedes the Godhead. 11 Berdyaev, 
indicating both the unfathomable nature of God and the idea of move-
ment within His divine nature, finds references to Eckhardt and Boehme 
5 
helpful. 
B~aev thinks that God possesses freedom and potentiality--not 
that He is pure being or "Unmoved Mover. 11 He interprets Boehme 1 s Un-
1. BE, P• 214. 
2. SR, P• 140. Cf. DM, P• 25 and SR, P• 141. 
3. BE, P• 107; DM, P• 29; and DR, p. 99. 
4. BE, p. 107. Here Godhead would include what Eckhardt would desig-
nate by both terms, Gott and Gottheit. Both Spinka (NBCF, P• ll9) 
and Clarke (ITB, p. '8'B)"note that for Boehme the Ungrund. lies within 
the Godhead (Spinka uses the tenn Godhead, while Clarke says God), 
while for Berdyaev the Ungrund goes further than this. It may be 
that Berdyaev follows Eckhardt more closely than does Boehme. Or it 
may be that there is some inexactness in the use of tenns, i.e. God-
head is not always used in the Eckhardtian sense. 
5. FS, PP• 72-73 and MH, PP• 54-55. 
• 
• 
grund as revealing 
an interior lj_fe and process within the Deity itself • 
It is an eternal birth of God, a self-begetting. The 
denial of this theogonic process is a denial of the 
life of the Godhead. • • • The contradictory, suffer-
ing, and flamingly tragic character of the life of the 
world is accounted for by the fact that before being 
and deeper than being lies the Ungrund, the bottomless 
abyss, irrational mystery, primordial freedom, which 
is not derivable from being.l 
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The struggle inherent in the theogonic process is seen to continue 
eternally. If this is denied, the resulting concept of God is too 
2 
rational and logical. God faces struggle and suffering. 
Conceiving of the Ungrund as primary, Berdyaev says that God 11is 
all-powerful in relation to being but not in relation to nothingness 
3 
and to freedom, and that is why evil exists. 11 God is not the source 
4 
of evil, nor is "a being existing positively beside Himi' the source. 
Evil arises from the infinite potentiality of the primal freedom of 
the Ungrund. Emphasizing that freedom must be accepted and understood 
in order to justify evil,Berdyaev s~s that eVil implies the existence 
of God, because the presence of evil in the world indicates a present 
5 
lack, pointing to a good beyond. If there were no evil in the world, 
1. BE, P• 105. 
2. MH, p. 55. 
3. FS, p. 160. Cf. the following statement from MCA, p. 149: "The 
final truth about evil is included in the genial -~±c1 works of 
Jacob Boehme. From the Ungrund, the abyss, light 1s born, God: 
the theogonic process takes place and out of it flows darkness, 
evil, a shadow over the light of divinity. Evil takes its source 
not in the God that is born, but in the foundations of God, in the 
abyss, from 1/!ihich proceed both light and darlmess. We can give 
reasoned meaning to evil only if we accept the principle of develop-
ment in divine life." 
4 •• FS, p~ 165 . 
.5 Ibid., PP• 159-160. Cf. William Hubben, Four Prophets of Our Destiny 
{N.Y. : Macmillan, 1952 ), p.. 73, where the following statement appears: 
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it would of course be all good, and would not "need" God nor any good 
1 
greater than its own resources. 
(4) Man's relationship to uncreated freedom. Berdyaev sees man 
as a child of God and of freedom or non-being. 11Man 1 s 'nature' is 
created by God, but his 'freedom' is not created, not determined by 
2 
any being and is prior to all being. 11 Because human nature is rooted 
3 
in "pre-existential meonic freedom, 11 man has the freedom to realize 
himself and to choose or to reject God and choose instead the dark 
4 
abyss of irrational freedom. Berdyaev says that 
man is not free if he is merely a manifestation of God, 
a part of the Deity; he is not free if he has been en-
dowed with freedom by God the Creator, but has nothing 
divine in himself; nor is he free if evil has its source 
in an evil god, in matter upon ..,.rhich he is dependent.!:> 
Man's participation in the primal meonic freedom underlies his 
"Nicolas Berdyaev sums up the essence of Dostoyevsky1 s faith by 
stating that the existence of evil proves God 1 s existence. A 
wholly good and righteous world would have no need for God, 1for 
the world itself would be god. 1 And he concludes that God is be-
cause evil exists, 'and that means that God is because freedom is. 1 11 
1. Berdvaev labels as "shallow" the attitude of some kinds of humanism 
which would assert the illusiveness of evil as hinted here. Cf. TNE,p •. J.4. 
2. DM, p. 27. This is the most direct statement in a discussion of 
several pages relating to this subject. See especially pp. 25 and 29. 
3. DM, P• 69. 4. Ibid., p. 69. Clarke expresses Berdyaev 1s idea well in the follow-
ing passage from ITB, p. 180: "Freedom gives to man the possibility 
of fighting against God •••• But if freedom be only God's creature, 
if freedom be given to man by God, then the drama. between God and 
man is not real life but play-acting, man is only dressed-up in free-
dom, he is not basically free." (Italics in original.) 
5. DM, p. 34 This passage is cited and discussed by Charles Hartshorne, 
Rlilosophers Speak of God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 
pp. 290-291. See also Berdyaev's statement in FS, P• 127: "Human 
freedom is not only freedom in God, but also freedom in relation to 
God. Man must be free in respect of God, the world, and his O'Wll life. 
• • • Freedom is not identical with goodness and perfection of life; 
it is this compulsion and this identification which have been the 
cause of its being misunderstood and denied." 
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ability to act without outer compulsion, and to know subjectively and 
1 
creatively. In the genuine creative act, man brings to fruition his 
foundation of freedom: "In every creative act there is an element of 
. 
the primordial freedom inherent in the subjective spirit, an element 
2 
free from external determination." 
ii. Rational freedom 
Berdyaev emphasizes that freedom must be freedom from external 
compulsion, but he also points out that freedom limited solely to 
"freedom from ••• 11 leads nowhere. "To desire freedom for its own 
sake, freedom without purpose ••• is to desire emptiness, to turn 
3 
away towards non-being." A creative act is done "for the sake of" 
4 
a positive good. Freedom for its own sake may degenerate into its 
opposite, i.e. a man who feels free may be enslaved to his emotions 
5 
or to his environment. Individualism as a social organization (or 
lack of organization) doew not necessarily engender long-lasting and 
creative freedom. If man is merely struggling to escape an outside 
power, 
if there is nothing towards vmich man can lift up his 
eyes, he is deprived of substance, human liberty is 
silllply a formula without a:rry contegt. • • • Individ-
ualism is • • • a negative reform. 
Freedom is less meaningful as self-assertion and opposition to the ex-
ternal. than as self-determination of the moraJ. will which recognizes 
1. SS, P• 75 
2. SR, P• 58. Cf. DM, p. 53. 
3. MCA, P• 147. 
4. DM, p. 147. 
5. RSRC, pp. 104-105. 
6. "The New Middle Ages," p. 85. This is the sunnnarizing statement '0£ 
a discussion beginning on p. 84. Cf. MCA, P• 290. 
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l 
other men as persons. Berdyaev agrees with Hegel that "freedom is 
2 
to be in possession of oneself." Man's creative act is at best an 
3 
11intelligent freedom ••• , liberty in truth and goodness." 
iii. God wills and gives freedom 
In Freedom and the Spirit~ Berdyaev refers to freedom's rela-
tionship to autonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy. Autonomy is inter-
preted as moral self-determination, not as negative "freedom from . 
4 
" 
. . . . Heteronomy is rejected, and theonomy is said to transcend 
in value both other concepts. God does not determine any man's life, 
nor does He create freedom within which man lives. He expects and 
wants man to be free; 11He waits for his (man's) free response to the 
5 
divine call. 11 Man is essentially the image of God. He has potential 
for good or evil and is not oriented automatically toward the good. 
If he were "deprived of the freedom to do wrong (m~ would be merely 
6 
a good automaton." 
7 
God works in the world through free man, not "above his head." 
Because God loves man He gives him freedom (the greatest value) rather 
8 
than happiness (a lesser value). God values the free sinner more 
than He does the obedient slave. 
1. MCA, p. 290 and BE, p. 137. 
2. FS, p. 122. 
3. Ibid., P• 125. 
4. Ibid., p. 147. 5. Ibid., p. 126. Cf. MCA, p. 112, where Berdyaev states that man's 
~ creativity fulfills the will of God. 
6. FS, p. 131. Here Berdyaev especially repudiates Augustine who claims 
that man is free to choose only the good while in choosing evil he 
forfeits his freedom. See "Christian Optimism and Christian Pessimism," 
p. 419. 
7. ''Christian Optimism and Christian Pessimism," p. 420. 
8. MH, p. 59 and FS, p. 141. 
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Berdyaev also speaks of transcension in connection with this 
third type of freedom. While transcendence implies going outside 
oneself and subjecting oneself to an external force, transcension 
implies going beyond Without going outside oneself. In Berdyaev 1 s 
words, 
The process of transcension in freedom never means 
subjection to an alien will, which indeed is slavery, 
but subjection to the Truth which is at the same time 
also the Way and the Life.l 
In relating the self to the supra-personal in freedom, transcen-
2 
sian 11is the liberation of man from captivity to himself. 11 
1. SF, p. 10. Transcension might conceivably mean freedom through 
the moral law, but for Berdyaev it means freedom in relation to God. 
2. ~., p. 30. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BERDYAEV 1 S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 
1. Relationship between Philosophy of Religion and Social Philosopny 
As has been noted previously in this study, Berdyaev 1s philosophy 
1 
has its foundation in religious concepts, including the nature of man 
and his knowledge of, and relation to, the world beyond his self. Ber-
dyaev is one of many Russian philosophers whose system of thought is 
less an elaboration of a single aspect of philosophy than a search 
2 
for "integrated truth." In Berdyaev's writings, religion is not an 
isolated fragment of man's experience. It is to be projected into 
3 
all of life so that all of life may be transfigur-ed. Man as a moral 
being is "rooted in the spiritual world and social relations are merely 
4 
a projection" of this. 
· Philosophy is to integrate all knowledge and action. For the 
Russian philosopher, philosophy typically does not begin with logic 
and epistemology, but with man as an historical, ethical and religious 
5 
being. Man is seen as a whole being, including religious and social 
aspects. Thus, 
1. Cf. supra, Chap. II, Sec. 5. 
2 • ORO, p. 38 • 
). MH , p. 223 and Spinka, NBCF, p. 22. · Spinka cites a reference in 
"0 novom religioznom sozanii, 11 an article in Voprosy Zhizni, pp.l51-15?. 
4. DM, p. 20. 5. BE, p. 35. Of. TNE, p. 53. Berdyaev writes that personality is 
generally more central in Russian than in western thought. 
It should be the aim of any concrete philosophy to in-
tegrate the social aspects of knowledge and to lay the 
foundations of a sociological philosophy. ~ philosophy 
of this kind would help to throw light on religious 
philosophy.l 
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Life is not diVided into the "purely religioustt and the "purely social," 
but each point of view illumines the other :;· 
i. The religious orientation of Russian thought 
In his religious approach to social questions, Berdyaev follows, 
a tradition which he feels is typically Russian. The religious char-
acter in atheistic CODUilunism, a movement which arose partly as an at-
tempted answer to the torturing existence of evil, is an example of 
2 
this, as are Russian nihilism, anarchism, and narodnichestvo. As 
Berdyaev states, "Russian socialism is a question of God and godlesa-
3 
ness" as much as it is a question of economics and politics. He calls 
4 
politics the "religion of the Social Revolutionists." The absorbing 
and almost fanatical faith which Berdyaev notes as a Russian character-
istic was first evident in the devotion of the people to the Orthodox 
Church. When many exchanged their fa:tth in the supernatural for a 
faith in the supra-personal super-state, it seemed that 
The spirit of the people could very readily pass from 
one integra'bd faith to another integrated faith, from 
one orthodoxy to another. • • • Russia passed from the 
old Middle Ages to a new Middle Ages, avoiding the ways 
of the new history with its secularization, its differen.;.. 
1. SS, P• 84. 
2. RI, passim, especially pp. 49, 98-100, 159. On narodnichestvo, 
see infra, Chap. IV, Sec. 3, Sub-Sec. ii, Par. 3. · 
3. RI, P• 159. 
4. TNE, P• lo6. 
tiation of various fields of cu1 ture, with its liber-
alism, its individualifll, its triumph of the bour-
geoisie of capitalism. 
ii. The problem of evil and social philosophy 
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One connection between Russian religious and social thought is 
the relationship of the problem of evil to social thinking and acting. 
The intelligentsia, united more by their idealism than by their social 
status, revolted against suffering and injustice. Unable to reconcile 
the concept of an omnipotent and good God with the evil they saw in 
the lives of men, they came to reject altogether the idea of God. 
As a result of pity, sympathy; tnd the impossibility 
of bearing suffering, Russians became atheists. They 
became atheists because they could not accept a Crea-
tor who made an evil, incomplete world full of suffer-
ing. • • • Russian atheism • • • is a religious phe-
nome~n. In its foundations there lay a love of jus-
tice. 
iii. Nihilism 
3 
The intelligentsia 1 s rejection of God "for moral reasons, 11 led 
into Russian nihilism. Berdyaev lists the values recognized by nihil-
ism as "social truth, justice, the welfare of the people, the happiness 
4 
of the lower working classes." Because God had failed, man's task was 
to enlighten and improve the world by his work. Though nihilism pro-
fessed to be an"atheistic movement, Berdyaev calls it a "revolt against 
5 
God ••• in the name of God, for the sake of a higher idea of God. 11 
1. ORC, P• 141. 2. Ibid., PP• 42-43. Cf. RI, pp . 25-28 and TNE, P• 60. 
3. "Russian Religious Psychology and Communistic Atheism," in The Rus-
sian Revolution, p. 14. 
4. Ibid., P• 21. 5. DH, P• 2. For Berdyaev there can be only nominal atheism for anyone, 
because "in reality no atheists exist; there are only idolators. " 
(DH, P• 2.) 
85 
He sees in nihilism an atheism born not primarily of man 1 s pride and 
hatred, but of his suffering. 
It is important to note the need for some kind of "purge 11 of the 
"official religion" of Russia at the time of the rise of nihilism 
(19th century), regardless of the adequacy of nihilism's "purge.n 
The church had a long history of control by the state, dating back 
1 
to the Muscovite and Petrine periods (14th through 17th centuries), 
and Otthodox Christianity seemed to continue to sanction the great 
2 
social injustices which existed. Many Christians had become compla-
cent, decadent, and unwilling to revolt actively against these evils. 
Without the consolation of a belief in eternal life, nihilists willing-
ly sacrificed and even died for their beliefs while Christians sat si-
3 
lently by. As the intelligentsia became nihilists, there was 
a transposition of religious motives and religious p~­
chology into a non-religious or anti-religious sphere, 
into a region of social problems, so that the spiritual 
energy of religion flaws into social cnannels, which 
thereby take on a religious character.4 
Nihilism was a non-supernatural eschatology, 
asceticism without grace; asceticism not in the name 
of God, but in the name of the future welfare of man-
kind, in the name of a perfect society.5 
6 
Berdyaev calls nihilism a kind of "social utilitarianism," because 
while it was to free man from suffering, it did not give attention to 
the freedom of his spirit. In order to escape social injustice, for 
1. ORC, P• 175 and RI, PP• 5, 7. 
2. "Russian Religious P~chology ani Communistic Atheism," P• 22. 
3. Ibid.' p. 24. 
4. Ibid., p. 10. 
5. Ibid., P• 20. 
6. Ibid., p. 19, and RI, PP• 136-137. 
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example, man was to be made subservient to social order and class value. 
Art, religion, philosophy, and other manifestations of culture were 
rejected as values. Thus man's freedom, dignity of personality, and 
1 
creativity were also lost. Nihilism contained a radical contradiction 
because the nihilists sought 
the liberation of personality; the,y proclaimed a revolt 
against all beliefs, all abstract ideas, for the sake 
of that liberation. On behalf of the liberation of 
personality, they emptied it of its qualitative content, 
devastated its inner life, and deni2d its right to crea-
tiveness and spiritual development. 
2. The Ethical Basis of Social Philosophy 
For Berdyaev, the "summum bonum" and the basis of his ethical 
system is the freely creating person, not a social harmony or other 
supra-personal goal. As he expresses this in !he Destigy of Man, 
The universal law is that every moral action should be 
unique and individual, i.e. that it should have in view 
a concrete living person and not the abstract good.3 
The moral good is not a: goal but an inner force which 
lights up man's life from within. The important thing 
is the source from which activit,y4springs and not the end towards which it is directed. 
Man is good if he uses his energy creatively. As the source of crea-
tiveness the person and not the abstract goal is the primary good and 
5 
of primary value. Man's devotion to a goal is to be an expression of 
1. "Russian Religious Psychology and Communistic Atheism, 11 p. 21; RI, 
PP• 136-137; and ORO, pp. 45-46. 
2. ORC, P• 56. 
3. DM, P• lo6. 
4. Ibid., p. 81. 5. cr.-Berdyaev's statement in BE, p. 186: "Even the most perfect 
production does not reach the same high level as the creative 
genius himself." 
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1 
himself rather than servitude to an external force. In this sense, 
"goodness and moral life are a path in which the starting point and 
2 
the goal coincide--it is the emanation of creative energy." 
i. The ethics of law 
The minimum basis for any ethics is a system of restraining law, 
which protects individuals from each other. In The Destiny of Man, 
his book on ethics, Berdyaev begins to define ethics with reference 
to "the ethics of law," in which he includes Old Testament ethics, 
pagan ethics, the ethics of primitive man, and the legalistic ethics 
3 
of scholastic philosophy. On this level, ethics are concerned with 
society as a unit rather than 1li th man as a person. 'Ihe life of the 
individual is regulated in relation to society as order is brought 
4 
out of chaos and man's unruly instincts are controlled. 
(1) Characteristics of the law. Under a system of law, the in-
di vidual is freed from certain dangers J his personality is preserved 
"from interference and violence on the part of others, whatever their 
5 
spiritual cond.i tion may be. 11 Law has a negative function as it brings 
the self-centered individual to see and carry out his obligations to 
6 
society, thus establishing justice. 
(2) Transcending the ethics of law. As a beginning, then, the 
law fulfills a needed function, but alone it is not enough. As Berdyaev 
1. BE, P• 181. 
2. DM, P• 144. 
3. Ibid., P• 85. 
4. Ibid., PP• 86, 90, 93. 
5. Ibid., p. 101. 
6. Ibid., p. 138; RSRC, p. 99; and SF, P• 29. 
• 
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writes, the law "restrains unruly instincts and creates order, but it 
1 
also prevents the creation of a new order." In theological terms, 
man as sinner needs the law so that he m~ overcome his sins. But · 
one who sees only his sins is powerless to create. Mere negative 
2 
crushing of sin is not enough--something good must replace evil. 
The law also upholds the average, but Berdyaev points out the 
3 
need for moving creatively beyond the average. Beauty, knowledge, 
and creativity are greater values than bare morality and obedience. 
4 
"The law neither cares about the individual's life nor gives him strength 
5 
to fu.lfill the good vmich it requires of him. 11 
6 
In trying 11to make man 
into an automaton of virtue 11 it fails to do justice to hi.s freedom to 
7 
be himself. 
ii. The ethics of redemption 
Going beyond the law and justice , Berdyaev discusses ethics based 
on love and working for redemption. In theological terms, as man 
struggles to overcome the world's evil, God also struggles and sacri-
8 
fices. By working l'ri.th man to destroy evil, God helps man to achieve 
freedom from evil and from the law with its normative and legalistic 
limitations. Life is a greater value than the law and must include 
more than the conquest of evil. "Redemption from sin, salvation from 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
DM, P• 90. 
MCA, PP• 256, 264; Clarke, ITB, p. 135; and Berdyaev 1 s article, 
"Unity of Christendom in the strife Between East and West," P• 23, 
where he 1vri tes: "Repentance alone may lead to impotence." 
MCA, P• 264. 
Ibid.; p. 104. 
DM, p~ 95. 
Ibid.; P• 95. 
DR, P• 95; Williams, BPH, P• 191; and DM, P• 130. 
DM, p. 103 and Spinka, 11Berdyaev and Origen: a Comparison, 11 p. 18. 
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evil, are in themselves negative, and the final aims of being lie far 
1 
beyond, in a positive creative purpose." It is to this "positive 
creative purpose" that attention will now be given. 
iii. The ethics of creativeness 
In a one-sentence summ~ of Be~aev 1 s ebhics, Clarke states 
2 
that "man is redeemed from the law in order to create." He moves 
from a morality based on obedience to a higher morality based on crea-
3 
tiveness. In his fullest discussion of the ethics of creativeness, 
Berdyaev states that the creative moral act is primarily individual, 
concentrating less on the goal to be achieved than on the development 
4 
of the creative person. While the perfect fulfillment of the law 
would be the attainment of a more or less static goal, the perfectly 
fulfilled life is constantly pressing on and acting creatively in a 
world which is never 11finished 11 but must be continually transformed 
5 
through free man's creativity. 
necessarily make a perfect life. 
The doing of perfect deeds does not 
6 
The genius who continually breaks the law by going beyond it; 
'Who, being daring rather than obedient, refuses to follow the demcnds 
of t he world, who does not necessarily give to others what is "accepted," 
7 
is the most religious and the most moral man. Creative ethics, then, 
cannot be given a priori, but must be based on a moral experience of 
- 8 
of "creative activity." 
(1) The importance of freedom. In The Destiny of Man, Be~aev 
1. MCA, P• 95. 
2. Clarke, ITB, p. 133. 
3. MCA, P• 272. 
4. DM, PP• 131-132, 141. 
5. DH, P• 53 and Spinka, NBCF, ~147. 
6. DM, p. 143 and TNE, P• 108. 
7. MCA, PP• 172-179. 
8. DM, P• 15. 
writes that 
moral life presupposes freedom; a moral valuation is 
always a free act. Freedom can never be found solely 
in the known, but must be present in the knower as 
the very basis of his being.l 
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Man introduces and works to realize purposes and values in the world; 
there is not a "fixed static moral order subordinated. to a single uni-
2 
versally binding moral law11 which stands as "absolute good" while man 
3 
is but an automaton whose moral life is without freedom. 
4 
Teleology 
is not above man nor independent of him. Creative man not only builds 
a new and better world; he liberates the world from its bondage to 
5 
material, time, habit, etc. Progress in the world comes through man 1 s 
work and struggle with the 11 given11 and from his realization of aspira-
tions. 
Real development and progress in the world are the re-
sult not of a regularly working and necessary process 
but of creative acts, of the invas~on of the realm of 
necessity by the realm of freedom. 
(2) The creative conquest of evil. Berdyaev asserts that evil 
must not be merely exterminated. Something positive must be brought 
7 
into i ts place. He also points out that evil cannot be effectively 
used t o fight evil since the all-out struggle of evil against another 
8 
evil may give rise to a third and greater evil. End and means must 
9 
be clearly distinguished, particularly in dealing with evil. Berdyaev 
1. Ibid., P• 13. 
2. Ibid., p. 133. 
3. Ibid., "pp. 16, 133, 149. 
4. BE, pp. 146-147. 
5. Ibid., P• 173. 
6. Ibid., P• 147. 
7. DM, P• 166; TR, p. 152; and Clarke, ITB, p. 136. 
8. FS, P• 181. 
9. DM, P• 165. 
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feels that in dealing With evil in oneself, man can afford to be ruth-
less, but that in attempting to lead others from evil, one must be '!l.n-
dulgent, 11 remembering that the person and his freedom of action are 
the greatest values and of more importance than the evil in which he 
1 
may be involved. 
3. The "Russian Idea" as Background for Berdyaev 1 s Social Philosophy 
In The Russian Idea, Berd.yaev describes the Russian type and gives 
the background of Russian social and religious thought. The influences 
of both eastern and western cultures on Russian history have made Rus-
sian thought complex and inconsistent. The Russian soul, like the Rus-
sian country, has always been vast, vague in its outline, and 'stretched" 
2 
toward the infinite. Russian extremism, messianism and totalitarianism 
3 
seem to be expressions of this longing and reaching. The thinking of 
Russian philosophers seems to be more in..f'luenced by these elements than 
by a trust in logical reasoning. According to Lossky, 
Russian thinkers trust intellectual intuition, moral 
and aesthetic experiences which reveal the highest 
values, and above all they trust mystical religious 
experience that establishes man 1s connection with God 
and His Kingdom.4 
i. Eschatological elements 
In The Russian Idea, Berdyaev writes that "Russian thought is 
essentially eschatological arrl the eschatology takes various forms. 11 
1. FS, p. 186. 
2. RI, p. 2 and Dostoevsky, trans. Donald Attwater (N.Y.: Meridian 
Books, i957), p. 162. 
3. RI, PP• 3, 249. 
4. Lossky, HRP, p. 405. 
5. RI, p. 192. 
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Tilere is less desire for gradual. growth than for sudden change, both 
in religious and social thought, the latter including hihilism, anaroh-
1 
ism, and Russian socialism. Tilroughout its history, Russian Chris-
2 
tianity seems to Berdyaev more eschatological than western Christianity. 
Moscow's claim to -leadership as the "Third Rome" and in the Third In-
3 
ternational are definite expressions of the Russian messianic idea, 
but according to Berdyaev these ideas of messianism are distorted be-
4 
cause of their strong Will to power. 
Such an eschatological orientation has two implications for ethics~ 
First, life is to be lived in the light of the eternal, and second, the 
attainment of good is never realizable "Wi. thin this world or within his-
torical time. Because of this orientation, Berdyaev writes his categori-
cal imperative to read, "Act so that eternal life might be revealed to 
you and that the energy of eternal life should radiate from you to all 
5 
creation." 
The longing for a far-off goodness, seemingly unattainable in this 
world, is expressed in Tile Russian Idea: 
Among the Russians there is always a thirst for another 
••• world; there is always discontent with that which 
is. An eschatological bent is native to the structure 
of the Russian soul. • . • A pilgrim walks around the 
l. RI, pp. 128, 141 and DH, pp. 176, 187-188. 
2. RI, p. 195 and "Unity of Christendom in the Strife Between East and 
West," p. 17. 
3. RI, P• 217. 
4. Ibid., p. 196. 5. DM, p. 263. Cf. the statement in MH, p. 196: "Our function ••• 
is to determine our relation to the problem of life and history in 
the terms and according to the criteria of eternity. Only when we 
have situated human destiny and history in the perspective of eter-
ni. ty w.ill the future appear no more real than the past and the pre-
sent no more real than either. For eternal time suffers no divi-
immense Russian land but never settles down or attaches 
himself to anything. A pilgrim is in search of the 
truth, in search of the Kingdom of God. He struggles 
into the distance; the pilgrim has no abiding city upo~ 
earth, he moves eagerly towards the city that is to be. 
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(1) Extremism and schisms. In an article on Berdyaev, Dean Inge 
sharply differentiates the Russian from the English approach to life's 
problems: 
To a Russian compromise is treason; to an Englishman 
it is wisdom. • • • To an Englishman with his long 
experience of popular government politics is the art 
of second-best. • • • If we aim directly at the ide~ 
we get nothing done. But no Russian thinks this way. 
In contrast to the rational and practical Englishman, the Russian is 
inclined to be fanatically devoted to his cause. For example, Lenin 
3 
would have said that "everything is moral l'lhieh serves the Revolution. 11 
Many a Russian in promoting his cause has been "prepared to burn his 
. 4 
neighbor, but • • • ready at ·any moment to be burned himself." To him 
right and wrong seem clearly differentiated. Because each pursues his 
own idea to the limit, many splits w.i. thin groups develop. Russian his-
5 
tory is replete with schisms in both religion and politics. 
(2) The ideal of comunmity. "The Russian idea" must also be said 
to include the concept of the brotherhood of all men ill community. Ber-
dyaev sharply distinguishes the Russian idea of community from the German 
sions. The rationalization of a disintegrated time undertaken by 
the religion of progress is a sin before eternity." 
1. RI, P• 197. Cf. DR, P• 294 and DOS, p. 163. 
2. Inge, "The Fhilosophy of Berdyaeff," P• 203. 
3. ORC, p. 64. 4. Ibid., p. 63. Here Berdyaev refers especially to Dostoyevsky's novel 
~Possessed. 
5. "Democracy, Socialism and Theocracy," in The End of Our Time
4
, p
6
• 206; 
"Russian Religious Psychology and Communistic Atheism, 11 pp. , . ; arrl 
RI, pp. 8-14. In RI, p. 13, he notes one particularly schismatic 
group, the nyetovshchina or "no-sayers, 11 who alwaYS said "no." 
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1 
idea of imperialistic domination. The Russian idea involves salva-
tion in community rather than individual salvation as emphasized by 
2 
the West. The Russian idea of friendship includes more group fellow-
3 
ship than individual "chuminess" based on certain personal traits. 
ii. Some important events in Russian history 
As Russian history unfolded, various social philosophies emerged 
and were put into practice. The present section considers briefly some 
of the historical events and social theories which Berdyaev found most 
relevant to his own concept of social philosophy. 
(1) Peter I and ''westernizing." Peter the Great reigned from 
1682 to 1725 as a powerful ruler who put his ideas into practice with 
autocratic force. Impressed with the learning he acquired in Europe 
as a young man, he proceeded to force 11western culture" onto the Rus-
sian people, particularly the upper classes. He opposed the Orthodox 
Church as "un-western, 11 weakening its influence, particularly over the 
ruling classes. With his reforms the "Muscovite Period 11 of Russian 
history ended. During this time Moscow had been considered the ttThird 
4 
Rome," and the church had had great power. However, this borrowing of 
1. RI, P• 254; DH, P• 182; and TNE, P• 75. 
2. RI, p. 208. Cf. supra, Chap. II, Sec. 5, Sub-Sec. ill. 
3. DR, pp. 277-2?8. In this passage, Berdyaev makes an interesting 
comparison between Russian "friendship" which is built on "the pur-
suit of life itself" and the French "friendshipu lffiich is dependent 
on abstract 11 intellectualit~ and sensualit6. 11 
4. ORC, pp. 12-14. Cf. Robert Nisbet Bain, "Peter I, 11 Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, (1957), Vol. XVII, 637-639. An example of Peter's type 
of reform was his order that all men should shave their beards in 
order to indicate a break with their religious and cultural heri~ 
age. Those who insisted on keeping their beards had to pay an 
extra tax. (Ibid., p. 638). 
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European ideas produced only a superficially western cu1 ture. Though 
Peter made his country larger, he did not strengthen it, and within 
1 
its borders it was "utterly fragmentary. 11 There was a great and 
widening gulf between its miserably poor serfs and its upper classes. 
Within the upper classes, the fift between the intelligentsia and re-
actionary nobility also began to develop. 
(2) The Slavophile. Peter's "westernizing" brought a reaction 
from the Slavophile who wanted a distinctively Russian rather than a 
western culture. They loved Russian religion and social customs and 
were often influenced by the ideas of German romanticism as expressed 
by Hege~ and Schelling, but only as these ideas were 11Russianized. 11 
According to the Slavophile, the Roman, Teuton, and Roman Catholic 
rationalistic tendencies prevalent in Europe led to Protestant indi-
vidualism. Both were undesirable extremes, while "Russia, on the other 
hand, represented an organic community, alien to the European spirit of 
violence and competition; Russia alone harboured the promise of social 
2 
justice and of a perfect order. 11 The Slavophile also believed in the 
people more than Peter had. They defended freedom of conscience and 
speech and upheld the Russian concept of property as a trust to man 
from God rather than the Roman law concept of man 1 s absolute Ollllership 
3 4 
and possession of rights of is property. Khomiakov (1804-1860) and 
Kireyevsky (1806-1856) were the greatest of their early leaders. 
1. ORC, PP• 15-16 and RI, PP• 16-17. 
2. Hans Kohn, 11 Pan-Slavism, 11 Enctclopaedia.Britannica, (1957), 
XVII, 189. Cf. also Rl, PP• O, 160 and ORC, P• 28. 
3. ORC, P• 30. 4. Cf. infra, Chap. IV, Sec. 3, Sub-Sec. iii, Par. 4. 
Vol. 
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(3) Narodnik socialism. Socialism was a part of Russian life 
long before the rise of the Bolsheviks, as Berdyaev indicates by out-
lining its four stages of developnent. First came Utopian socialism 
with its abundance of theory and scarcity of practice. '!hen followed 
Narodnik or "people's" socialism, the most typically Russian in kind 
and the concern of this section. '!he last two stages were Marxian 
1 
"scientific" socialism and Bolshevik communism. 
Though there were many leaders in the Narodnik movement, such as 
2 
the personalistically-inclined Radishchev, Alexander Herzen (1812-
1870) is generally considered to be the founder of Narodnik socialism. 
He was concerned with the lives of the people ani held that freedom 
is a greater value than swift and sure progress. However, his "per-
sonalism" tended to be individualistic rather than genuinely communi-
tartan. He opposed "bourgeois middle class ideals" and believed that 
3 
socialism could be realized without a preceding "bourgeois" period. 
'!hat is, Narodnik socialism could be "built on the foundations of the 
4 
communal tradition of Russian village life 11 by the peasants. Accord-
ing to Berdyaev, this was seen· as possible because Russia was less 
"socialized" than the west. The social ethics of Narodnichestvo were 
based on an attitude toward men rather than on a relationship to an 
abstract state. Russia was ready for cammunal life because the peas-
5 
ant's closeness to the soil was almost a "mystical relationship." 
1. TNE, pp. 63-64. Cf. ORC, p. 32, where Berdyaev speaks of three 
stages, combining Marxism and Bolshevism into one. 
2. RI, PP• 28-29. 
3. Ibid., pp. 62-64; ORC, pp. 44, 60; and TNE, P• 56. 
4. George Douglas Howard Cole, "Socialism, 11 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
(1957), Vol. XX, 885. Cf. ORC, P• 59. 
5. RI, PP• 254-255. 
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Basically there were two types of Narodnichestvo. First there 
was the "religious type 11 which had as its compenents the "soil mysti-
cism" mentioned above and the peasants' pious devotion to the church. 
This type assumed that peasants and more cultured persons could and 
should have the same kind of religion. Because some of the more cul-
tured persons or intelligentsia could not accept this, and the peasants 
in turn could not accept them, some weaknesses in the whole Narodnik 
movement were exaggerated. The more significant type of Narodnichestvo 
was the purely social type which considered the possibility of a non-
i 
bourgeois-inspired socialism on the polittal and social levels. 
A draWback in the Narodnik movement was its hostility to culture 
and its sometimes undiscriminating love of the primitive. There de-
veloped a peculiar mixture of progress and regress in the combination 
2 
of social progress and cultural reaction. 
(4) The rise of the intelligentsia. With the Decembrist movement 
in 1825, a group Within the upper classes opposing the autocratic mon-
3 
archy and living for culture and. freedom began to arise. From this 
group developed the often-mentioned Russian intelligentsia. Of no 
particular profession, social, or economic group, the intelligentsia 
4 
were not intellectuals in the western sense. A member of the intelli-
gentsia might sympathize with either Westernizers or Slavophile. His 
distinguishing characteristic was a pre-occupation With thinking and 
talking and a lack of constructive social action. Berdyaev labels his 
main occupation as "social day dreaming •115 Largely divorced from sur-
1. ORO, pp. 59, 70-71. 
2. RI, PP• 251-252 and ORO, P• 59. 
4. ORC, P• 19. 
5. Ibid., P• 20. 
3. RI, PP• 22-25. 
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rounding life, he loved "man in general, 11 but did not do much to help 
his neighbor. Often he thought in absolute terms of black and white 
or sudden change, unable to accept anything even slightly relativistic. 
As a group, the intelligentsia were crushed between the autocratic 
ruling class and the unenlightened masses. They failed to connect 
their dreams with reality or to act in accordance with the needs of 
1 
the time and the place. 
(.5) The power struggle and the failure of ideals. Arising to 
oppose the autocratic rule of the Czars and to express the perennial 
Russian drive toward social justice, the conununist party began. At 
first it had no unified group opinion nor party discipline, but as its 
elements struggled with each other, one group emerged on top in the 
struggle for power. This group, the Bolsheviks, were not supported 
by others, but depended on their own sheer power. Practical power 
2 
politics came to dominate "genuine revolutionary socialiSill. 11 Berdyaev 
writes that with the Bolshevik victory in the conununist power struggle, 
those who gained power acquired such a taste for it that the power it-
3 
self became satisfying "as an end and not as a means." Though the 
welfare of the proletariat was supposedly the object of their reforms, 
the Bolsheviks did not consider persons as such. They practiced so-
cial regimentation rather than allowing man to have freedom. 
1. "Russian Religious Psychology ani Communistic Atheism," PP• 8-10; 
ORC, PP• 21-25, 32; and DOS, PP• 164-167. 
2. DR, p. 229. Cf. RI, p. 33 and George Barr Carson, Jr. and Harold 
J. Laski, "BolsheviSill, 11 Encyclopaedia Britannica~ (1957), Vol. III, 
824. 
3. ORC, P• 128. 
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(6) A fu:bure outlook for Russia. It ·. might be said that as the 
West infiltrated Russia by way of Peter's "westernizing," so Russia 
infiltrates the West with her communism. But Berdyaev views the com-
ing si.tuation as a two-way exchange of influence rather than as one 
culture dominating or infiltrating the other. On the one hand, he 
thinks that Russia will develop her own peculiarly Russian democracy, 
while 
the peoples of the West will not experience Communism 
in its Russian Soviet fonn, but some sort of a move-
ment of this kind Will undoubtedly take place.l 
Berdyaev is much concerned with the past and future relationships 
between Russia and the West. These have been stormy, partly due to 
a lack of understarrling stemming from divergent backgrounds. Russia 
has been more unsettled and less legalistic, her "soul corresponds 
with the landscape of Russia, the same boundlessness, formlessness, 
2 
reaching out into infinity. 11 Th.e West has been more orderly, more 
confined by laws and categories, more institutionalized, and in some 
ways more shallow and artificial. Berdyaev saw that during his life-
time as much as today, the West feared Russia. In his interpretation, 
Russia has great possibilities of fulfilling her task of developing a 
more just social structure (along some type of socialism) than that of 
the West, but she must allow £reedom in accomplishing this. 
A free soul can create a socialist regime, but this 
presupposes at the same time free criticism and the 
admission of diversity. One can recognize the meaning 
of the Revolution and be pleased with the social results 
1. TNE, p. 111. Cf. TNE, PP• 94, 68. 
2. ORC, p. 9. Cl. DR, p. 278 and RI, PP• 110, 197. 
which it has achieved. One can believe that Russia 
and the Russian people are called to realize social 
truth in the world. One can defend the very prin-
ciples of the political structure of the Soviets, 
one can defend Russia's poliqy in international af-
fairs in this harsh moment of her existence, but one 
can at the same time evince no sympathy w:i. th the 
spiritual and cultural results of the Revolution 
and see the danger involved in the formation of en-
slaved souls. This is precisely~ point of view, 
and it is in this sense that I remain faithful to 
• • • a Soviet orientation.l 
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Because of his perceptive temperment and his unique experiences, Ber-
dyaev was a "spirit vast enough to comprehend the designs of the two 
opposing worlds. 
2 
on the earth." 
He refused to admit the final division of men 
iii. Some important Russian thinkers who influenced Berdyaev 
(1) Dostoyevsky. In Berdyaev 1s estimation, Dostoyevsky is one 
of the greatest Russian thinkers, particularly in his clarification 
of the "~steries" of the uncompromising and apocalyptic B.ussian soul. 
In a few references from DostoevskY, Berdyaev expresses this high eval-
uation: 
So great is the worth of Dostoievsky that to have pro-
duced him is by itself sufficient justification for 
the existence of the Russian people in the world.3 
Dostoievsky is drunk with ideas, for in his books ideas 
intoxicate, but in the midst of it all the fine edge 
of his intelligence is never blunted.4 
He who understands Dostoievsky integrally has assimi~ 
lated an essential part of the Russ~an soul and has 
read in part the mystery of Russia. 
1. TNE, PP• 92-93. Cf. TNE, PP• 94, 105. 
2. stefan Schimanski, "Nicolas Berdyaev." The Hibbert Journal, 
46(1948), P• 312. 
3. DOS, p. ·227. Different speJl.ings of Dostoyevsky appear above be-
cause of variations in quotations. 
4. DOS, P• 34. 
5. Ibid., P• 16. 
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'.I'he influence of Dostoyevsky on Berdyaev is seen in two related 
areas, namely the nature of man and the nature of freedom. Looking 
first at Dostoyevsky 1s concept of man, Berdyaev notes that he super-
seded both the "classical man" of Dante and the "Renaissance man" of 
Shakespeare. 'lhe "classical man" is viewed as "an organic part of the 
1 
objective order of the world, 11 a kind of "object" with other "objects" 
including Heaven, Hell, God and Satan external to him. The 11Renais-
sance man" no longer lived in the single ordered cosmos of the 11classi-
cal man, 11 but in "endless space. 11 Finding himself 
lost in those vast solitudes which were no longer sub-
ject to any cosmic order ••• he turned inward to him-
self, entering the psychic realm, and took refuge • • • 
in the earth frightened of being separated from her in 
the face of that new and strange infinitude. 2 
Thus man no longer depended upon an external supernatural order above, 
but, as a humanist, he saw psychological order within. Depending on 
J 
this, he became "flat". and "two-dimensional. 11 With Dostoyevsky, Ber-
dyaev finds a third concept of man emerging. Here man is not merely 
4 
a natural phenomenon, but a microcosm, "the center of being." Do a-
toyevsky explored man's spirit as well as his soul, and as a "spiritual 
5 
psychologist" he added another dimension of reality to man. In this 
view, "in man himself an abyss opened and therein God and Heaven, the 
6 
Devil and Hell were revealed anew. 11 Through the characters in his 
7 
novels, Dostoyevsky explores the universal destiny of man. 
For Dostoyevsky, as for Berdyaev, freedom is the central value 
].,. Ibid., P• 46. 5. Ibid.' pp. 213-218, cr. P• 5o. 
2. Ibid., P• 47. 6. Ibid., P• 49. 
3. Ibid., P• 48. 7. Ibid., PP• 11-32. 
4. Ibid., p. 39. 
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around which his philosophy revolves. For both, freedom is dynamic 
1 
and existential and cannot be comprehended by the static mind. For 
both, arbitrary self-Willed freedom or misdirected freedom is its own 
downfall. Such misdirected freedom can be made good only when it joins 
2 
with higher freedom, not through external compulsion or law. Dostoy-
evsky opposed atheism because it seemed to him to be the ultimate of 
man 1s self-sufficient freedom. For him such freedom was empty, not 
3 
meaningful as the 11freedom of the spirit. 11 
In considering the relati onship of freedom to evil, one notes 
that Dostoyevsky 1s interpretation o~ this relationship is very close 
to Berdyaev 1s. For neither are good and freedom identical. Any good 
based solely on necessity is no longer good but rather compulsion or 
4 
non-freedom. 11Wi thout freedom evil is unexplainable, wherever there 
is freedom there is evil: if there were no freedom then God alone would 
5 
be responsible for eVil. 11 For Dostoyevsky, "man is terribly free, ••• 
6 
liberty is tragic and a grievous burden to him." Particularly in his 
11Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, 11 Dostoyevsky portrays the conflict 
which so often exists between happiness and freedom. Because, in the 
Legend, Christ gives freedom rather than happiness, he is accused by 
the Grand Inquisitor of not loving man. The Grand Inquisitor, in the 
1. Ibid., P• 87. 
2. Ibid.' pp. 76-77. 
3. ORC, p. 87 and RI, PP• 89-90. The man who tries to become God, as 
did the Grand Inquisitor, seems to Dostoyevsky to deny all freedom. 
4. DOS, PP• 69-70. 5. Ibid., P• 89. Cf. supra, Chap. III, Sec. 2, Sub-Sec. i, Par. 3. 
6. DOS, p. 62. Cf. RI, P• 153. 
name of love, takes away man's freedom and gives him security and 
1 
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happiness. Berdyaev states that this 11Legend 11 "contains the best of 
2 
the constructive part of Dostoievsky 1s religious ideas." It also in-
dicates something of his social philosophy which is not developed as 
fully as his religious thought. On any level, "freedom is the supreme 
good, man cannot renounce it without renouncing himself and ceasing 
3 
to be a man. 11 11Dostoyevsky does not want a world without freedom; he 
does not even want Paradise without freedom, he raises objections above 
4 
all to a compulsory happiness. 11 
Dostoyevsky opposed revolutionary socialism because of its oppres-
sion of per sonal freedom, its failure to fulfill its promises, and its 
5 
lack of ethics in its use of any means to acquire its desired end. 
He felt that the evils seen most by communism or revolutionary social-
ism were caused not so much by exploitation as by the free choice by 
6 
the brave few of hunger and suffering instead of bread and secu:City. 
It seemed to Dostoyevsky that those who accepted communism's compulsory 
organization of life did so because they feared the "burden and respon-
7 
bility of freedom. 11 He saw in both European (i.e. Roman) Catholicism 
1. DOS, pp. 188-212 (complete chapter on the Grand Inquisitor). Cf. 
Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov 1 pp. 255-272. Cf. Berdyaev 1 s 
remarks in DR, p. 231 and DOS, p. 7, where he writes, "'Ihe Lege~"' 
of the Grand Inquisitor, in particular, made such an impression on 
my young mind that when I turned to Jesus Christ for the first time 
I saw him under the appearance that he bears in the Legend. 
At the base of my notion of the world • • • has always lain the 
idea of liberty, and in this fundamental intuition of liberty I found 
Dostoyevsky as it were on his own special ground. 11 
2. DOS, p. 204. 
3. Ibid • , p. 56. 
L .• RI, P• 78. 5. DOS, PP• 137, 151; RI, P• 181; and TNE, P• 59. 
6. DOS, P• 143. 
7. Ibid.' p. 83. 
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and communism "the same conception of the compulsory organization of 
1 
an earthly kingdom. 11 
Dostoyevsky does not state his social philosophy in detail ex-
cept to assert that freedom was its "first principle." 
2 
did not say how freedom might be realized in societ.y. 
However, he 
Berdyaev de-
3 
scribes Dostoyevsky as partly a populist of the religious type, part-
4 5 
ly a believer in theocracy, and partly a religious anarchist. Dos-
toyevsky 1 s social philosophy is summarized in The Russian Idea where 
Berdyaev writes that ideally "the Church swallows up the state as a 
6 
whole and gives effect to a kingdom of freedom arrl love 11--this is 
Dostoyevsky's ideal, at least. In this kingdom of love, social justice 
is to express Christian love. With the union of personalism and the 
best in socialism comes the realization of "spiritual communism, the 
7 
responsibility of each for each." 
Evil's value as a stepping-stone to the good is questioned by 
Dostoyevsky who feels that evil must be neither ignored nor stamped 
out, but met and conquered creatively and through suffering. "The good 
that can be derived from evil is attained only by the way of suffering 
1. DOS, p. 145. '!he full discussion from which this quotation is taken 
i s found on pp. 144-146. Berdyaev notes, however, that Dostoyevsky 1s 
knowledge of both Roman Catholicism and Marxism was limited, thus he 
does not consider his judgment in this particular diseussion fully 
valid. 
2. DOS, P• 221. 
3. Ibid., P• 169. 
4. Ibid., pp. 210-211. Berdyaev opposes Dostoyevsky's theocracy, as he 
does theocracy in general. (See infra, Chap. IV, Sec. 5, Sub-Sec. i, 
Par. 3.) For Berdyaev, theocracy denies freedom and minimizes the 
"independent temporal value of the state as a natural society direct-
ly ordained by God. 11 (DOS, P• 211). 
5. RI, pp. 122, 152-153. 
6. Ibid., P• 122. 
7. TIRU; P• 87. Cf. TNE, P• 57 and RI, P• 80. 
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1 
and repudiation of evil." Contact with evil may strengthen man through 
"that spiritual strength which is aroused in him for the overcoming of 
2 
evil." Dostoyevsky also has the interesting idea that "suffering is 
3 
the one ani only source of knowledge," or rithe sole cause of conscious 
4 
thought." 
5 (2) Leontyev. Berdyaev finds Leontyev over-conservative in many 
ways, but he finds certain points of agreement with him, such as their 
mutual hatred of mediocrity. For example, Leontyev rejected certain 
political forms because of their tendencies to reduce persons to a com-
6 
mon bourgeois level. Leontyev and Berdyaev differ widely in their views 
of human freedom. Leontyev rejects the primacy of this ·freedom, finding 
spirit. and freedom in the laws of nature and history rather than in per-
7 
sons. Both Leontyev and Berdyaev find good and beauty in the on-going 
8 
struggle of history rather than in "paltry • • • per.rection," but Ber-
dyaev feels that man at his best is man working toward the good through 
the present evil and confusion which is a prelude to the "coming of the 
kingdom" to be realized through the "free creative act of God and man. 11 
t 3) Solovyev. Berd.yaev frequently mentions JlJ.ad.imir Solovyev as an 
9 
important Russian thinker. Solovyev did not emphasize freedom, but 
1. DOS, P• 95. 
2. RI, P• 124. 
3. DOS, P• 54. 4. RI, p. 179. Cf. DH, p. 72. Cf. supra, Chap. III, Sec. 1, Sub-Sec. ii~ 
5. Had it been available, Leontyev, trans. George Reavey (Toronto: S.R.J. 
Saunders, 1940) would doubtless have been helpful for this section. 
6. ORC, p. 88. Cf. Berdyaev 1s statement in RI, p .• 69: "If he hates pro-
gress, liberalism, democracy, socialism, it is simply because all this 
leads to the sovereignty of the bourgeois and to a dull earthly para-
dise.11 
'1· a:r,.. PP• ·68,. 93. 
8. DR, P• 282. 
9. RI, PP• 167-178 and ORC, PP• 90-91. 
1 
viewed man as caught in a kind of "spiritual determinism." In his 
2 
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well-known book, The Meaning of Love, however, he seems to agree With 
Berdyaev in his emphasis on the primac,y of personal-spiritual love 
rather than racial-physical love and of the androgynous being rather 
3 
than the sexual being as the true image of man. 
(fi.) Khomiakov. Khomiakov was an early Slavophil, one who opposed 
4 
the imposition of European ideas on the Russians. Like Berdyaev and 
many others, he stressed the "concrete existent" or 11real existence 
5 
which precedes rational thought. 11 That is, life precedes philosophy 
and religious experience comes before theology. He was an early ex-
ponent of sobornost, which Berdyaev has spoken of as 11the organic un-
6 
ion of freedom and love, community. 11 His "extraordinary love of free-
7 
dom" closely parallels Berdyaev's own. Like Berdyaev, he opposed 
"western" Protestant individualism and Roman Catholic authoritarianism 
8 
with his concept of sobornost. 
(5) Tolstoy. Though Berdyaev disagreed with much in Tolstoy's 9) 
thought, particularly his "un-Christian" antipersonalist religion, 
he valued his love of truth and approved his anti-pragmatic practice 
lO 
of the right regardless of consequences. Like Tolstoy, Berdyaev felt 
1. RI, P• 167. 
2. Vladimir Solovyev, The Meaning of Love, trans. Jane Marshall (Lon-
don: Bles, 1945). 
3. RI, PP• 175-176. Cf. supra, Chap. II, Sec. 4, Sub-Sec. iii, Par. 3. 
4. ORC, P• 81. Cf. supra, Chap. IV, Sec. 3, Sub-Sec. ii, Par. 2. 
5. RI, P• 160. 
6. Ibid., :P• 162. Cf. supra, Chap. II, Sec. 5, Sub-Sec. iii, Par. 1. 
7. ~p. 41. 
8. Ibid., PP• 42, 165. 
9. Ibid., p. 183. 
10.'ii'Tiie Paradox of Falsehood," Christendom, 4(1939), 498. 
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that society is often built on falsehood and injustice and that cer-
tain social concepts such as property ownership should be examined 
1 
and criticized rather than accepted as such. Yet he criticized Tel-
stoy 1s tendency to portray society and history as static and also dis-
agreed with his "underestimation" of revolution and movement. He writes 
that though "Tolstoy knew nothing about a revolution, forewaw nothing, 
yet he himself was caught up like a blind man in the machinery of the 
2 
revolutionary process." 
(6) Bulgakov. Like Berdyaev, Bulgakov was for a time a "non-or-
thodox Marxist. 11 Later he became a Christian and a clergyman. In his 
theology there is no absolute division between God and man. However, 
Bulgakov, in speaking of the closeness in interaction of God and man, 
is criticized by Berdyaev for being a platonist and kataphatic theolo-
gian rather than an existentialist. He does not emphasize man 1 s free-
3 
dom and so is unlike Berdyaev. 
( 7) Belinsky. As a typical menber of the intelligentsia, described 
4 
as "intolerant, fanatical, ••• passionately devoted to ideas," Belin-
sky was first a follower of Hegel and later his opponent, particularly s . 
in social philosophy. He first interpreted "the real is the rational" 
to mean that the whole is of greater reality ani value than the part; 
i.e., the person must accept, suffer from, and be reconciled to his en-
vironment which he cannot change. "Society .•• is always more in the 
6 
right and stands higher than the individual person. 11 Later Belinsky 
changed his position, thinking that "the fate of the subject, ••• of 
l. SF, p. 12 and RI, P• 181. 
2 • DOS, p. 23 • 
3. RI, PP• 240-241. 
4. ORC, P• 37. 
s. Ibid., p. 38. 
6. RI, P• 74. Cf. ORC, P• 39. 
+ 
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1 
the person is more important than the fate of the whole world." This 
revolt on behalf of living human personality, and the 
conflict for living human personality resolved itself 
into a conflict for a socialist structure of society. 
Thus was formulated the characteri~tically Russian 
type of individualistic socialism. 
Belinsky's "Russian socialism" was revolutionary and atheistic, with 
an ultimate willingness to persecute brutally the individual -who 11op-
3 
posed the betterment of mankind." Belinsky's concern for persons 
was not concern for all persons, for as one fanatically devoted to 
causes, he valued the cause above the person. 
4. Time and History 
i. The nature of different kinds of time 
Berdyaev often refers to the problem of time and its relation to 
eternity. Human destiny is realized in time. In one sense, Berdyaev 
sees life in the world as lapsed or "fallen" from eternity, but in 
4 
another sense "time . . . remains inwardly present in eternity. 11 Man's 
"inner life," as it is "governed ••• by the creative impulse, freedom, 
and spiritual activity, rather than by evolution, determinism and natu-
5 
ral causality" is lied in time. However, man cannot live in time 
alone. At his best, he is the connecting point between time and eter-
nity. Lost in the flurry of modern civilization, he may lose touch with 
1. RI, PP• 75-76. 
2. ORC, P• 39. 
3. Ibid., pp. 39-42. 
4. ss, p. 144. Cf. ss, pp. 129-130, 138~ IJ;l these pages Berdyaev al~o 
states that s.1ffibolically speaking, t~e 1s a result of man's orig1nal 
11Fall. 11 
5. ss, p. 144. 
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1 
the eternal and Eliscount its value; thUs man needs contemplation as 
2 
a "respite • . • from • • • enslavement by the stream of time. 11 Ber-
dyaev distinguishes three kinds of time to which man is related, namely 
3 
cosmic time, historical time, and existential time. 
(1) Cosmic time. . Cosmic time is symbolized by a circle, indi-
eating the ever-recurring rhythmic movement of nature seen in season-
al changes, the individual cycle of birth, procreation and death, etc. 
4 
In cosmic time, the species lives on while the individual dies. 
(2) Historical time. Historical time is symbolized by the straight 
line stretching toward infinity, indicating the eternal movement from 
past to future. There is no "historical present" (for the historical 
present exists only as a fleeting or illusory fragment). '!here is only 
5 
the "historical past" and the "historical future." There is no touch 
with "reality" in this divided "false time, 11 since in it the past is 
already gone, the present is a mere abstraction, and the future has 
6 
not yet arrived. In historical time, no true synthesis between the 
7 
polarities of conservatism and progressivism is possible. 
(3) Existential time. Existential time is symbolized by the point, 
implying non-extension. It is "kairos • • • the interruption of eter-
8 
ni ty into time. 11 In a sense, existential time lllreaks out beyond time 
1. "The Crisis of Christianity," P• 237. 
2. SF, p. 130. 
3. See SF, pp. 257-260 for a fairly full discussion of these three types 
of time. A briefer discussion, giving the same ideas is in BE, p. 2o6. 
4. SF, PP• 251-258. 
5. Ibid., PP• 259-26o. 
6. MH, PP• 69-70. 
1. SF, PP• 198, 26o. 
8. Ibid., P• 260 • Cf. Berdyaev 1 s statement from DR that he was always 
trying to rise above "ordinary-" time to "existential" time. Here he 
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as man ordinarily knows it, but because of his limitations, man must 
work within time even when symbolizing that which is "beyoln time." 
In a crude analogy, Berdyaev compares this to the loss of conscious-
ness of time experienced when one forgets to "watch the clock" as some 
"state of ecstasy leads out from the computation of objectivized mathe-
1 
matical time and leads into existential qualitative infinity." For 
exampl e, the truly creative act "is performed in existential time and 
2 
is merely projected in historical time." As existential time impinges 
3 
on historical time it is 11eschatologica1. 11 
ii~ Berdyaev's philosophy of history 
As a philosopher of history, Berdyaev is concerned with its sig-
nificance rather than with its facts and events. Calling himself a 
4 
"historiographer" or a "metahistorian," he sees the events of history 
5 
in relation to man's spiritual life. For him, philosophy of history 
6 
forms a close link between social philosopny and philosophy of religion. 
(1) History and metahistory. Closely tied up with the relation-
ship between historical and existential time ±s the relationship between 
history and metahistory. Metahisto:cy, Berdyaev says, is that existen-
sqs that 11the conquest of the deadly flux of time has always been 
the chief concern of my life. 11 (DR, p. x.) 
1. SF, p. 261. Cf. BE, p. 2o6, where Berdyaev writes: "Existential 
time is not susceptible of mathematical calculation, its flow depends 
upon intensity of experience, upon suffering and joy. It is within 
this time that the uplifting creative impulse takes place and in it 
ecstasy is known. It is symbolized above all by the point, 'Which 
tells of movement in depth." 
2. SF, P• 262. 
3. BE, P• 115. 4. Spinka, NBCF, pp. 67-68. 
5. Cf. especially MH, passim, also parts of DR, FMMW, and "The New 
Middle Ages. 11 
6. Lossky, HRP, p. 243. Cf. supra Chap. II, Sec. 5, Sub-Sec. iii. 
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tial force which stands above history but sometimes impinges upon his-
1 
tory. This is seen in discontinuities in the "flow of history." Here 
2 
time and eternity, which are not sharply separated, interpenetrate. 
Time does not contain eternity, yet ••• eternity moves 
out into time and time moves out into eternity. The 
paradox of the relation between the finite and the in-
finite, between time and eternity, is fundamental. 
Everything moves through the antithesis of the finite 
and the infinite, the temporal a.nd the et8rnal. Our 
whole life rests or rather is restless upon this.3 
The fuJl!meaning of history's finitude and temporality lies beyond 
history. It is, then, 
our function at every period, at every moment • • • to 
determine our relation to the problem of life and his-
tory fin the tenns and according to the criteria of eter-
nity. 
(2) An eschatological philosopgy of histo;r~ For Berdyaev, his-
S 
tory must come to a culmination in order tO be meaningful. Within 
the confines of time as experienced by man, "there is a meaningless-
ness ••• wluch points to a meaning which lies beyond the limits of 
6 
history." As a personalist, Berdyaev sees the "realization" of man 
1. BE, pp. 166-167. 
2. MH, pp. 64-65. 
3. BE, P• 230. 4. MH, p. 196. Cited and discussed by Clarke, ITB, p. 117. Expressing 
the same idea in a more personal fashion, Berdyaev writes, in DR, pp. 
29-30, "Dissatisfaction vd. th the given and yearning for the eternal 
were the supreme and decisive imperatives in my life. All my life I 
have re-echoed Zarathustra's immortal words: 'Eternity, I love thee.' 
It is impossible to love anything but the eternal, and all love is 
love eternal. If eternity is not, then nothing is. An instant in 
time possesses value to the extent to which it is united to eternity 
and provides an issue out of the issuelessness of time--only in virtue 
of being an atom of eternity, as Kierkegaard says, rather than of time." 
Cf. Spinka, "Berdyaev and Origen: a Comparison, 11 p. 19. 
5. MH, PP• 205-2o6 and DH, p. 168. 
6. SF, p. 257. 
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as a person rather than the development of the historical or social 
"great whole" as the greatest value and final goal of history. He con-
cludes that "history must come to an end, since it is incapable of re-
1 
solving the problem of personality within its limits." 
The final, integral humanity, the final, integral reali-
zation of personality, are unthinkable within the limits 
of this world and presuppose a transcendence to another 
world. The supreme worth of human personality 88 not 
only an individual but2as also a social principle, points the w~ to that world. 
3 
l''or Berdyaev, an "endless temporal series" is "meaningless. 11 He 
points out that eternity may be either qualitative (as in the existen-
tial 11kairos 11 ) or quantitative (as in the endless stretching out of 
4 
historical time). Thus there are two possible interpretations of es-
chatol ogy or apocalypse. In The Beginning and the End, Berdyaev states 
that 
The eschatological outlook is not limited to the pro-
spect of an indefinable end of the world, it embraces 
in its view every moment of life. At each moment of 
one's living, what is needed is to put an end to the 
old world and to begin the new. In that is the breath 
of the Spirit.5 
The eschatology of the creative act enters our moments of living, and 
thus man "realizes" his personality. 
Man's highest dream and greatest achievement are to ex-
perience the plenitude of a given instant. • • • 5n 
this way, he was able to triumph over time's evil. 
1. DR, P• 294. 
2. Spinka, NBCF, P• 140. Cf. Berdyaev's statement in DH, P• 179: "His-
tory does not solve the problem of personality and its destiny, and, 
therefore, the end of history is inevitable." 
) •• DM, P• 251. 4 SS, P• 154 and DM, P• 290. 
5. BE, p. 254. 
6. SS, p. 139. Cf. DH, P• 182 and SS, P• 156. 
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For Berdyaev, the traditional idea of the apocalyptical end of history 
and the "dawn of a new day of peace for the righteous" is an objecti-
fication. 
Heaven is not a remote transcendental and unattainable 
sphere; it is a part of the inmost depths of our spir-
itual life.l 
But the attainment of perfection is not the attainment of a static life 
devoid of movement and creati¢y. If anything, the "life beyond" is 
2 
more actively creative than 11lif e in time. " Thus, 
The end is perceived and accepted not as a fated doom, 
but as freedom; and it is the discovery of personality 
and freedom in the concrete universality of spiritual 
existence, in eternity. It is the transformation of 
the world, ~ man creatively and actively takes his 
part in it. . 
One must grasp the meaning which Berdyaev gives to the relation-
ship of the end of history to the end of time in order to comprehend 
his eschatological philosophy of history. He states that the "end of 
history" occurs neither entirely w.i thin nor entirely beyond historical 
4 
time. "The end is a spiritual event 'Which takes place in existential 
5 
time." It is, in a sense, 
the victory of existential time over historical time, 
of creative subjectivity over objectivization, of per-
sonality over the univeraal-common6 of existential society over objectivized society. 
1. MH, P• 44. Cf. BE, p. 238 and the following statement from DM, p. 291: 
"The Kingdom of God is not a reward but tl:e attainment of perfection, 
deification, beauty and spiritual wholeness." 
2. DM, pp. 288-289. Continuing this passage, Berdyaev writes, "It is 
impossible to think of perfection as the absenee of creative dynamism. 11 
3. BE, p. 233. 4. Ibid., p. 231. Cf. DH, P• 197 and DM, P• 261, whi. ch reads: "Apocalypse 
~ paradox of time and eternity that cannot be expressed in rational 
terms • The end of our world will come in time. • • • But it is also 
the end of time as we know it, and, therefore, lies beyond its limits.n 
5. BE, P• 252. Cf. BE, P• 232. 
6. SF, p. 265. 
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(3) History requires freedom. History must come to an end, and 1 . 
it must embody freedom. As "author of history," God wills freedom 
2 
rather than pre-established harmoQY, and history becomes 
a drama of love and freedom unfolding itself between 
God and his other self, whi3h He loves and for whose 
reciprocal love He thirsts. 
Bert Williams points out that for Berdyaev, "freedom • • • is the meta-
4 
physical basis of history. 11 Berdyaev notes that the Greeks, with 
their static concept of the cosmos, had no Philosophy of history. GnLr 
with a dynamic eschatological or messianic concept of history is a true 
5 
philosophy of history possible. 
Because it moves toward not only fate, but destiny, history par-
. 6 
takes of freedom. This freedom may be "irrational, 11 i.e. "prior to 
being and deeper than it ••• bound up with meonic freedom, the primal 
7 8 
darkness, the Ungrund. 11 It may thus allow freedom of evil. The com-
ponent forces of history interact in and through freedom, not only in 
and through fate. 
(4) History as conflict and interaction. In history, Berdyaev per-
9 
ceives various interacting elements, e.g. eternity and time, life and 
10 11 
death, conservatism and creativity, and individualization and uni-
1. BE, p • 2fi)9. 
2. MH, P• 58. 
3. Ibid.' p. 52. 4. Williams, BPH, p. 83. 
5. MH, pp. 27-29, 66. 
6. SS, P• 151. Cf. Buber, IAT, pp. 52-61. 
1. DM, P• 31. Cf. supra, Chap. III, Sec. 2, Sub-Sec. i. 
8. MH, P• 30. 
9. Ibid.' p. 67. 
10. Ibid. ' p. 68. 
11. Ibid., P• 39 • 
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1 
versalization (the struggle of the personality against society). How-
ever, he most often enumerates history's interacting elements as three: 
~1) Providence (the "super-cosmic God"), (2) the freedom of the human 
2 
spirit, and (3) fate (the "outcome of the dark meonic freedom") • 
(i) God's action in history. As Berdyaev views history, God's 
influence in it is limited because He wills freedom for man and because 
· of His relationship to the Ungrund. Providence does not embody neces-
sity of compulsion, but is "the antinomous union of God's will and human 
3 
freedom. 11 Because of its relationship to man 1 s freedom and to natural 
determinism's fate, God's action often seems mysterious and complex. 
(ii) Man's freedom and failures in history. In Berdyaev's 
philosophy, freedom is an essential ingredient of history. Freedom 
4 
may be concretely specified as the freedom of man to "create" history 
through his willed action. In The Meaning of History~ Berdyaev writes: 
There would be no universal history Without the free-
dom of the human spirit conceived as an autonomous prin-
ciple independent of either divine freedom or divine 
necessity • .? 
Though in a sense, the "realization of man's self 11 lies in the spiritual 
realm ,, beyond the confines of time and space, · and though "his destiny 
is sunk deep in eternity and cannot depend solely upon this fallen time, 11 
man is deeply involved in history. He must live responsibly in history 
l. FMMW, PP• 76, 1-2. 
2. DM, P• 31. This passage is cited by Clarke, ITB, P• 124. Cf. also 
· .PH,p. 48 and BE, p. 210. Sometimes the third component is labeled 
"necessity" (MH, p. 61) or "natural determinism11 ( 11Christian Optimism 
and Christian Pessimism," p. l.u8) rather than "fate." 
3. MH, P• 19. 
4. "Christian Optimism and Christian Pessimism, 11 P• 425. 
5. MH, p. 37. Cf. FS, p. 155: "Freedom is man's fate and destiny, how-
ever parp.~oxical that ma;y appear." 6. BE, p. 241. Cf. supra, Chap. II, Sec. 4, Sub-Sec. iii, Par. 1. 
6 
• 
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1 
and bear its judgments. For Berdyaev, history is not only a mani-
festation of "mere phenomena;" it is "essential" to the "ontological 
2 -
nature of man." Neither man nor history can be known apart from the 
other, for 
only deep down in his o~n self can man really discover 
the secrets of time; for these, far from being something 
superficial and alien, something imposed • • • UPOn him 
from w.i. thout, represent on the contrary the deepest and 
most mysterious strata implicit in himself.3 -
In one of his latest books, Berdyaev writes, 
History should be received into oneself and • • • an 
active part should be taken in its destiny. I accept 
history not because I am part of history but beca.use 
history is part of me. That means that I accept it 
not as an obedient slave but as a free man.4 
Man has great significance in relation to history in his freedom 
5 
to guide its course. In a tribute to Berdyaev, Schimansld writes that 
historical necessity ••• cannot be suppressed, but 
it can be $uided and in some ways improved •••• 
Cfreedom 1sJ function is to spiritualize and ennoble 
.the social movements that become inevitable.6 
VVhile man cannot completely control history nor COmPletely escape its 
11objectivization, 11 he has some freedom from it, and he can realize a 
part o:f hi:s creative ideal. Although he fails to reach this ideal, 
I 
man may introduce great values. The Renaissance, for example, "fell 
short of its perfection, the full accomplishment of earthly joy and 
7 
beauty, and yet its values are tremendous. 11 
··--(iii) latural and historical determinism. While Berdyaev 
1. SS, P• 261 and TR, P• 80. 
2 ~ :MH, p. 16. 
3. Ibid., p. 23. Cf. MH, P• 15. 
4. TR, P• 82. 
5. MH, P• 202. 
6. Schimpski, "Nicolas Berdyaev," p. 313. 
7. 11The End of the Renaissance, 11 p. 32. 
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generally includes Providence, human freedom, and natural determinism 
within history, the balance between these three influences differs in 
various periods of his thought. While his later books give more weight 
to man's freedom, his relatively early writings, particularly The Fate 
of Man in the Modern World, take a more pessimistic View, picturing 
man as suppressed by such "impersonal forces of history" as Hegel's 
"spirit of history ••• 'Which deceives man for the purpose of gaining 
1 
its own ends." In the early and middle 1930 1 s, man seemed to Berdyaev 
to be particularly "objectivized, 11 "socialized, 11 and "submerged in the 
2 
collective" because of the increased technization of his world and the 
occurrence of historical catastrophes which impelled a reactionary de-
3 
struction of freedom. 
5. Berdyaev 1 s Evaluations of Some Types of Social Philosophy 
Berdyaev is generally negatively critical in his evaluations of 
the types of social philosophy. In his autobiography he writes, "I 
have always felt ••• passionately about social questions, yet every 
4 
social order and movement is completely alien to me. 11 He felt that 
all political forms were relative in value, and that one's allegiance 
to a given political form might change from time to time in order to 
support that form allowing the most freedom and recognizing the most 
5 
intrinsic value in persons. To realize social justice and to free 
1. FMMW, P• 3. 4 2. Ibid., PP• 4, 6-7 and SS, P• 1 7. 
3. DR, P• 216. 4. Ibid., p. 35. Again in his autobiography, p. 281, he says, "All rrryt hed 
Iif9 I have done nothing but fight public op~n~on and all its wre c 
manifestations." 
5. BE, P• 217. 
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man's spirit for creativity is more essential than maintaining a given 
1 
form in "Ceasar's realm." Any doctrinaire position is bad when it 
does violence to personality by sacrificing men to ideas. 
Man ought not to be bound to any particular form of the 
state. The love of freedom with which all human dignity 
is connected is not liberalism, nor democracy, nor anarch-
ism, but something immeasurably more profound · a~d con-
nected with the metaphysics of human existence. 
Both abstract individualism and collectivism treat man as .an isolated 
3 
atom who is incapable of living in community or of being creative. 
i. Col lectivism 
Berdyaev bitterly opposed collectivism or totalitarianism in any 
form, because these social types place more value on the collective 
·than on the person. As man loses his inward sense of unity and crea-
tivity, he increasingly depends on seeking this sense outside of him-
self. Thus he allows himself to become enslaved to an external ''will 
4 
to power." In preferring security (physical or emotional) to freedom, 
5 
man renounces personality. He is reduced to a means-a mere 11 It 11 who 
cannot communicate with a "Thou" or even speak in terms of a living 
6 
11We. 11 This does not mean that no social order or organization has 
a:ny value. There must be social discipline to allow man to develop 
L. RSRC, P• 178. 
2. SF, P• 151. Cf. SF, p. 218 and MCA, PP• 282-284. 
3. MH, PP• 160--170 and liThe End. of the Renaissance," PP• 37-38. 
4. TNE, p. 44. Cf. SF, p. 104, where Berdyaev says, "The slavery of 
man to society finds expression in organic theories of society. • 
The organic interpretation of society is antipersonalist, 
it inevitably recognizes the supremacy of society over personality 
and is compelled to see in personality an organ of the social organism. 11 
5. SF, PP• 200-201; TNE, p. 3; and Spinka, NBCF, P• 10. 9. ss, PP• 178, 189-192. Especially in this latter passage, Berdyaev 
uses Buber' s ideas and terminology. Cf. Buber, IAT, and Between Man 
and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor &lith (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955). 
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as a person, "but when the discipline demands the repudiation of per-
sonal consciousness and conscience, it is converted into the tyranny 
1 
of the community. 11 
Man's submergence in the collective becomes a more serious prob-
lem under the more extreme forms of collectivism 'Where the state itself 
2 
"pretends to be spirit 11 and eliminates the person as spirit. Neither 
the collective spirit nor society is independently real for Berdyaev, 
3 
except as it expresses man's relationship to man. 11Society is an or-
4 
ganization and not an organism." Because the collective itself has 
neither consciousness nor existential center, it is a mere 11pseudo-re-
5 
ality. 11 While society cannot have the capacities of a person, it may 
6 
have the capacities of an individual. 
Berdyaev also notes that organic theories of society are generally 
7 
conservative, based on a "false reactionary optimism. 11 He calls false-
8 
hood the 11 chief basis of the so-called totalitarian state, 11 criticizing 
its use as a means to any end and pointing out that while "falsehood 
may support the present organization of society, ••• falsehood destroys 
9 
pers:>nality." Falsehood is largely a social phenomenon, and when it 
is forced upon members of a collective, it denies the person the right 
10 
to searCh for and distinguish truth. Specifically, a dictator's power 
is based on a lie which he has told to himself and which he must enact 
11 
before others. 
1. SF, P• 202. 
2. BE, P• 129. 
3 • RSRC, P• 59 • 
4. SF, p. 108. Cf. FMMW, P• 73. 
5. RSRC, p. 120. Cf. pp. 116-118. 
6. BE, P• 129. 
7. SF, p. 111. 
8. "The Paradox of Falsehood, 11 
9. Ibid., p. 497. 
10.1'6icf., P• 500. 
11.Ibid., P• 500. 
p. 496. 
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( 1) Comnnmism. . While communism will be analyzed in some detail 
in this study, other fonns of collectivism will be only briefly dis-
cussed, due to the emphases of Berdyaev 1 s discussions of his personal 
experiences with communism and his comments on social philosophy in 
general. 
(i) Historical and ideological background.. Analyzing the back-
ground of communism, Berdyaev states that while communism may be viewed 
1 
as an imposition of western ideas on the easily-dominated Russians, it 
is also a natural outcome of Russian history and an expression of such 
long-standing Russian ideas as "Russian messianism and universalism, II 
2 
"the Russian search for the Kingdom of truth and righteousness, 11 or 
the 
thirst for social righteousness and equality, a recogni-
tion of the working classes as the highest type of hu-
manity, aversion to capitalism and the bourgeoisie, the 
striving after an integrated ••• relation to life, 
sectarian intolerance, a suspicious and hostile attitude 
to the cultural ~lite, an exclusive this-worldliness, a 
denial of spirit and spiritual vf-ues, a well nigh re-
ligious devotion to materialism. 
(ii) Some elements of communism. 
( (1~ ) Messianism. Berdyaev finds the most outstanding char-
acteristic of communism not in its economic determinism, but in the 
4 
messianic mission of the proletariat. Clearly this "messianic prole-
5 
tariat" is an ideaJ. rather than an empirical or scienti:fic reality. 
Since it opposes religion, communism might object to the use of the 
1. ORC, P• 133. 
2. Ibid., p. 155. Cf. ORC, p. 113. 
3. Ibid., p. 122. Cf. "The Crisis of Christianity," P• 235. 
4. ORC, P• 98 and RSRC, PP• 129-130. 
5. RSRC, P• 130 and BE, P• 128. 
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term "messiah;" thus Berdyaev suggests that the messianic idea is only 
implicit in Marxism, an unconsciously inspired "secularized form o:f 
1 
the ancient Jewish chiliasm." Nonetheless, in Berdyaev 1s theological 
language, the proletariat, not being guilty of the "original sin o:f 
exploitation" has a messianic mission "to be the liberation of all man-
2 
kind" and to bring about the "eschatological expectation of the adv~nt 
3 
of God 1 s Kingdom on Earth. 11 
(( 2) ) Communism 1 s "religious zeal. " Berdyaev o:ften compares 
3 
communism to a fanatical and dogmatic religion. He states that "the 
anti-religious psychology of communism is a religious psychology turned 
4 
inside out." He feels that no man is ever a complete atheist, but 
5 
that each has his god. If a man's god is false, he is an idolator. 
6 
Communism's idolatry is its identification of the state as deity. As 
in theocracy, the state assumes both religious and political roles, 
thus failing to distinguish between "the realm of the spirit and the 
7 
r ealm of Ceasar. 11 
The communist government is also concerned for the salva-
tion of the souls of its subjects; it desires to bring 
1. "The Religion of Communism, 11 P• 74. Cf. CC¥i , P• 25. 
2. "The Religion of Communism, 11 P• 71. 
3. Ibid., p. 76. In Dostoevsky, p . 138, Berdyaev writes, "Russian so-
cialism is entirely apocalyptic •••• In Russia· revolutionar,r so-
cialism has never been regarded as a passing form of the economic 
and political organization of a society but as a de:finitive and ab-
solute condition, a solution of the destinies of mankind and the be-
ginning of the establishment o:f God's Kingdom on earth. 11 
4. "Russian Religious Psychology and Communistic Atheism, 11 p. 46. Cf. 
"The Religion of Communism, 11 p. 60. 
5. ORC, P• 160; "The Religion of Communism, 11 p. 83; ani TNE, p. 106. 
In this last reference, Berdyaev states that "totalitarianism is 
always a substitute for religion. 11 
6. "Russian Religious Psychology and Communistic Atheism," P• 4o. 
7. 11The Religion of Communism," P• 88. 
them up in the one saving truth; it knows the truth, 
the truth of dialectic materialism. The communist 
government ••• finds its motive power in hatred. of 
Christianity, in which it sees the cause of slavery, 
exploitation and darkness of mind.l 
122 
Religion by definition includes the worship of an object of su-
preme value, and as a religion, communism worships the state. It als6 
2 
requires "the confession of the true faith" as adherence to dogma is 
demanded and "conviction of heresy" is prevalent. The individual has 
3 
no right to search for truth or to criticize the established order. 
( (3)) The nature of the state. For communism, the state 
is a temporary necessary evil which will ultimately "wither away. 11 Its 
temporar,r despotism is condoned because the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat is the only force which can overcome the oppressing bourgeoisie. 
(iii) Positive values of communism. All of Berdyaev's comments 
about connnunism are not negative, however. Communism's economic plan-
ning, for example, is much better than the bourgeois idea that if you 
"follow your own personal interest • • • this will • • • be good for 
5 
the community. 11 The communist idea is: "in economic life serve others, 
4 
serve the uhole community and then you will receive everything which you 
6 
need for your life." Berdyaev also praises the Soviet Constitution of 
1. ORC, P• 169. 
2. RSRC, P• 143. 
3. 11 The General Line of Soviet Philosophy, 11 in The End of Our Time, 
pp. 211-212. Cf. "Russian Religious Psychology and Communist Athe-
ism, 11 P• i!l and RSRC, PP• 136-137 • 
4. ORO, PP• 125-126. 
5. Ibid., p. 185. 
6. Ib'!'a., p. 186. Of. Berdyaev 1s comment in "The Religion of Communism," 
p. 77: liThe idea of methodically planning out the nonns of economic 
life is, on principle, a right idea. The liberal principle of formal 
freedom in such matters produces enormous injustices and deprives a 
considerable portion of humanity of all real liberty. 11 
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1936 for its legislation on property ownership. Here, "personal prop-
1 
erty i s recognized, but in a form 'Which does not allow of exploitation. n 
( (1)) Berdyaev as a communist. As a student, Berdyaev at-
tended communist meetings and was favorably impressed with Marxism, 
2 
especi ally in its "appreciation of the moving surface of history" and 
its concerns with social justice. .He carefully points out the often-
forgot ten fact that Marx himself was not a strict determinist, but that 
' 3 
in his "revolutionary voluntarism- ••• the world is plastic." Neither 
4 
did Marx regard society as an organism, though his followers did. Ber-
dyaev saw that ll1BDY of the changes brought by the Russian Revolution 
5 
were for good, but he would not tolerate communism 1 s lack of respect 
for personality. For him, not even the attainment of perfect world 
harmony justifies the torture of a single person. This position ul-
timately led to his open opposition to the Party, but even in 1931, he 
dedicated Christianity and Class War _ "to the memory of Karl Marx who 
was the social master of ~ youth and whose opponent in ideas I have 
9 
now become." 
((2)) Some good points of Marx' system. 
( (i)) Humanistic and personalistic beginnings. Berdyaev 
asserts that Marx began as a humanist who affirmed "the absolute suprem-
7 
acy of man11 Rebelling against the "impoverishment of human nature in 
1. RI, p. 251. 
2. DR, p. 117. 
3. RSRC, p. 131. cr. Clarke, ITB, PP• 34, 166. 
4. SF, p. 105. 
5. DR, P• 324. 
6. CCW, P• 7. 
7. RI, P• 95. cr. "Spiritual Dualism and Daily Bread," trans. Donald 
A. Lowrie. American Scholar, 7(1938), 225; BE, P• 32; and DH, P• 118. 
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1 
. a capi talistic economy," he saw man's great possibilities for purpose-
ful action. As a humanist, he hated the Verdinglichun~ . _(the maki~ of 
thing) of which capitalism was guilty. Yet, by see-man into a mere 
3 
ing man as "sufficient unto himself, 11 Marx 1 humanism cut man off from 
God, and thus debased him. 
( (ii)) Social phenomena needing the criticism given by 
communism. 
(((1))) Capitalism. For B~aev, one of the strong-
est points of communism was its criticism of capitalism. Concerned 
with the development of materials and capital, the capitalist places 
4 
economic considerations above personal ones. Capitalism engenders 
anarchy as each pursues his own interests, and this should be counter-
5 
acted by the regulating of economic processes. Marxism is right in 
showing that capital has no reality of its own but that it comes from 
6 
the "social relation of man with man in indus.tr.r. 11 
(((2))) Complacent Christianity._ Berdyaev claims that 
communism became powerful in Russia largely because Christianity failed. 
Russian Christianity before 1917 had become conservative and degenerate, 
7 
involved with 11an order which was based upon wrong and oppression. 11 
Communism came &I a challenge to CP..ristianity and should not merely be 
8 
condemned by ChristianS. Berdyaev interpreted the suffering caused 
1. "Spiritual Dualism and Daily Bread, 11 p. 224. 
2. ttMarx Versus Man," p. 488: DH, P• 34; TNE, P• 19; and RSRC, P• 131. 
3. "Marx Versus Man," P• 493. 
4. CCW, P• 103. Cf. TNE, p. vii. 
5. "The Religion of Communism, 11 P• 72. 
6. ORC, P• 98 
7. RI, P• 247. Cf. RSRC, P• 150. 
8. DR, P• 229. 
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by connnunism as a result of his own sin and the sins of all Christians. 
1 
In his eyes, 11all are responsible for all." 
(iv) Some disadvantages of communism. 
( (1)) Naturalistic and materialistic basis. Communism is 
based on a materialistic metaphysics, and its motivating spirit is seen 
to be not in human spirit but rather in matter endowed with spiritual 
2 3 
qualities. This is a r-Blse idea of the source of power, as is the 
idea that man 1 s life is determined wholly by his surroundings. 
Materialism is an extreme form of determinism. It is 
the determining of human personlli ty by the external 
environment; it does not see any principle within hu-
man personality which it might be able to set in op-
position to the action of the external environment. 
• • • Such a principle could only be a spiritual prin-
ciple, an interior support of the freedom of man, a _ 
principl~ which is not derivable • • • from nature and 
society.4 
If its metaphysics were true, however, 
Marxist socialism is the last word in a social order 
based on the non-cosmic condition of the world and on 
the want of co~~on, the lack of cohesion, the ali-
enation of men. Socialism is the final justice and · 
final truth of people striving to unite and make order 
for themselves in the realm of Ceasar, according to 
the laws of natural necessity. Socialism is the ulti-
mate obedience in bearing the world 1 s bgroens and in 
the just distribution of these burdens. 
((i)) The logical impossibility of dialectical materialism. 
6 
Berdyaev calls dialectical materialism a "contradiction in terms," 
7 
and a "logical monstrosity, 11 since matter itself, being atomistic and 
1. "The New Middle Ages," P• 71. 
2. "The General Line of Soviet Philosophy, 11 P• 239. 
3. CCW, P• 22. 
4. RI, P• 136. 
5. MCA, P• 287. 
6. RSRC, P• 135 • 
1. CCW, P• 37. 
• 
• 
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and static, cannot produce the dialectic. Inherently self-moving 
spirit can engender true dialectic, wP~le the mere pushing of mate-
rial particles cannot. 
There car1r1ot be a dialectical development in society 
unless there is a real integration within vmich the 
dialectical process can be accomplished, and this it 
is impossible to envisage from the materialist point 
of View, for materialism is atomistic and nominalist.l 
( (ii)) The false dualism in communism. In its furious 
prejudice against the "bourgeois" class and its blind acceptance of 
the proletariat as wholly good, "the whole point of Communism lies 
2 
in the division of the ·world into two irreconcilable halves." Ber-
dyaev finds this striking dualism impossible to accept because he sees 
each person as a mixture of good and bad rather than merely as a mem-
3 
ber of a class. 
The communist dualism between bourgeois and proletariat breeds 
a backward-looking hatred rather than a constructive and forward-look-
4 
ing approach to inter-group rivalries. In its desire to eliminate 
capitalism, communism takes over the capitalistic eVils of materialism 
and antipersonalism, thus becoming more an opponent of past evils than , 
a builder of a new and better social system. 
( (2)) The person is not tm primary value. Communism orig-
inated as a protest against capitalism's oppression of personality, 
but in its own way it further oppressed personality, finally to dis-
6 
solve it altogether in the social collective. Eager to revolutionize, 
1. CCW; ~- 35. C~ ORC,pp. 149-150. 
2. TNE, P• ·30. 
3. RSRC, P• 127 and ORO, P• 100. 
4. ORO, P• 184. 
5. CCW, P• 39 and TNE, P• 47. 
6. "The Crisis of Christianity," p. 235. 
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communists became despotic, rejecting the humane ideas of man's broth~ 
1 
erhood and closeness to the earth held by the Harod.nik socialists. 
Finding no independent spiritual principle in man, and regarding him 
as a cog in a wheel, the communists denied freedom of conscience and 
2 
exalted the social, the economic, and the technical. In this system 
man's creativity is stifled and "collective work, compulsory and or-
3 ganized, takes the place of the principle of creative individuality." 
Connmmism 's "ideal man 11 is "the result of complete dehumanization, • 
4 
• thoroughly antipersonal." Communism is based on an impersonal 
and t herefore very poor psychology, which, in identifying the mental 
5 
with the spiritual, eliminates a genuine spiritual category. Society 
is a good sum of bad parts , which "must be so org.anized that the hope-
lessly bad human material shall be subjected to regimentation and made 
6 
accustomed to the conditions of life lived as a community." Thus 
7 
everything becomes rationalized, controlled, and organized. In a 
fiery protest against this, Berdyaev writes: 
You reject and destroy personality, .all you heralds of 
the materialistic revolution, you socialists and anarchists, 
radicals and democrats of various shades, all you levelers 
and subverters, heralds of the religion of equality. You 
would like to convert men into atoms, and the human society 
into an atomic mechanism, into a collective of impersonal 
atoms. But in truth man is not an atom, but an individuum, 
1. ORC, pp. 126, 174. It must be recalled that Narodnik socialism was 
based on an essentially agricultural rather than an urban industrial 
economy. 
2. "The General Line of Soviet Hli1osophy," p. 258 and ORC, P• 153. 
3. 11 'lhe End of the Renaissance," P• 50. 
4. "Marx Versus Man," P• 491. 
5. RSRC, p. lL'I; CCW, p. 24; and "Marx Versus Man," P• 487. 
6. ORC, P• 156. 
7 . ccw' pp. 40-41. 
an individual, a differentiated being. Every man poS"-
sesses a unique, individual lot in this life and the 
life beyond, in eternity .1 
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( (i)) Connnunist monism opposes personalism • . For Berdyaev, 
communism is a kind of monism, and its "most unpleasant side" is its 
2 
"mysticism of collectivity." One cannot take a stand against the com-
munity which alone "knows the truth" and possesses the "center of con-
3 
sciousness, 11 and is thus more valuable than he. Man is "the image 
4 
• of society," and he is thus unreal and unknowable apart from 
his social class. 
On the higher level, society is a function of class; on 
the lower level, personality is such a function: Class 
is, in a w~, the ••• noumenon, the thing-in-itself, 
and everything else is only accident.5 
Berdyaev finds the subordination of man to class wrong, even if this 
class happens to be endowed with every quality of goodness. For Ber-
dyaev, the dictatorship of the proletariat fails to restore human dig-
6 
ni ty to all. In sununarizing, it may be said that Berdyaev considers 
the view that man is a function ·of class "the most striking and unhu-
7 
man error of Marxism. 11 
((ii)) The neglect of the spiritual for the social and 
econoinio. In his interpretation, Berdyaev finds that economics in cam-
munism have replaced spirit as the primary force and value for man. 
1. Filosofj_ya neravenstva (untranslated), P• 42. Cited by Spinka, 
NBCF, P• 54. 
2. "The Religion of Communism, 11 P• 84. 
l: ~itep:Rei~gion of Connnunism, 11 p. 82; "Marx Versus Man, 11 P• 494;0RC, p.97. 
5. COW, P• 36 (italics in original). In reply, CCW, p. 38, Berdyaev 
writes "Class is simply a function of the social process, and ••• 
' • t to al't II only a constituent part of society, subord~na e person ~ y. 
6. SF, PP• 213-214. 
7. CO.f , P• 33. 
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Corrnnunist economics "are spiritual and metaphysical economics that 
take the place of God and spiritual life and reveal real being, the 
1 
essence of things. 11 Man viewed as an economic being is seen in terms 
2 
of his lower self and not in terms of his deeper being. Even if one 
accepts the aims of communist economic re-organization as valid, as 
Berdyaev does, such re-organization is inherently limited and does not 
guarantee that man will become a "new and better creature. 11 Man • s 
spiritual problem cannot be solved merely by overcoming economic in-
3 
justice. When the means of production are given to the members of 
the proletariat, there is no necessary effect on each man's spiritual 
4 
center. Further, Berdyaev would say that man's creativity is not 
limited to material and economic creativity, as the Marxist believes. 
Berdyaev also disagrees with communism's treatment of suffering. 
5 
Believing that suffering has a social cause, (spirit is not real, thus 
cannot cause anything), the communist tries to eliminate the individ-
ual' s suffering solely by social remedies. But Berdyaev points out 
the f allacy here, stating that 
the problem of suffering • • • is not merely a social 
problem, although it has got a social aspect. It is 
essentially a spiritual problem. Man will be no happier 
when his life is better organized; his suffering will 
merely manifest itself in more subtle sud more intense 
forms. Happiness cannot be organized. 
Because communism views man only on the social and material levels, it 
1. "The Religion of Communisn," P• 86. 
~: ~~c~.Pl275~d1ft§Rc, PP• 63, 169. 
4. 11Marx Versus Man, 11 P• 492. 
5. RSRC, p. 148. 
6. SR, p. 128. Cf. SR, pp. 101, 176, 177. 
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lacks psychological, philosophical, artistic, and religious depth, 
and so becomes antipersonal. 
Neither Marxism nor any other materialist socialist 
system attempts to deal with the problems of solitude 
and of communion as distinct from the problem of com-
munication, because these systems fail to apprehend 
the profound metaphrical significance of the problem 
of the personality. 
((iii)) The inadequate nature of freedom. With his lim-
ited power of choice and creativity, communism's man has some freedom. 
Berdyaev points out that Marxism is not wholly deterministic and that 
freedom is understood not as liberty of choice • • • 
to turn to the right or to the left, but as the active 
changing of the world, as an act accomplished not by 
the individual but by the social man, after the choice 
has been made. Real constrmti ve freedom comes 
only after • • • man moves in the defined direction. 
Only that sort of freedom • • • for the collective con-
struction of life in the general direction of the com-
munist party, is recognized in Soviet Russia; ••• 
this freedom is actual.2 
This freedom of the group to work by such means as revolution seems 
to the Russian to be more meaningful than the freedom of each person 
to think and act for himself. In this latter situation, each may go 
his own way, so ultimately nothing is changed. Such is the situation 
engendered by the French political system, for example. It becomes 
impossible to change life in France. • • • The so-called 
freedom there was of the kind which leaves everything un-
changed. • • • In Soviet communist Russia, on the other 
hand, there was real freedom because any day might change 
the life of Russia.3 
However, if freedom is actual only when many act as a group, then 
1. SS, P• 190. Cf. ORC, P• 108; "Marx Versus Man," P• 483; and "Spirit-
ual Dualism and Daily Bread, 11 p. 226. 
2. OR.C, p. 52. Cf. "Marx Versus Man, 11 P• 490 a.rrl RSRC, PP• 133-134. 
3. ORC, P• 1.51. 
• 
• 
the person is not a free agent, and 
what takes place inwardly before the act, the realiza-
tion of creative energy, is lost sight of, then the 
denial of freedom of conscience and • • • thought is 
ineVitable. And we can see that in the Russian commu-
nist realm freedom of conscience and thought is abso-
lutely denied.l 
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Briefly, the freedom of Russian communism is freedom of the collective, 
' 2 
not of the person. This. freedom is also defined as "necessity ab-
3 
sorbed into consciousness. 11 While it may bring changes, it remains 
4 
"the inevitable result of necessity." 
( ( iv)) Optimism and historical determinism. The commu-
nist beliefs in the ineVitable downfall of capitalism and the establish-
ment of the perfect socialist society-the "Realm of Freedom"-are for 
5 
Berdyaev based on unwarranted optimism. For him, 11it remains incom-
prehensible why the elemental, material, economic process does not lead 
6 
to the complete triumph of meaninglessness, slavery, and darlmess." 
He also writes that "Marxist optimistic faith in the beneficence of 
the process of history is a secularized experience of faith in Provi-
7 
dence." 
((3)) Bourgeois elements in communism. To be called bour-
8 
geois has always been uncomplimentary to any Russian, including Ber-
dyaev. To him, the bourgeois mind is over-optimistic in its belief 
11in the natural harmony of contradictory interests," e.g. its idea 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
~: 
ORC, P• 1.52. 
"Marx Versus MAn," pp. 490-491 and MCA, P• 103. 
ORC, P• 100. 
RSRC, P• 137. 
TNE, P• 114 and RSRC, PP• 55, 132, 138-139. 
11The Religion of Communism, 11 p. 66. 
RSRC, P• 149. 
RI, p. 196. 
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"that the abolition of castes and the conferring of equality in civil 
and political rights eradicates oppression, strife, and social in-
1 
equali.ty. 11 He also feels that the bourgeois concern is to gain mate-
rial wealth, comfort, and social acceptance at the expense of freedom 
2 
and development of personality. In opposing the bourge.ois class, the 
proletariat is caught up in hatred and envy, desiring to grasp for 
3 
themselves that Which they have taken by force from the bourgeoisie. 
"The proletarian who strives to become a bourgeois ••• is spiritually 
4 
identj.cal with the bourgeois. 11 The worker, on becoming the 11new 
bourgeois," may grow self-indulgent and decadent and may betray those 
5 
struggling to "make good" as he did. 
The bourgeois spirit may, then, transcend class lines; in fact, 
bourgeoisity, being more a spiritual than a social category, cannot 
6 
be changed merely by altering the social structure. It is not sur-
prising that Berdyaev finds bourgeois elements even in communism, which 
claims to oppose the bourgeois. Rather than eliminate it, communism 
7 
may merely make an 11 equitable distribution of the bourgeois spirit. 11 
1he positive ideals of socialists and cownunists are 
eminently middle-class: the ideals of the drear.y para-
dise of the factory, of power, of material prosperity. 
This does not ••• exclude the presence of a positive 
l. CCW, p. l2. Cf. SR, P• 122. 
2. SF, pp. 183-185. 
3. SF, p. 213. In CCW, p. 47, Berdyaev writes: 11The working-man quite 
definitely wants to become bourgeois, and it is necessary from the 
social point of view to admit his right to do so. It is not the 
workers but a number of intellectuals and other representatives of 
a high degree of culture who show a strong aversion from the bour-
geois spirit." 
4. CCW, P• 81. 5. Ibid., pp. 99-101. 
6. SF, PP• 181-188 and TNE, P• 31. 
7. SF, p. 188. Cf. DR, P• 115 and RSRC, P• 162. 
truth in Communism and Socialism. But it is no good 
fighting the bourgeois spirit with an economic system 
(that is a valid weapon only against capitalism), it 
must be fought with another spirit: a class economtc 
power cannot resist it, but a spiritual power can. 
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( (4)) Incompatible ends and means. Defining the good nar-
rowly and holding to a false dualism between the good and the bad, com-
munisn both confuses good and bad and condones the use of any means to 
2 
attain the good. This Berdyaev finds impossible, stating that "there 
is nothing more evil than the determination to create good, no matter 
3 
what the cost. 11 The use of force to achieve peaceful brotherhood can-
4 
not work, nor can the attempt to establish social justice by suppress-
ing the individual. 11 Communism tries to realize social justice, but 
does so in suppressing the human personality, which, economically, it 
wants to liberate. It is • • • an imitation of the old theocratic sup-
S 
pression of man. 11 The fight against evil may become the greatest of 
evils, for evil is not overcome by the liquidation of bad persons, but 
6 
by the efforts of all to achieve life and freedom. 
((5)) The nature of truth. Berdyaev views as narrow the 
communist i:4ea that truth belongs only to one class. He points out 
that while there may be class falsehoods or perversion of truth by a 
1 
class, there is no class truth, but only universal truth. Knowledge 
1. caw, p. 48. 
2. ORC, p. 118 and TNE, P• 25. 
3. RSRC, P• 94. Cf. FS, p. 16?. 
~. . nMarx Versus Man, 11 p. 495 and RSRC, p. 88. 
5. "Unity of Christendom in the strife between East and West, " p. 2 3 • 
cr. IIDemocracy, Socialism, and Theocracy, 11 P• 181. 
6. TR, PP• 135-136. 
7. ccw, p. 20; nspiritual Dualism and Daily Bread," P• 228; DR, P• 123; 
TNE, p. 26; and TR, PP• 24, 32. 
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would be impossible if truth were the possession of a single class or 
1 
if it were a function of one's atti~ude toward social reality. Commu-
nism 1 s concept of truth is also limited because of its basis in a 
2 
naively materialistic epistemology and metaphysics. On Lenin's view, 
for example, truth is a "fixed enitlty" which may serve man in the class 
struggle; in Berdyaev's view man must search for and serve universal 
3 
truth. 
( (6)) The failure of Russian communism. Berdyaev sees the 
greatest failure of Soviet communism as its disregard of human freedom, 
a prelude to totalitarian tyranny. He wrote that the communists 
fail to see and undierstand the most important thing of 
all-the freedom of the human spirit, and the impossi-
bil ity of organizing a perf~ct society by external, 
mechanical, forcible means.4 
He called Stalinism "Russian fascism 11 and felt that the Five Year Plans 
brought about state capitalism rather than socialism. Because of its 
basis in force, he reasoned that should the Soviet government fall, 
5 
there would be nothing but anarchy to take its place. 
( v) A future outlook for communism. Considering the future 
of communism, Berdyaev concludes that its truths must be retained. 
Its evils must be creatively overcome, not fought With purely negative 
means. He writes that "into the highest stage which will come after 
communism there must enter the truth of communism • • • but freed from 
1. CCW, P• 18 ~d SF, P• 13. 
2. TR, p. 33. For Lenin's "naively materialistic" philosophy, see his 
Material and Empirio-Criticism. 
3 • SF, p. lL. and TR, p. 2 3. 
L.. "The Religion of Communism, 11 p. 57. 
5. ORC, PP• 142-147. 
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1 
its element of falsehood." Recognizing that the foundations of com-
munism laid by Lenin recognized the possiblli ty of change by the minor-
ity, Berdyaev reasoned that brotherhood might be realized and class 
conflict removed without Stalinist tyranny. 
(2) Utopianism. For Berdyaev, a Utopia is a perfectly ordered 
life of universal harmony, attainalble only if man's freedom is sacri-
2 
ficed. In Utopian thinking, man's well-being is derived from social 
3 
well-being. The desire to create Utopias may result from a "folie 
4 
raisonnante 11-a burning desire to regulate all life by reason. Writ-
ing of a Utopia, Berdyaev states that "the idea of universal order and 
harmony has no moral or spiritual value, because there is no implicit 
5 
relationship with the personality's inner life." World harmony at 
6 
the expense of personal freedom is "a false and an enslaving idea" 
from which man must~ree himself for the sake of his own dignity. 
Man's "harmony11 with his environment is a relative value anyway, since 
one who is at peace with an unworthy or shallow environment may lack 
the spiritual depth of the continually dissatisfied man who is never 
7 
at horne in his surroundings. Even if it were worth sacrificing man's 
freedom for a Utopia, all suffering would not be eliminated, since 
only some suffering can be alleviated by social changes. Only a "lower 
kind of suffering 11 such as physical hunger can be organized arrl then 
1. RI, P• 50. 
2. DM, p. 285 and RSRC, p. 175. Cf. Berdyaev's statement in SF, P• 206: 
nA Utopi a always includes a project for the complete, totalitarian 
ordering of life. 11 
3. DM, P• 159 • . 
4. Ibid., p. 182. 
5. SS, P• 177. 
6. SF, p. 88. Cf. DM, P• 211. 
7. DM, P• 71. 
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eliminated. The "tragic basis of life is not the outcome of a bad 
1 
social order and cannot be removed by the amelioration of it. n 
The external sources of tragic conflicts may be removed 
by a more just and more free social order. • • • But 
••• then ••• man will be faced with the pure tragedy 
of life.2 
Berdyaev feels that "Paradise and perfection within the confines of 
3 
our aeon would be intolerable, 11 because with the ceasing of creativity 
4 
the world would lapse into dullness. Berdyaev contrasts the static 
"Angel Kingdom" with man's realm, noting the lack of freedom in the 
former. The "Angel Kingdom" cannot be introduced into the "Kingdom 
5 
of Ceasar" without great loss in man 1 s freedom. 11A perfect and har-
monious order in the realm of Ceasar would annihilate freedom, which 
6 
means that such an order is not attainable in this world. 11 
It seems to Berdyaev that social Utopias are often realizable be-
7 
cause of their limited scopes. However, a spiritual Utopia or a Utopia 
of freedom cannot be realized because life cannot be rationalized, nor 
8 
does freedom insure perfect harmony. Perfect harmony implies monism 
for Berdyaev, while freedom presupposes pluralism. To abolish plural-
9 
ism is to sacrifice freedom. Swmnarizing his views of Utopianism, 
Berdyaev writes: 
If human life were to become the incarnate expression 
o:f a completely organized, mechanized and rationalized 
life of masses and not of peoples, if it were to become 
divided up into categories and at the same time com-
1. DH, p. 79. 
2. RSRC, P• 173. 
3. TR, P• 153. 
4. D:M, P• 288. 
Cf. RSRC, p. 178. 
6. RSRC, P• 177. 
7. SF, p. 205 and RSRC, pp. 172-174. 
8. RSRC, PP• 172-176. 
9. SF, P• 207. 
5. FS, p. 346. 
• 
pletely totalitarian, that is to say if the last traces 
of freedom were to disappear, the spirit and spirituality 
also would disappear, for s pirit is freedom. Free com-
munity can only be the result of a movement wbi ch is both 
spiritual and social, and in which the spiritual and the 
social cease to be separate and opposed.l 
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(i) Hedonism. Berdyaev understands hedonism to me an that hap-
piness is the supreme good ani that all must be bent toward its attain-
ment. His objections to it as a moral theory are shown when he writes 
in The Destiny of Man, 
The idea that happiness is t h e supreme good and t he final 
end has been instilled into man in order t o keep him in 
slavery. Human freedom arrl dignity forbid us to regard 
happiness • • • in this light. There is an irreconcil-
able conflict between freedom and happiness.2 
Suffering is closely connected with freedom. To seek 
a life in which there will be no more suffering is to 
seek a life in which there will be no more freedom. 
Hence all hedonistic morality is opposed to freedom.3 
Happiness in the midst of emptiness or at the expense of awareness 
might 'be pleasant, though of litt le spiritual value in comparison t o 
man's free moral personality. 
There is nothing spiritual or even human about a com-
pletely happy and contented creature, impervious to 
evil, suffering, pain and tragedy. A sensitive aware-
ness of evils and a capacity for suffering are ••• 
attr ibutes of the spiritual man. • • • If all things 
had a uniform goal, if the tragic contradictions of 
life were abolished, if there were an end to suffering, 
then nian would lose th~ power of transcending himself 
and his urge to do so. 
The man who appears happy may be shallow in his outlook or unaware of 
5 
a great deal. At best, 11 t here are no very happy men but only moments 
1. DH, p. 193 
2. D11, p. 102. 
4. SR, PP• 102-103. Cf. DR, PP• 45, 61. 
5. DM, P• 291. 
3. Ibid., P• 119. 
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1 
of happiness. 11 Like the building of a Utopia, mer ely making man happy 
2 
seems an oversimplified remedy for his restlessness in the world. 
3 
Hedonism dooms man to fear, and fear 'paralyzes moral valuations." 
Berdyaev also points out the "naturalistic fallacy" of hedonism, st at-
ing t hat happiness has no content and no meaning except as a by-pro~ L. . 
duct. .Also ; i£ suffering rather than sin and evil is opposed and at-
tacked, the offensive is being wrongly aimed at results rather than 
5 
causes. 
(ii) The "progress m;y-th." Berdyaev thinks that history pro-
gresses, but t his progress is possible because "of true creative acts 
6 
in history, not from evolutionary naturalism or determinism." For 
7 
him, "progress is a task, not a law. 11 Inevitable progress in history 
sacrifices past and present generations for the future. It assumes 
t hat Utopia m~ be attained within history and implies the adaptation 
of man to the world rather than his freedom in it. In one of his early 
works , Berdyaev writes: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
SR, 
SF, 
DM, 
DM, 
SF, 
DR, 
BE, 
There is no such thing in history as progress from good 
to perfect on a single plane of development, in virtue,· 
of which some future generation m~ exalt itself at the 
expense of all those who have gone before. There is no 
such thing in history as simple progress in human happi-
ness. There is only progr8ss in the tragic sense of the 
inner principles of being. 
p. 117. 
PP• 182-183. 
P• 167. Cf. DM, pp. 174-177. 
P• 74 and DR, P• 60. 
p. 16o. 
P• 296. 
P• 165. 
MH, P• 192. This excerpt is from a particularly good passage, 
namely :IIlli, PP• 186-193. cr. DR, p. 30. 
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(3) Theocracy. In Berdyaev's analysis, theocracy, like all other 
monistic forms of government, denies freedom. In The Beginning and the 
Errl, he writes, 
The spirit of imperialism, and the will to power have 
been the breath of life to theocracies. • • • They 
have imputed a sacrosanct character to earthly power 
and this has resulted in • • • monstrous violence upon 
man.l 
God cannot be made ruler of the pPlitical state, for this confuses law 
with grace, nature with spirit, and the perfect society with the per-
2 
feet spiritual life or will of God. 
Not society, but the person is the image of God. Man himself must 
strive to live up to this; he 
ought to live according to his divine image, i.e. theo-
centrically; whereas socie~ should live according to 
the human image, i.e. anthropocentrically. Theocentrism 
in society gives birth to totalitarianism, religious or 
secular, theocratic or ideocratic, "W..i.ch, as history 
has abundantly shown, be:brays freedom.3 · 
(4) Fascism. Berdyaev finds fascism's totalitarian state opposed 
to personal freedoms and thus to man's spiritual development. Unlike 
communism, which views the dictatorial state as a passing phase, fas-
cism considers this as permanently necessary. There is no progress 
from state control of all of each man's life to a future Utopia in 
4 
which there will be freedom for man. 
(5) Racialism. Berdyaev views racialism as more degrading to man 
1. BE, p. 204. Cf. CCW, P• 61. 
2. Dukhovny krizis inteligentsii, cited by Spinka, NBCF, pp. 37-38. 
Cf. DH, p. 10; RSRC, p. 71; and "Democracy, Socialism, and Theocracy," 
PP• 197-200. 
3. DR, p. 280. 
4. nspiritual Dualism and Daily Bread," p. 229; "Fatality or Faith," 
Christian Century, 58(1939), 604; and SS, P• 189. 
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than any other totalitarian form. He calls it a "naturalist mysticiBm 
1 
••• equipped with modern civilized technique." It sees man as mere-
ly zoological, rejecting any spiritual dimension of freedom. Racial 
2 
theories also doom man to a fatalistic "staying where he begf.!ls." 
ii. Individual ism 
While for Berdyaev the social regimentation of totalitarianism 
is hostile to freedom, pure individualism is not the desired al terna-
tive. The negative freedom to revolt completely against one's environ-
ment expresses desire without a purpose. Here the isolated individual 
3 
has the highest reality and value. One in this situation seems free, 
but s i nce he is not free to act positively, he is not really free at 
all. He does not lmow freedom of the spirit. 
Freedom of the spirit has in fact nothing in connnon with 
individualism: to be free is not to be insulated; it is 
not to shut oneself up, but, on the contr~, to break 
through in a greative act to the fulness and universality 
of existence. · 
For example, the formal political freedom of some countries (Ber-
dyaev notes particularly France) makes social changes difficult or im-
possible to achieve. Practically, such formal freedom results in con-
5 
servatism rather than social progress. At its best, such a society 
is governed by majority rule, wherein political relativism takes pre-
6 
cadence over universal truth, i.e. "opinion is above knowing. 11 In 
its poorer aspects, formally free and liberal society sets men against 
1. FMMW, p. 76. 
2. Ibid., pp. 74, 87-99; CCW, p. 12; Christianity and Anti-Semitism, 
trails. Alan A. Spears (Aldington: Hand and Flower Press,I952), PP• 
13-14; TR, P• 106. 
3. MCA, PP• 152-154 and SF, P• 133. 
4 .. D~ p. 54. Cf. FS, P• 19 and MCA1 P• 152. 5 11 Tne Religion of Communism," p. 8u. 
o. "The New Middle Ages," PP• 87-88. 
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each other by exalting competition above co-operation, as in pure capi-
talism, where persona are disregarded and economic considerations are 
1 
primary. Individualism undervalues inter-personal relations, man's 
2 
living as part of 11 a real and living whole. 11 
As an isolated individual man lives in and for himself, while as 
a person ,he lives with and for others as well. Life at best is in com-
munity rather than in abstract isolation. 
A better, a more just and really human society can be 
created only from the spiritual sociality of man, f3om 
an existential source and not from objectivization. 
(l) Capitalism. Many of capitalism 1 s problems stem from its in-
ternal contradictions. For example, while individual initiative is 
originally important,under capitalism man is seen enslaved to the ma-
4 
chines he invents and the money he invests. Berdyaev writes dramati-
cally of capitalism's anti-personalism: 
The financial world of money, banks, and the stock exchange 
forms a mysterious •~rld of its own; ••• there is an ef-
fective mysticism of money: it is neither divin5 nor natural 
but diabolic, and in secret it rules the world. 
Capitalist economy is deeply anti-personal: it dehumanizes 
econrunfuc lj_fe and makes man a thing. • • • The power of 
the banks is a faceless, anonymous power. • • • It is 
even ~certain who is responsible for the misery under 
vmich the world is now suffering; there is no culprit, for 
he has no name. The unemployed do not know who is to 
blame for their bitter: l9t~- -- Man is crushed by ~ vast 
shapeless, faceless, and nameless power, mone,y. 
Despite its basis in individualism, capitalism embodies an urge 
1. ORC, P• 179 and SF, P• 136. 
2. "The New Middle Ages," p. 109. 
3. DH, P• 135. 4. TNE, P• 15; ORC, P• 185; 1ffi, p. 219; and SF, P• 211. 
5. CGIV, P• 58. 
6. FMMW, P• 71. 
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1 
toward collectivity. This collectivity is seen in his enslavement 
to money and machines and by the growth of monopolies and elimination 
of open competition. With all of its "dynamic ••• immense energy 
and developing the material powers of production, ••• it is the ruin 
2 
of men and deforms the soul alike of employ,ers and the employed," due 
to its antipersonalist ethic. Berdyaev feels that capitalism can 
3 
truthfully be called "practical atheism." As man is brought to the 
level of the crowd, the "bourgeois spirit" appears. "Capitalism ere-
ated t he proletarian mass, which unfortunately is more inclined toward 
4 
collectivism than toward community." 
Another contradiction vd. thin capitalism is its optimistic view 
that the conflict of private interests can produce an orderly society. 
On the contrary, Berdyaev reasons that the clash of individual inter-
est s will lead to conflict and that 
a normal social and economic life is inconceivable as 
the collision and reciprocal action of isolated atoms; 5 it can come about only by a principle of co-operation. 
Ultimately the conflicts in capitalism will lead to war because the 
state as well as the individual s t rives for power which is usually 
6 
seen as military power. Elfen though there may be no declared war, 
there is often conflict so that "a state of peace is alao a state of 
7 
war. 11 
1. FMMW, PP• 8-11; 62-67. 
2. CCW, P• 59. Cf. SF, P• 212 and TNE, PP• 69-70. 
,3. RSRC, P• 64. 
4. Ibid., P• 121. Cf. CCW, P• 49. 
5. ccw, P• 76. Cf. "The Religion of Communism," P• 58 and BE, P• 219. 
6. SF, PP• 154-157 and RSRC, P• 81. 
1. SF, P• 159. 
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Berdyaev is most critical of capitalism b'ecause of its inadequate 
concept of freedom. For him, freedom of the spirit is ureal freedom,n 
but the "secondary freedoms" of politics: and economics are primary ac-
1 
cording to capitalism. The economic freedom of capitalism gives free-
2 
dom only to a few powerful and wealthy individuals. For the many, 
there is only formal economic freedom. 
When a man • • • has no control over the means of pro-
duction he is forced to aeal his labour as a commodity; 
that is coercion, and a regime w~ch allows that state 
of things is based on despotism. 
Freedom of work means the freedom to sell one's work as 
though it were merchandise, and this freedom must be 
exercised under a threat of starvation. The buyers' 
conditions are made in accordance with the unescapable 
position of the sellers; the buyer ~s in a position to 
wait and choose, the seller is not.4 
In this system, the worker may lose out either through exploitation or 
5 
unemployment. 
(2) Democragy. Berdyaev most frequently criticizes democracy far 
elevating mediocre quantity above superior quali~. Democracy ignores 
the few best for the sake of the average. 
The propagation of democratic forms in a given society 
may help to undermine the personality, • • • to reduce 
all men to an average standard, gnd, finally, to pro-
duce 'impersonal' personalities. 
Pure democracy misunderstands the spiritual value of the person and 
therefore needs modification by some of the strong: points of aristocrat-
? 
ism. Because political democracy can give equality only in this lim-
1. !_N}:_.t. P• 74. 
2. .l!"MMW, PP• 35-49 • 
3 •• ccw.\ p. 81. 4 Ibia., p • .53. 
5. FMMW, P• 70. 
6. ss1 P• 169. ~ 1. Ib~d., p. 170. Cf. infra, Chap. IV, Sec. ~' Sub-Sec. ii. Par. 4. 
.. 
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ited sphere, it allows other more basic inequalities to grow and be-
come harmful. 
Political and juridicial equality go hand in hand With 
the greatest social and economic inequality. • • • In 
a democracy based on universal suffrage and parliamen-
tarianism the nation is organized by the state, but 
society is not; its organization parallel to the state 
produces very ~eat difficul ties, which lead to social 
disintegration.! 
Democracy tends to become bourgeois because of its ethical basis 
in moral relativism. It is guided toward truth and right by the for-
mal principle of majority vote, and there is no certainty that the 
2 
majority will seek the highest values of truth and freedom. Demo-
cracy 1s greatest problem would be overcome if it could and would sub-
3 
mit to the criteria of absolute truth rather than relativism. 
The problem of freedom also arises in democracies. Democratic 
freedom m~ be merely the formal freedom of each to speak and act ac-
cording to his whim or opinion. Energy is then spent smoothing out 
conflicts between interests, social progress is retarded or blocked, 
and freedom engenders conservatism. "Formal democratic parliamen-
tarianism has compromised itself; it suffers from an inertia so ter-
4 
rible, that it is evidently incapable of reforming society. 11 A re-
lated problem is liberal democracy's inability to defend itself against 
highly efficient totalitarian forms such as Nazism, fascism, and com-
5 
munism. However, in giving voice (even though in a limited realm), 
1. ccw, pp. 26-27. 
2. "Democracy, Socialism, and Theocracy," pp. 174-176; "The Russian Revo-
lution," in The End of Our Time; p. 140; MCA, P• 266;FS, p.80; DR, P• 52. 
3. "Democracy, Socialism, and Theocracy, 11 p. 202. 
4. FMMW, p. 33. Cf. pp. 32,36 ani "Democracy, Socialism, and Theocracy,11 pp. 
177-179. . . 603-604 5. FMMW, PP• 37-38 and "Fatality or F~th, 11 PP• • 
to every man, democracy has value. 
If there is an eternal element in democracy • • • it is 
surely connected, not with the idea o~ the supremacy of 
a nation, but with the idea of the subjective rights of 
human personality, with freedom of spiritual life, free-
dom of conscience, thought, speech, and creativity. 
(3) Anarchism. In discussing anarchism, Berdyaev is careful to 
distinguish it from anarchy. While he defines anarchy as completely 
chaotic absence of order and control, he describes anarchism as 
not opposed to order, ••• but to authority, force, and 
the Kingdom of Ceasar • • .-an ideal of freedom, of 
harmony and of order which arises from Wi. thin, that is 
to say, it is the ~ictory of the Kingdom of God over the 
Kingdom of Ceasar. 
While he does not favor the chaos of anarchy, then, he finds much 
in anarchism to approve. Since the s'b.te is basically the governing of 
some men by others, there is no perfectly ideal state. 
All forms of state organization • • • are temporal and 
transitory; not one of them may be ••• regarded as 
sacred. The only political principle which is connect-
ed with absolute truth is the principle of the subje~.' 
tive rights of human personality, of the freedom of 
spirit, of conscience, of thought and speech.3 
No government should be accepted unconditionally by its people. 
4 
But while the ideal of anarchism may be very fine, in practice 
5 
anarchy may allow freedom to the crowd rather than to the person. 
6 
This freedom, 11'Which inwardly devours and consumes itself, 11 degrades 
1. FMMW, P• 33. . 
2. RI, P• 152. Cf. BE, P• 217. 
3. DM, P• 198. Cf. DM, PP• 196-197; SF, P• 148; and DR, P• 51. In this 
last reference, he says, "All ideological groups, all gatherings of 
people in pursuit of 1ideals 1 are known to encroach on ••• the free-
dom • • • of man. • • • Every mass of people banded together is hos-
tile to freedom. . • • Every society which has so far been organized 
• • • is inimical to freedom and tends to deny human personality. 11 
4. DR, pp. 252, 321. 
5. SF, PP• 147-149 and Seaver~ NBIT, P• 79. 
6. MH, P• 172. Cf. FS, P• 13~. 
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personality and leads to the rule of the mob over the person. Although 
Berdyaev sympathizes with anarchism, he recognizes the necessity of 
some sort of government. As he states, his "anarchistic instincts 
have nothing in common with the romantic and optimistic utopianism 
1 
based on evolutionary theories, 11 and "the anarchist Utopia of an idyllic 
2 
stateless life is a lie and a seductive delusion. 11 
Referring to anarchy, Berdyaev cri ticiz.es Bakunin, describing him 
as an 11overgrown child 
3 
. . • aflame with the most extreme revolutionary 
ideas. 11 For Bakunin, all the evils of force, authority, and order were 
embodied in the state and in God. 
All authority is of God. To Bakunin that means that 
all authority is of the devil, ••• the cause of en-
slavement and violence. 'If there is a God, then man 
is a slave. 1 The idea of God is tlle denial of human 
reason, of justice and of freedom.4 
Because his revolt against the state was a negative revolt against 
force ~~d order and because he had no concept of the primacy of person-
ality, Balrunin's anarchy degenerated into a kind of collective, where 
5 
each person would be "drowned in the elemental mass of the people. 11 
(4) Aristocratis.m. In many of his books, but particularly in The 
6 
Philosophy of Inequality, Berdyaev notes that 
inequality is the basis of the cosmic order and harmony, 
and is the justification of the existence of the human 
personality itself, the source of all creative movement 
1. DR, P• 115. Cf. DR, P• 320. 
2. SF, p. 150. 
3. ORC, P• 66. 
4. Ibid., p. 68. Cf. ORC, PP• 66-67 and RI, P• 148. 
5. RI, P• 149. 
6. Filosofiya neravenstva, (1923). This is nd available in English 
translation, but is cited and discussed by Spinka, NBCF, P• 54, and 
Lossky, HRP, p. 246. 
in the world. • • • Out of inequality the world and 
the cosmos were born. Out of inequality, man himself 
was born. An absolute equality would leave being in 
a state of equilibrium, in a nondifferentiated state, 
that is, in nothing.l 
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The egalitarian strivings of such forms of government as demo-
cracy and socialism have their good points, but are not alw~s condU-
ci ve to the best development of the outstanding personal qualities of 
all men. For example, while "aristocratisrn is morally revolutionary-
~ · 2 
democratism is morally conservative." Truth exists for all men, but 
it is revealed only to the few of the 11 aristocracy" able to perceive 
3 
it. If the many completely dominate these few, all are ultimately 
hurt, because the superior sensitivities of the few do not have the 
4 
chance to help the many rise from mediocrity. The social problems 
of all cannot be solved from the spiritual realm, and it is the "per-
meation of the spiritual aristocracy" which can ennoble the entire 
5 
society. 
Berdyaev writes that 11true aristocracy is a vision of the image 
of personality, not of the image of a social group or class or caste." 
Thus he asserts the primary significance of the spiritual or personal 
arist ocracy rather than the social aristocracy. He often calls the 
former the "real" aristocracy while the latter he refers to as "sym-
7 
bolic." Social aristocracy is based on such "artificial considera-
1. Filosofiya neravenstva, p. 44, cited by. Spinka, NBCF, P• 54. 
2. MCA, P• 266. 
3. BE, P• 71. 
4. FS, PP• xi-xiii. 
5. CQV, PP• 107-108. 
6. SF, p. 179. 
7. Ibid., p. 176; CCW, P• 92; SS, P• 193; and ORC, P• 179. 
6 
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tions" as wealth or membership in an elite class rather than the crea-
tive personal qualities of the artist, philosopher, scholar, social 
reformer, or worker--i.e. anyone -who creates "hecessary values upon 
1 
which the life ••• of society depends." 
C.~eativity is a primary characteristic of the spiritual aristo-
cracy whose "prophetic mission" must often be compromised for the sake 
of acceptance. 
The creative genius is always individual, subject to 
nothing and to no one, and in his indiVidual creative-
ness he expresses the spirit of the people ••• even 
better ••• than the people themselves in their col-
lective life.2 
Freedom, a prerequisite for creativity, is aristocratic as it resists 
external pressures and allows personal expression. 
Real aristocracy is nothing less than the attainment 
of spiritual freedom, of independence of the surround-
ing world and of human quantity, in whatever form it 
may take. It is ••• harkening to the inward voice 
••• of God, and the voice of conscience.3 
Like the traditional aristocracy of birth, Berdyaev 1s spiritual 
aristocracy is connate rather than bred. It can neither be forced to 
maturity quickly, nor brought from the outside, nor developed Within 
4 
a lifetime. 
iii. Organic pluralism 
Because Berdyaev 1s ~Nn social philosophy is a type of organic 
1. Spiruca, NBCF, P• 175. Cf. CCW, PP• 69, 84, 92; and SF, P• 18 • 
2. RSRC, PP• 95-96. Cf. MCA, P• 35 and CGW, P• 96. 
3. SF, p. 125. "Human quality" rather than "human quantity" may give 
a better meaning to this passage. Cf. DM, p. 96 and BE, P• 217. 
4. DR, P• 19 and TNE, P• 6. Cf. the following statements from CrrN, p. 
88: 11 aristocratism takes for granted that I have owned something 
from the beginning, not that I began without something; it is ~ priori, 
not a posteriori. • • • It takes a long time to make an aristocracy, 
but a bourgeoisie can be formed within a generation." 
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pluralism, the present section will be a brief one. His social philos-
ophy will be treated in the next large section. 
(1) Socialism. Berdyaev uses the term socialism in a general way 
to denote the economic system which attempts to distribute goods as 
equitably as possible. As such, it has neither a spiritual dimension 
1 
nor a peculiar religious world-view of its own. It deals only with 
the problem of bread. In so doing, its 
most difficult problem is that of freedom. How can one 
combine the solution of the problem of bread for every-
one, a problem on which human life itself depends, with 
the problem of freedom, on which human dignity depends?2 
In socialism, major problems may be the rise of the bureaucrat in the 
place of the capitalist exploiter and en over-emphasis on the material 
at the expense of the spiritual. These problems can only be met by 
the 11real molecular processes within human society which are founded 
3 
in the ••• personalist brotherhood of man. 11 
Socialism as a noun must be modified by adjectives in order to 
be clear as to form. It may be revolutionary or reform in method, re-
ligious or atheistic in world-view, democratic or aristocratic in gov-
4 
ernment. Socialism has done a great good in raising before the world 
the problem of the working-man and in pleading not only for his econom-
5 
ic betterment, but for his recognition as a person. Noting the de-
6 
cline of i ts'1'revolutionary standards, 11 Berdyaev recognized that it may 
1. SF, P• 209 and RSRC, pp. 65-66. 
2. RSRC, P• 65. 
3. SF, P• 211. Cf. SF, P• 210 and RSRC, PP• 64-65. 
4. RSRC, P• 66. 
5. SF, P• 212. 
6. cow, P• L~B. 
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be consistent with personalistic ethics and metaphysics. He had begun 
to develop his type of socialism, ethically based upon the supreme 
1 
value of personality, before he was influenced by Marxism. 
(2) Social democracy. Though he is critical of both pure social-
ism and pure democracy., Berdyaev feels that the good points of ·each 
might be united under a system of social democracy, stating in one of 
his last works that "the future belongs to a new form of democracy, 
2 
social democracy." As a young man he was associated with the social 
democrats, a group which held both Christian and Marxist ideas. Ac-
cepting Marxism as a guide for a system of reform rather than as a 
"religion," they approved its criticisms of capitalism. Because as 
Christians they saw intrinsic value in every person, they saw no sharp 
break between bourgeois and proletariat, and they disapproved of the 
3 
use of violent revolutionary methods even to achieve a vrorthy goal. 
6. Elements of Berqyaev 1s Social Philosophy 
While Berdyaev was not primarily a social philosopher, he had an 
alert social conscience. He was interested in the fate of man in the 
social and political world, but he was a critic of every existing form 
of social organization. In his autobiography, he writes 
In a • • • deeper sense, I have been non-social. Social 
movements have never been able to claim my whole-hearted 
allegiance. I have p.lways been a spiritual 1 anarchist 1 
and 1 individualist. •4 
His personalism underlies his interest in social and political affairs. 
1. DR, p. l15. 
2. TNE, p. 115. 
3. ORC, pp. 165-166 and DR, p.ll8. 
4. DR, P• xii. 
His position is indicated in The Russian Idea: 
The social problem plays a much greater part with me 
than With other representatives of Russian religious 
philosophy. I have. close affinity with that school of 
thought which in the West is called religious socialism, 
but the socialism is decisively personalist. In m~ 
respects, some of them very serious, I have remained 
and I remain a lonely figure; I represent the extreme 
left in the Russian religious philosophy of the time 
of the Renaissance, but I have not lost and I do not 
wish to lose my links with the Orthodox Church.l 
It is further elaborated in a letter written in 1947: 
I am primarily a philosopher and a moralist. Even when 
I write an article which seems to deal with politics, 
I write it not from a political point of view but from 
that of the philosophy of history. It is quite incor-
rect to evaluate my philosophy from the point of view 
of advantage or harm to Communism. I am a fanatical 
defender of the ideas of freedom and personality as 
religious, philosophical, and moral principles and I 
will defend them to the end of my days. I want up to 
the day of my death to be able to speak the truth even 
if it be regarded as harmful. I am not a man of any 
one camp. I am outside camps. I want to be free as 
a thinker. I want as far as my strength will allow me 
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to be a representative of the spirit and not of 'inte-
rests.' Such a type of person is sometimes badly needed. 2 
Summarizing his social philosophy, he writes in Slavery and Freedom: 
The fundamental contradiction in my thinking about social 
life is bound up With the juxtaposition in me of two ele-
ments--an aristocratic interpretation of personality, 
freedom, and creativeness, and a socialistic demand for 
the assertion of the dignity of every man, of even the 
most insignificant of men, and for a guarantee of his 
rights in life. • • • When a levelling tyranny offends 
against my understanding of the dignity of personality, 
my love of freedom and creativeness, I rebel against it 
and I am ready to express my revolt in the extremest 
form. But when the defenders of social inequality shame-
lessly defend their own privileges, when capitalism op-
poses the labouring masses, and turns a man into a thing, 
then also I rebel.3 
1. RI, P• 244. 
2. From a letter to Xenia Mikhailovna Fielding Clarke, dated May 7, 
1947, cited by Clarke, ITB, P• 156. Cf. DR, P• 217. 
3. SF, P• 9 
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i. Ber dyaev's analysis of the world situation 
Berdyaev felt a great sense of urgency as he looked at the world 
situation. As he viewed it, the world during his lifetime was experi-
encing the catastrophic end of an epoch of history and looking forward 
1 
to the davm.ing of a new epoch. In his earlier writings, such as "The 
New Middle Ages," he characterized the culture of this new epoch as 
spiritually complex and economically simpl~ . based on town and coun-
2 -
try co-operation rather than on urban competition. In his later writ-
ings, such as Towards a New Epoch, the nature of this emerging culture 
3 
was less easily known or described. 
Berdyaev viewed man as potentially creative and therefore able 
to control his destiny and that of the world, but he saw that too few 
live by and for the spiritual interests that would lead to the reali-
zation of this potential. Too many are concerned "only for the world-
ly, economic, commercial interests of d~ life, without looking for 
4 
another world and a better life." Men of the present age, in neglect-
ing spiritual for political and economic values, become spiritually 
weak. Worship of power, race, nation, money or other collective values 
lead to the devaluation of pers~nality. 
Man desires power, power for himself, but this leads 
him to put power above self, ••• it leads him to 
readiness to sacrifice his own humanity for the sake 
o:f power.5 
Berdyaev saw that the world was in a state of "spiritual anarchy," 
1. TR, P• 150. 
2. "The New Middle Ages," pp. 94-95. 
3. TNE, P• v. 
4. CCW, P• 94. 
5. FMMW, p. 22. cr. FMMW, p. 116; lr.lllie Crisis· ·qf Chi'i:stianity," P• 229; 
CAS, p. 12; TNE, P• vi. 
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lacking the Greek sense of harmony with the cosmos and the nineteenth 
centur,y man's belief in the possibility of progress through science 
1 
and humanism. Man, feeling forsaken by God, engaged in a new 11prac-
tical atheism" and abandoned reliance on faith and reason for belief 
in power, mich by its nature is irrational or non-rational iri many 
cases. 
High moral principles at the present moment in history 
lack any dynamic force. We are living in an epoch when 
only irrational forces have any strength and the rational 
seems powerless. Our epoch teaches that reason is power-
less in a struggle with fatalit2, that to conquer fate 
we need a super-rational power. 
Yet, strangely enough, with this sense of imbalance and contradiction, 
3 
there is less sense of sin and evil than ever before. Man feels 
powerless in the face of an alien world whose catastrophic events he 
4 
cannot control. 
The need, as Berdyaev saw it, was for a 11 christianization and 
spiritualization of Communism, at the core of which we must know how 
5 
to di scern the positive elements of social justice." Some form of 
soci<tiistic economy seemed to him the best background for man's spir-
itual development, yet he knew that economic re-organization could 
6 
accomplish little without the deepening of spiritual forces. 
ii. Some b~sic definitions 
In considering Berdyaev's social philosophy, it seems helpful to 
1. liThe Crisis of Christianity, 11 P• 228 and BE, P• 249. 
2. "Fatality or Faith," P• 603. Of. DH, PP• 1-2 and TR, PP• 89-90. 
3. FMMW", P• 15 · 
4. DR, P• xi and BE, P• vi. 
5. TNE, P• 46. 
6. Ibid., P• 47 • 
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examine some of his basic social concepts. 
(1 ) St.ate~ . _ Furthest removed from the personal or spiritual 
realm is the state. Entirely external to man, it has no personality 
of its ovm, but receives its power wholly from its members. Its im-
1 
portance is not intrinsic, but 11 symbolic," "relative, 11 and 11functional. 11 
It is necessary in order to protect man from harm by others, i.e. to 
insure social justice. However, if man gives absolute allegiance to 
2 
the state, he is enslaved rather than helped by it. 
3 
The highest principle of the state is justice. Its authority 
rests on its power to do that which man, in faith, delegates to it. 
The state loses this authority when man loses his faith in it and does 
4 
not give it power to act. 
(2) Society. While in the state men are bound together on the 
symbolic or administrative level of the law (including police, courts, 
etc.), in society they live together interdependently as prophets, 
5 
artists, scientists, craftsmen, etc. Society has less intrinsic value 
than the person, but more than the state. 
Society is a certain reality and not merely the sum of 
its members. Society has an ontological kernel, which 
the state has no~, ••• an ontologically real communion 
between persons. 
It expresses man's relationships to others on a co-operative level. 
\iVhile man is an organism, 11 society is ••• not an organism; society 
1. SF, PP• 149-150. 
2. MCA, pp. 277, 294; SF, P• 145; and Seaver, NBIT, P• 76. 
3. Spinka, NBCF, P• 156. 4. DM, p. 207. Of. discussion of this passage in Clarke, ITB, P• 147. 
5. DM, P• 82. 
6. Ibid., P• 198. 
•• 
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1 
is co-operation. 11 
Borrowing the language of "I, 11 "Thou, 11 and 11We 11 from Buber, Ber-
dyaev further describes the relationships within eociet,r; . 
The problem of society is a problem of relationships, 
not between 'I' and 1Thou, 1 but between 1 I 1 and 1We, 1 
, and through the relation to 1We, 1 the relation to 
'Thou. t2 
Vfuile the individual is part of society, the person is not part of 
anythj_ng, but a primary reality in himself. Society is not an "I," but 
the objectivization of the 1We 1 which possesses no reality 
at all and no existence outside the relation to it of the 
'I' and ••• the relation between the 1I 1 and the 1You.•3 
Societ y, then, allows communication between men, while community pro-
4 
vides the possibility of communion. 
(3) Community. While in society men are related as independent 
but co-operating persons, in community men are related to others not 
1. SF, p. 106. On the same page of SF, Berdyaev writes: 11It is not 
society that is an organism; it is man that is an organism. The 
idea of the integral man, not of the integral society, ought to 
be laid as the foundation-stone of the organization of society." 
2. RSRC, p. 84. While Buber emphasizes 1.1I 11 and "Thou" more than 11We, 11 
he has an interesting reference on the meaning of 11We 11 in Between 
Man and Man, pp. 175-176: 11 It is true that aWe can arise in every 
kind of group, but it cannot be understood from the life of any 
single one of the groups. By We I mean a community of several in-
dependent persons, who have reached a self and self-responsibility, 
the community resting on the basis of this self and self-responsi-
bility, and being made possible by them. The special character of 
the We is shown in the essential relation existing, or arising 
temporarily, between its members; that is, in the holding sway with-
in the We of an ontie directness which is the decisive presupposi-
tion of~he I-Thou relation. The We includes the presupposition of 
the I-Thou relation. The We includes the Thou potentially. Only 
men who are capable of truly saying Thou to one another can truly 
say We with one .another. 11 
3. SF; p. 104. Cf. SF, P• 103 and infra, Chap IV, Sec. 6, Sub-Sec. 
iv:, Par. 5. 
4. SS, P• 181. Cf. supra, Chap. II, Sec. i, Sub-Sec. ii, Par. 1. 
• 
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merely as providers of essential externals for the lives of others, 
but as persons--each in his own right. 
No society is capable of appeasing the nostalgia for 
comnrunion, • • • for the true reflection of one Ego in 
another. Every society is Ceasar 1s,whereas true com-
munion is the Kingdom of God. • • • The path of oo~ 
munion is beset with difficulties and pain because each 
personality represents a distinct and mysterious world 
only partially accessible to another personality.l 
Seaver expresses the difference between society and community ver,y 
well in the folloWing passage: "If the watchword of organized society 
is 'each for all (the whole) 1 that of a free community is 'all (ever,y-
2 
one) for each. ' " 
-~ile the state or society m~ become too powerful and enslave 
man to the lower values of the collective, 
the community of people, communion in freedom, in love 
and mercy, has never been able to enslave man, on the 
contrar,y it is the realization of the fullness of the 
life of personality.3 
iii. Apophatic sociology 
While for Berdyaev man is the highest value and community is the 
setting for the highest quality relationship among men, and while he 
speaks quite specifically on some social issues, he does not outline 
a blueprint for the "ideal personalistic community. 11 Because such a 
community would have to "grow i'rom within" and its 
form • • • would be an outcome of the qualities and 
capacities of the persons that coflprise it • • • there 
can be no stereotyped ideal form. 
In Slavery and Freedom, Berdyaev discusses apophatic and kataphatic 
1. SS, P• 193. Cf. SF, P• 109. 
2. Seaver, NBIT, p. 90. 
3. SF, P• 104. 
4. Seaver, NBIT, P• 87. 
• 
·-
sociology, stating that 
it does not suffice to assert the truth of an apophatic 
negative theology. One must also assert the truth of 
an apophatic negative sociology. Kataphatic sociology-
and still more if ft is founded in religion--is a source 
of slavery to man. 
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Like apophatic theology, apophatj_c sociology is described negatively, 
as 11not this, not that. 11 According to apophatic sociology, 
a society of free men, a society of personalities, is 
not either a monarchy or a theocracy or an aristocracy 
or a democracy, nor is it authoritarian society nor a 
liberal society, nor a bourgeois society nor a social-
ist society: it is not fascism nor communism, nor even 
anarchism as tar as objectivization exists in anarchism. 
This is pure apophatics, ••• free from concepts • • • 
(an~ all rationalization.2 
Slavery and Freedom is a "philosophical-spiritual" criticism of socio-
logical elements such as civilization, the state, war., nationalism, 
money, Utopia, etc. It is not a kataphatic 11programme for the solu-
3 
t ion of the social problem. 11 
iv. Man is primary, society secondar,y 
For Berdyaev, the person is primary, society secondary. As he 
writes in The Beginning and the End, 
I take my stand upon a ••• scale of values ••• in 
which human personality, unique, unrepeatable, and ir-
replacable is the highest value of all. Spirit, which 
reveals itself in the depth of the subject, makes i$s 
judgments in a different way, and establishes realities 
in another fashion than nature and soci~ty . ••• which 
have revealed themselves in the object.4 · 
Man must be viewed pr:iJnarily as a person, rather than as a mere sooio-
1. SF, p. 18. 
2. Ibid.' p. 71. 
3. Ibid., p. 217. Of. SF, P• 72. 4. BE, p. 128. Of. omv, p. 60; DH, PP• 120-127; and RSRC, p. 63. 
• 
logical entity. 
At the basis of personalist society at its best there 
lies the idea not of the citizen nor the idea of the 
producer, not a political idea nor an economic idea, 
but the s piritual idea of the whole man, of personality. 
This involves the supremacy of spirit over politics and 
economics. • • • Integrality is always to be found in 
man, not in society .1 
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The establishment of a just and happy society is only an instrumental 
2 
value in relation to concrete living persons. 
Berdyaev states that "the most individual and personal is at the 
3 
same t ime the most general and universal." This "inward existential 
4 
iniversalism of personality" which is the basis of true community op-
poses the "outward objectivized universalism" of the collective. This 
"inward universalism" draws men together into community rather than 
into collectivity. 
(1) The purely social level is seconda;r. . Berdyaev criticizes 
the tendency of some social philosophies to identify 11the realm of the 
s pirit and the realm of Ceasar," noting that this identification leads 
to the objectification of the spiritual and its eventual domination 
5 
by the political. While the "realm of Ceasar" can be organized, the 
"realm of the spirit" cannot-it must remain free and autonomous or 
it is no longer spiritual. 
Man is freed from the burden of freedom of choice in the 
interests of the peace and happiness of society and the 
organization of human life. The spiritual world ceases 
to possess the quality of infinitude and the organization 
1. SF, p. 216. 
2. RSRC, PP• 58, 89 and DH, PP• 116-117. 
3. Tl'f.E, p. 87. 
4. SF, P• 69. 
5. RSRC, PP• 78-79. Cf. "Spiritual Dualism and Daily Bread," p. 224. 
• 
of the merely finite becomes a substitute for its true 
pathos.l 
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Solution of each social problem (e.g. equitable distribution of 
wealth through some form of socialism) would be necessary but would 
not create sufficient condition for the realization of every person's 
life. There must be further movement into "social personalism" or 
community. 
The economic slavery of man undoubtedly signifies the 
alienation of human nature and the turning of man into 
a thing. Marx was right in this. But for the libera-
tion of man his spiritual nature -must be restored to 
him: he must be aware of himself as a free and spirit-
ual being. If on the other hand man remains a material 
and economic being and his spiritual nature is regarded 
as an illusion of consciousness, • • • then man remains 
a slave and he is a slave by nature. 2 
Even the solution of all social problems is insufficient. 
By themselves, political and social solutions are power-
less. The spiritual revolution which must take place 
in the world, and which is actually in progress, goes 
farther and deeper than social revolutions.3 
The solution of man's social problems will relieve some of his suffer-
ings, but if his spirit is kept alive rather than merely pacified, he 
will become aware of deeper sufferings. 
When the social problem has been solved and all men are 
settled in the conditions of a worthy existence, when 
there is no suffering which is due to a lack of guaran-
tee of one's position in society, or to hunger, to cold, 
to illiteracy, to sickness, to injustice, then ••• 
the • • • consciousness of the insuperably tragic nature 
of life will be intensified. It is precisely then that 
an agonizing yearning will lay it~ hold upon not only 
the chosen ferv but upon the many. 
1. FS, pp. 133-134. 
2. SF, p. 6o. Cf. SF, P• 203 and CON, P• 73. 
3. RSRC, p. 160. Cf. RSRC, P• 219 and TR, P• 149. 
4. DH, PP• 79-80. Cf. the statement in RSRC, P• 67, where Berdyaev 
• 
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Therefore, Berdyaev concerns h:iJnself more with "spiritua~ reform in 
1 
philosophy" than vnth a concrete program of social reform • 
(2) The need for work on the social level. It has already been 
pointed out that the state is necessary to uphold justice and that 
work on the social level is necessary, though not sufficient, for man's 
2 
fullest development. Man's work on the social level cannot be totally 
subordinated to his work on the personal level. In terms of Christian 
ethics, man must work for social justice and against social sin as well 
as for personal salvation and against pet'sonal sin. The spiritual is 
expressed in social life and work. "Man's destiny is linked up with 
that of the world; he must bear the burden of the world, he must be 
3 
creatively active in as well as free from the world. 11 "Vocation al-
ways involves creativeness; and creativeness is always ooncerned with 
4 
the world, with other men, with society, with history." 
There is always a tension between law, the highest contribution 
of the state, and grace, the highest contribution of the spirit. Law 
is necessary because grace does not alw~s come if one merely waits 
long enough. B,y merely waiting for grace, man m~ lose everything. 
Man's life, his freedom and rights, cannot be made to 
depend exclusively upon the spiritual condition of other 
says;·-"SOcialism, if we use the term in the radical sense, can never 
solve the basic problems of human existence. After the elementary 
truths of socialism have been realized, they will appear with special 
clarity, man's most profound problP~s, and the tragedy of human life 
will become specially poignant. The purposes of human life are 
spiritual, not social: the social is relative only to means." 
1. SF, P• 19. 
2. DH, p. 80. Cf. supra, Chap. IV, Sec. 6, Sub-Sec. ii, Par. 1. 
3. SR, P• 98. 
L Ib .d p 169 Cf. DH, p. 221 and 11The Crisis of Christianity,"p.235. ~. -~-·, • • lil! 
·-
men, of society, and of government. His life, freedom, 
and rights must be safeguarded also in case the spiritual 
condition of other men, of society, and of government 
proves to be a low one, or is not sufficiently enlight-
ened by grace. • • • It is impossible to wait for a 
regeneration of1society qy grace before human life is made tolerable. 
(3) The spiritual dimension of social life. Berdyaev often speaks 
of the spiritual dimension of man's social life, as when he writes: 
A rigid dualism of spiritual and social life is complete-
ly erroneous. For the social life, taken as a whole to 
include human relationships, and economics, regarded for 
the most part as a material phenomenon are both products 
of the Spirit. Spirit alone is active, matter is passive. 
The economic system is the result of man's struggle 
against nature and is, therefore, the result of human 
spiritual activity. The social life is wholly dependent 
on man 1s spiritual state. Diverse forms of spirituality 
determine the character of human labour and man 1 s atti-
tude to the economic system. 2 
Ideally, a society based on spirituality, 
would defend the human personality against the tyranny 
of society; it would recognize the sacred right of man 
to lead an intimate personal life. • • • When the forms 
of ••• society are admittedly based upon forms of spir-
ituality, the development of human character and the im-
provement . of human qualities will become primary consid-
erations.3 . 
Man can fully express his spiritual life only if he is 1'both spir-
4 
itually introverted ••• and extroverted." "Spiritual development 
in man does not mean his turning away from nature and technics; it 
5 
means rather his full command over them. 11 
1. DM, p. 130. Cf. Spinka, NBCF, PP• 154-157, for a discussion of this 
section of DM. He explains here the difficulties involved in apply-
ing the rtGospel of Love" directly to politics and economics. Both 
Spinka and Berdyaev recognize many problems inherent in this. 
2. SR, p. 175. Cf. "Spiritual Dualism and Daily Bread, 11 p. 229 and DH, p.l92. 
3. SR, P• 180. 
4. SF, P• 138. 
5. RSRC, P• 56. 
• 
• 
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Berdyaev sees that social freedom without spiritual freedom is 
1 
of little significance and that 
a society of free men, not of slaves, ought to be created 
not on the pattern of the cosmos but on the pattern of 
the spirit, that is • • • on the model of personalism, 
not on the ~attern of determination but on the pattern 
of freedom. 
If spiritual freedom is primary, man can freely oppose society if he 
3 
must in order to be true to his conscience. 
(4) The individual is the starting point for change. The adop-
tion of any social form as such cannot guarantee man 1s freedom, crea-
tivity, and maximum personal development, nor can the solution of so-
cial problems solve all human problems. For example, 
the brotherlJood of men, which is a spiritual problem, 
is not to be solved by social organization; it is prox-
imity and union not in the sphere of the abstractly-
conunon, but in the sphere of the concretely-individual.4 
Man as creative must give life to the social group rather than allow-
5 
ing the group to dominate him. For example, freedom cannot come from 
society to man: it must rather be infused into societ,y by men. 
It is impossible to create a free society out of servile 
souls. Society in itself cannot make man free. It is 
man that must make sogiet,y free because he himself is a 
free spiritual being. 
(5) The difference between "person" and "individual." Berdyaev 
distinguishes clearly between the terms "person" and 11individual~1 The 
individual is cut off from others. Though he is a member of the state 
or society, he exists independently, not in communion with others. 
1. SF, p. 112. Of. OCW, p. 60. 
2. SF, P• lo6. 
3. DR, p. 49. 
4. SF, P• 218. 5. Ibid., P• 203 and DR, P• 309. 
6. DH, p. 123. Of. RSRO, P• 59. 
• 
• 
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The person is man in community-- 11 1 11 in relation to "Thou. 11 ~~bile the 
individual is defined only on the natural level, the person belongs to 
the spiritual l evel. The distinction is well brought out in the fol-
lowing passage: 
Personality is a s piritual-religious category and indicates 
the task which is set before men. Personality is an en-
tirely different thing from the individuum, which is a 
biological and sociological category ~d the subordinate 
part of the family and the community. Personality cannot 
be a part of anything, neither of the cOimnunity nor of 
the world; it is an entirety and in virtue of its dept~ 
it belongs to the spiritual world and not the natural. 
v. Some specific issues in social philosophy 
(1) The family in society. Berdyaev views love and marriage as 
expressions of personality and freedom, over and above the control of 
law, but he is not always so optimistic in his view of the family. 
The family is seen as an economic and social unit, an aid to order in 
social organization, and an institution through which sex is given ac-
ceptability. At its best, it has "a religious meaning and justifica-
2 
tion, " it gives a new spiritual freedom, and it gives its members added 
3 
strength to pear its own and other burdens. Genuine love may be pre-
sent in family relationships, but if this love is lacking, the family 
may become a source of enslavement wherein procreation and economic 
well-being are the main aims and primary benefits derived from it. In 
such a case, love fades from the picture and is replaced by a kind of 
4 
"hypocrisy" or ''bourgeois mentality. 11 
1. Cf. BE, p. 227; ss, passim; and J.B. Coates, The Crisis 
Some Personalist Inter retations (London: Long-
and DM, pp. 235-238. Cf. Coates, CHP, P• 43. 
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(2) The organization of society. 
(i) Class and the classless society. Berdyaev states flatly 
that 11 a class society is • • • wrong, it is a denial of the dignity 
1 
of personality. 11 A society in which class is the primary considera-
tion is antipersonalist, for it views men as parts of the social whole 
or as means to an end rather than as personalities. As a person, every 
man is equal before God and society and should be viewed and treated 
2 
as such. 
A person as person does not belong to ~ class and is 
distinguished as bourgeois, noble, peasant, or proletarian 
only by accidental circumstances ••• : he belongs by his 
inner being to the spiritual world and to eternity.3 
No class is totally good, for only men are good. Rather, 
all classes are faulty, all class psychology is sinful, 
for they are opposed to the brotherhood of men; . all class 
isolation is an evil that must be fought spiritually; and 
there is nothing more saddening than to s~e the sense of 
sin blunted by class interests and greed.4 
The conflict of classes occurs in both capitalistic and socialistic 
societies. When man achieves the best possible society, class con-
flict will become a thing of the past and the truly free society will 
be born. At this point, 
the organization of society ••• Will guarantee the op-
portuni ty of work and of creation to every man. This im-
plies the disappearance of both social ranks and cla§ses 
and their replacement by the trades and professions.~ 
(ii) Guild organization. According to this last quotation, 
the ideal situation would be to replace the conflicting classes of 
1. SF, p. 215 • Lt.. CCW, p. 43 • 
2. Ibid., PP• 10, 215-216. 5. Ibid., P• 68. Cf. "Marx Versus Man," p. 496. 
3. CCW, P• 61. 
' 
• 
the state with a 
syndicalist form of a corporate state made up of repre-
sentatives of professional, economic, and cultural asso-
ciations composed of both employers and workers--and de-
fending the broad interests of their respective groups.l 
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These groups would be more organic within society than classes; they 
2 
would 11represent man's real economic needs and interests;" and they 
would co-operate rather than oppose each other. Berdyaev often shows 
a preference for t.P.is type of guild organization, but he does not 
analyze and criticize it carefully as does Spinka, who notes that 
'While this may be a nearly ideal form of social organization, it may 
3 
be infiltrated by dictatorial elements or governed non-objectively. 
(3) Culture and civilization. Berdyaev 1s distinction between 
culture and civilization is interesting, particularly as it is similar 
in many ways to Spengler's analysis. Berdyaev regards civilization 
as "more social arrl collective,'' while culture is "more individual, 11 
connected with personality which is spiritual and creative in its na-
L 
ture. Man begins history in a natural-organic state from which he 
5 
develops culture. As culture decays, ciVilizati on is born. 
C.'ulture, then, "occupies a middle zone between nature and tech-
6 
nics." It realizes new values, arrl its achievements are symbolic, 
7 
generally in such fields as philosophy and art. It depends less on 
the successful and powerful state than on the creativity of quality 
1. SDi~~a, NBCF, p~ 169. S 2. "The Religion oi Communism," p. 7 ; "The New Middle Ages," pp. 112-
n!,.; and SF,- p. 217. 
3. Spinka, NBCF, P• 169. 4. SF, P• 122. 5. nMan, the Machine, and the New Heroism," p. 79. 
6. SF, P• 123. 
7. MH, p. 210 and DOS, P• 223. 
• 
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1 
by the aristocratic indiVidual. As such, it has great intrinsic 
value, and though it is unstable and will later disintegrate in the 
process of history, it is "in fact the way that leads to the reality 
2 
of being: divine life itself is the highest culture of the spirit." 
Besides creative freedom, an essential element of culture is a deep 
tie with tradition. For example, the greatest art is produced when 
the artist is close to his people and their destiny, not when he works 
3 
abstractly. 
But time moves on, and culture does not remain at a high level. 
The creative genius goes beyond the limits of his surroundings, and 
his followers, because they cannot reaCh his heights, become imitators. 
The symbols of love, truth, goodness, etc. come to be substituted for 
the virtues themselves. Because there seems to be a "possibility of 
4 
attaining ••• perfection ••• in the objectivized world, 11 man ceases 
5 
to reach beyond; thus the symbol, ani with it culture, decays. A given 
culture as such cannot be revived, but must be constantly created from 
6 
within by its members in order to last. 
As culture becomes "successful, 11 its art and philosophy lose their 
vital connection with the experience of life and a "civilized will to 
7 
organized power and enjoyment of life" replaces culture. 
1. SF, p. 124 and MH, pp. 211-212. Aristocratic here is meant to denote 
one capable of the best, not one in a certain social or material cate-
gory. - Cf. supra, Chap. IV, Sec. 5, Sub-Sec. ii, ~ar. 4. 
2. DOS, p. 224. 
) •• TNE, PP• 83-85. 4 SF, p. 126. 
5. Ibid., pp. 125-126 and MCA, P• 324. 
6. MB, P• 217. 
7. Ibid., P• 218. 
• 
• 
Civilization is the passage from culture, contemplation, 
and the creation of values, to the experience of life 
itself whose torrent threatens to englllf man.l 
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The imperialism and materialism of civilization overlook the more hu-
man values of culture. With civilization 
goes a • • • frenzied acceleration of every kind of pro-
cess. Man has no time for recollection or for looking 
inwards into his own depth. An acute process of dehu-
manization takes place and it is precisely from the 
growth of human might that it takes its rise. There 
is paradox in this. 
In a bourgeois age of technical civilization an un-
bounded increase of wealth takes place and these riches 
are periodically destroyed by fearful wars. There is 
·a sense in which these destructive wars which are brought 
about by the will to power are the fate of societies which 
are based upon the dominating influence of technical ci vi-
lization and steeped in bourgeois contentment. The in-
struments of destruction are immeasurably more powerful 
than those of construction. Civilization at its height 
is extraordinarily inventive in devising means of kill-
ing, but it has no resuscitating forces in it. And that 
is its condemnation.2 
Civilization cannot be successfully fought by its own weapons of col-
lective force, but by the spirit of the concerned and responsible per-
3 
son. 
(4) Technization. With the development of civilization comes the 
age of the machine and technology. Primitive man faced nature, and 
in seeking to overcome his enslavement to this one great force, he be-
gan his climb toward civilization. As he developed various machines, 
man exchanged his orientation to nature 1 s unity for an urge to differ-
entiation. The machine, as it separates man from nature, "conquers 
1. ME, PP• 213-2Jlt .• 
2. BE, p. 224. Cf. MH, PP• 214-222 and TR, P• 149. 
3. BE, P• 83. 
• 
•• 
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not only the natural elements for the benefit of man, but also in the 
1 
process, man himself. 11 "The machine was intended to liberate man 
fran slavery to nature, to lighten his burden of labor, but instead 
2 
of that it has enslaved man anew." "The machine dehumanizes human 
3 
life. Man ••• beccmes the i.Inage of the machine. 11 He becomes an 
4 
object, losing the inner unity and integrity of his personality. Re-
gardless of whether its economic form is capitalism or socialism, t he 
machine dominated civilization has 11 a veritable religion of the machine, 
5 
which it worships as a totem." One of the worst aspects of this civi-
6 
lization is man's power to destroy man. 
In the machine age, speci alization is d eveloped at the expense 
of integration. Man is forced to seek external substitutes such as 
7 
collectivism for his needed integration of life. 
As the machine comes to dominate life, man is subordinated to the 
increasing tempo of time. 
Every instant • • • is but the means for speeding up 
the life processes aspiring towards a false eternity 
and the all-devouring vampire of the future, the prom-
ise of power atid happiness. ~e ever-quickening tempo 
of civilization de~troys all notion of • • • past, pre-
sent, or eternity. 
11 In everything, technique seeks to attain the greatest results with 
1. 11H, P• 152. Cf. MF , p. 215; SF, P• ~7; FW~, PP• 25-26; and "Man, 
the Machine, and the New Heroism," p. 88. 
2. F.MMV¥, p. 72. Cf. MH, P• 181; MCA, p. 292; "The Crisis of Christian-
i t y," p. 230; SF, P• 96; and BE, P• 223. 
3. F'MM"W', P• 19. 
4. "Man, the Machine, and the New He~toism," P• 86 and BE, P• 225. 
5. "Man, the Machine, and the New Heroism," P• 87. 
6. BE, p. 224 and "The Crisis of Christianity," P• 231. 
7. RSRC, p. 53. Cf. MH, P• 216. 
8. MH, p. 216. 
• 
1 
the :m:i.nimum expenditure of power." As time is conquered by speed 
and each moment is merely of instrumental value as passage to the 
next, man is caught in historicBJ. time and has no time for nor link 
2 
with eternity. 
In this age of the machine, hurry, and efficiency, man depends 
on the machine, but the machine does not need man. Berdyaev gives a 
dreadful picture of the culmihation of this age: 
We are occasionally haunted by a horrible nightmare. A 
time may come when machinery will have attained so great 
a perfection that man would have govemed the world through 
it had he not altogether disappeared from the earth. Ma-
chines will be working independently without a hitch and 
with a maximum of efficiency and results. The last men 
will become like machines, then they will vanish, partly 
because they will be unnecessary and also because they 
could no more live and breathe in the mechanized atmo-
sphere. Factories will be turning out goods at great 
speed, and motor cars and aeroplanes will be flying all 
over the earth; the wireless will be carrying the sound 
of music and singing and the speech of men that had 
lived; nature will be conquered by technique, and this 
new actuality due to it will be a part of cosmic life. 
But man himself will be no more, organic life will be no 
more--a terrible Utopia.3 
At one point, Berdyaev distinguishes three possible solutions to man's 
4 
present crisis of the machine. Man may succumb to the u1 timate mech-
anization described above, or he may allow capitalism, with its machines 
and i nstruments of destruction, to degenerate into total war. But man 
is still free to control the technics which he has developed and to 
5 
limit machinism, a "spiritual state" for which he is responsible • 
1. "Man, the Machine, and the New Heroism," p. 11. 
2. Ibid., P• 85 and SR, P• 70. 
3. "Man, the Machine, and the New Heroism," p. 84. This whole article, 
especially p. 84, emphasizesthis same point. 
4. RSRC, p. 100. -5. "Man, the Machine, and the New Heroism," p. 88. 
-· 
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"Born of the spirit, technics has WicJ materialized existence, but 
it may just as well aid in freeing the spirit from its bondage to the 
1 
materially organic. It may spiritualize the whole of life." Man 
'should not deny the scientific discoveries of technics, but rather 
2 
learn their spiritual control. 11 
(5) Economic questions. Economics, like other activities of man, 
are controlled by his basically· spiritual creativity. Likewise, spir-
3 
itual problems may be expressed as economic problems. But economics 
have no independent reality nor spiritual force apart from man. 
The economic process is the struggle of living creatures 
and constitutes their creative activity. There is no 
substantial economic reality; consequently, all economic 
categories are only historical categories, and not eter-
nal principles afl the classical bourgeois political 
economy teaches. 
A purely economic approach to social problems would be ineffec-
tive because it would not basically change man. Instead, change must 
5 
begin w:i th man and then result in economic reform. Berdyaev would 
have man free, but he finds purely economic freedom to be merely for-
mal freedom, needing limitation. 
Freedom should reach its maximum in spiritual life, in 
conscience, in thought, in creative power, in the rela-
tion of man to God. But freedom is limited and reaches 
its minimum in proportion to the extent to which it 
sinks to the level of material life. To secure the 
real freedom of men and women, • • • freedom of econ-
omy must be limited, otherwise the strong vdll oppress 
the weak and enslave him, and deny him a crust of 
1. "The Crisis of Christianity, 11 P• 231. 
2. RSRC, p. 48. Of. SR, P• 71. 
3. COif, p. 23 and TNE, P• 116. 
4. CCW, P• 39 • 
5. RSRC, P• 164. 
bread. The autonomy of economics is a false and Vision-
ary freedom.l 
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The state, then, must exercise some economic control in order to guar-
antee such rights as employment and freedom from poverty to its members. 
Pure economic laissez-faire will not do. 
A regime Which allows of revolting indigence in spite 
of a general increase of wealth, which is obliged in 
the name of economic interest, to destroy 'superfluous' 
goods although there are ·people in need of them, Which 
breeds abominable wars, which is possessed by a greed 
for riches which has become • • • a disinterested pas-
sion, which empties the life even of the directing 
classes of meaning by making it an accessory of the 
economic game, such a regime is completely mad and 
stands condemned by conscience and by reason.2 
A certain degree of material welfare is basic to life and the enjoyment 
of all "higher freedoms. 11 "The lack of 'bread 1 is really a lack of 
'freedom.' Failure to solve the economic question makes the realiza-
3 
tion of freedom impossible." 
But economic freedom must not be too strongly curtailed. 
False totalitarianism transfers the limitation of free-
dom in economic life to a limitation of freedom and even 
the annihilation of freedom in spiritual life. This is 
the great evil of all total~tarian systems through whose 
power the world is passing .4 
A "mixed economy" seems to Berdyaev to be the most desirable. 
The system of economy which is most favorable to person-
alism is a pluralistic system, that is to sa:y a combina-
1. SF, P• 219. Cf. ·DM, P• 151 and FMMW, PP• 33, 41. 
2. C~f, P• 57. Cf. em~, P• 65, SF, PP• 150-151; TNE, P• 45; and the 
following statement from Coates, CHP, p. 29: 11 To talk in terms of 
the freedom of the human person, ••• without recognizing the need 
for effective social control of that material environment whose con-
ditioning influence is so powerful, is to show that one is thinking 
of freedom merely in terms of the privileged." 
3. RSRC, p. 114. Cf. "Spiritual Dualism and Daily Bread," p. 228. 
4. SF, p. 219. 
• 
tion of nationalized economics, socialized economics, 
and personal economics, insofar as it does not admit 
capitalism and exploitation.l 
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Berdyaev calls 11bread 11 and 11freedom 11 the two great symlmls of 
social life--bread makes life pos sibl~ and freedom gives dignity to 
2 
life. It is often easy for a society to give either bread or freedom 
or for man to give up one for the other. 
The combination of bread and freedom is at once the most 
difficult of tasks and the greatest of rights. It seems 
to be beyond the power of • • • this era in ~nich the 
human masses are offered bread in return f or their refusal 
of freedom of spirit.3 
The spiritual dimension of man 1s mater ial needs is excellently stated 
by Berdyaev: 
The question of bread for myself is a material question, 
but the question of bread for • • • everybody is a spir-
. itual and religious question. Man does not live by bread 
alone, but he does live by bread and there should be 
bread for all. Society should be so organized that there 
is bread for all, and then it is that the spiritual ques-
tion will present itself before men in all its depths. 
Christians ought to be permeated with a sense of 
the religious importance of the elementary daily needs 
of men, the vast masses of men, and not to despise these4 needs from the point of view of an exalted spirituality. 
1. Ibid., p. 218. cr. Berdyaev's statement in DM, P• 221: 11 In social 
life freedom is apparently best attained through a complex pluralistic 
system combining private ownership with ownership by the state and 
limiting both, so that property is least likely to become a means 
of tyranny and exploitation of one man by another •••• ~ocialism 1 ;) 
truth must be spiritualized and given a deeper ••• meaning. • •• 
Economic life cannot be perfectly autonomous, it must be subordinated 
to moral principles." 
2. TNE, pp. 76-77. 
J. BE, p. 216. Cf. SF, PP• 209-210 and the following statement from 
DH, p. 138: "Men are all too ready to renounce spirit for the sake 
of bread (though it is not the business of those who have bread to 
denounce t his logic in the face of those who have not). 11 
4. ORC, p. 185. Cf. F&~, PP• 112-113. 
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(i) Ownership of property. Berdyaev's ideas on man's ownership 
of property are close to the old Russian idea that all property belongs 
ultimately to God .and is entrusted to man for his use. He does not 
fully accept the Roman law idea of man 1 s absolute right to own and to 
use as he wishes his property. "The right of property is justified by 
1 
its creative result. 11 Man is responsible to others in his use of prop-
erty and is obligated not to exploit or enslave anyone through its use. 
Berdyaev agrees with the provision of the Russian constitution of 1936 
that individuals may own property for personal "current consomption" 
2 
but not for exploitation. While owning property does not give a man 
freedom, property is a vehicle for expression of one's freedom. 
If a man is deprived of all personal power over the mate-
rial. world of things, of all personal freedom in his econ-
omic life, he becomes a slave of society and the state 
which will deprive him as well of the freedom of thought, 
conscience and speech, of the right to move about and 
even the right to live.3 
(ii) The meaning of work. Why must man work? First, he must 
labor because work is a means to gaining material necessities. The 
interpretations of Soviet communism regard this as the only reason for 
work. Since there is no spiritual reality in man there is no spirit-
ual dimension in his work. In this case, ''science and art serve only 
4 
the technical process of production." N~ has no inner motive for 
5 
work; he has only the demand of the collective upon him. 
1. DM, p. 218. Cf. ORC, P• 136 and SF, p. 186. 
2. Cf. TNE, p. 72. According to this provision, an individual cannot 
privately own "means of production. 11 
3. DM, p. 217. Cf. SF, P• 186. 
4. 11 The Crisis of Christianity, 11 P• 237 • " 
5. ccw, p. 56. 
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F'or Ber.dyaev, however, there is another dimension to man's work, 
namely its redemptive and creative aspect. Man as a person is creative, 
but creativity cannot always be manifest in one's work. As Berdyaev 
points out in The Destiny of Man, all work is redemptive but not all 
1 
is creative. As distinguished from creative work, redemptive work 
2 
is a form of personal asceticism and a means for service to others. 
Besides asceticism, work 
is also a technical and constructive achievement, a 
sacrifice and a struggle, a penetration of cosmic life; 
and it is also a form of association, of communication 
between men. Labour is deeply related to spirituality; 
it alter~ the nature of spirituality and makes it more 
whole. In this consists the relation of spirituality to 
society.3 
Work is also said to give man a positive spiritual creative link 
4 
with the cosmos. Therefore not all work, but only meaningless non-
creative and non-redemptive work, exploitation, and man's slavery to 
0 
· work should be eliminated. Berdyaev feels that in the master-slave 
relationship neither master nor slave is free because of the nature 
of their interdependence. This relationship reaches an extreme with 
a dictator, the least free of men because of his enslavement by his 
1. mr, P• 215. 
2 • GOlf, p. 56. 
3. SR, p. 180. Cf. Berdyaev's statement in SS, p. 184, that "labour 
can be a basis of communion as well as of society." 
4. SS, p. 78 and "The New Middle Ages, 11 p. 116. 
5. SF, p. 220; COW, pp. 55-56. In CGiV, p. 55, Berdyaev writes, "The 
spirit is activity and creation and freedom, but in the material 
\Wrld spiritual activity and creation are on the wane and its free-
dom comes into collision with the force of necessity. Work is not 
necessarily creative and the sharpest point of the labour problem is 
exactly this matter of uncreative work, which is often repellent j_n 
itself and meaningless for the person concerned." 
• 
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1 
Will to dominate and his constant f ear of those dominated. 
(6) Religion and the church. Berdyaev views the church as a so-
2 
cial institution with social responsibilities. Though 11the church 
looks toward eternity • • • she also lives in time and must spea..'Lc a 
3 
social language that is suited to the world which she addresses." 
Concerned with men as persons, the church's major task is to oppose 
antipersonalism in any fonn. She is to share man 1 s sufferings, trying 
not so much to gain members as to serve men. "True religious feeling 
should have concerned itself with the transfiguration of social life, 
4 
the relation of man to man in the human unit "we." 
Only • • • Christianity • • • as a religion, not alone 
of personal, but also of social and cosmic transfigura-
tion, that is by an increased sense of messianism and 
prophecy • • • can bring a solution to the tormenting 
problems of relationship between man and society.5 
The social and spiritual realms of man 1 s life are interconnected, but 
6 
the final goal is, of course, the spiritual. 
The church should be 11less social in the bad sense 11 of conformity 
to the world, but 11more social in the good sense" of involvement in 
7 
every phase of life. Yet because the final goal of life is man's sp±P-
itual development, it is not her task to elaborate a social system as 
such, to defend any particular class or group, nor to enunciate 
1. SF, PP• 61-62. 
2. ORC, p. 172; DH,_pp. 19-20; and "Christian Optimism and Christian 
Pessimism, 11 P• 418 • 
3. CCVV, P• 113. 
4. "Spiritual Dualism and Daily Bread, 11 P• 227. 
5. RSRC p. 62. Cf. "Christian Optimism and Christian Pessimism, 11 pp. 
418-425; "Unity of Christendom in the Strife between East and West, 11 
p. 16; FS, P• 343; and DH, P• 120. 
6. RSRC, p. 62. 
7. TNE, PP• 37-38. 
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techniques of social justice. Rising above "the Kingdom of Ceasar," 
she must provide the best possible spiritual and moral atmosphere for 
1 
man' s life. The church is to create an "inner . society" capable of 
giving the greatest possible meaning to the 11e:icternU 11 expressions of 
2 
social movements. Berdyaev emphasizes the importance of the ecumen-
3 
ical church as "the spiritual basis for the unity of mankind." 
(7) Love as a social force. Berdyaev often mentions the meaning 
of Christian love for interpersonal relationships and ethics. Love 
4 
at best expresses freedom and creativeness, yet love and freedom m~ 
be i n conflict, e.g. when "the routine of social life denies the free-
S 
dom of love, and regards it as immoral. n 
Berdyaev writes that "the mystery of individuality •• ~ is best 
6 
revealed in love. 11 Through love, isolation from others is overcome, 
and the lover knows the true nature of the beloved better than the im-
7 
partial outsider. Yet unfortunately, these insights still remain rela-
8 
tive, since love can never be quite totally fulfilled. 
If there were Christian love between all men, there would be no 
need for justice or other "guarantees of the rights of human personal-
9 
i ty, n but again this is not the case. Love must be of a concrete in-
dividual-not of an abstraction. It cannot be legislated. For Berdyaev, 
1. CCW, pp. 50, 115, 116, 123; ORO, PP• 181, 188; TNE, PP• 37, 117; RSRC, 
P• 74; nunity of Christendom in the Strife between East and West,"p. 19. 
2. FMMW, p. 115 and 11 Spiritual Dualism and Daily Bread, 11 p. 227 • 
3. RSRC, P• 159. 
L~. MCA, P• 151. 5. SF, P• 228. Of. DR, PP• 70-76. 
6. ss, p. ·195 and RI, P• 1. 
7. MCA, P• 214 and SS, PP• 195-196. 
8. DR, P• 77 • 
9. RI, P• 51. 
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the "highest 11 love is the erotic love of person for person. He connects 
eros with personality rather than with sex, as did Solovyev. Both op-
pose Rozanov's concept that love is merely racially oriented procrea-
1 
tivity . While usually man cannot successfully make an effort to love, 
love includes an element of compassion, and man can try to be compas-
sionate. As one works to achieve a compassionate "union with the suf-
2 3 
fering creature, 11 the suffering may be lessened. This "descending 
love," "caritas, 11 or "agap~ 11 as it is called in various writings, is 
eome*hat impersonal in seeking no reciprocation, but it is personal 
4 
insofar as it is concerned with the needs of a specific person. 
5 
One should love "man11 rather than 11the world." In doing this, 
one must take man as he is, loving both "God in man, • . • what is per-
6 
feet and beautiful in him," and his individuality and imperfections. 
"Love is always for that divine image which is to be found in every 
man, however low and sinful, but it embraces both the divine and the 
7 
human in a person. 11 
Berdyaev 1s "compassion" is closer to erotic love than is altruism. 
Compassion is not pity or altruism alone, altruism being a kind or "dis-
- 8 
guised utilitarianism." Mere altruism too often leads to smug self-
satisfaction or levels the quality of compassion in gaining quantity. 
1. SF, PP• 229-230. Cf. V. So1ovyev, The Meaning of Love, passim. 
2. DM, p. 192 • 
3. Ibid., p. 121. 
L~. SF, PP• 55-56, 226-227, 231 and DM, pp. 106-lO"h ·187, 190. 
5. FS, p. 33. 
6. DH, p. 125. 
7. DM, p. 192. 
8. MCA, p. 268. Cf. MCA, pp. 261-269; and DOS, P• 131. 
• 
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(8) Nationalism and internationalism. Berdyaev points out the 
ethical inconsistency of condoning a nation's assertion of its will 
tb power over others while a person's attempt to do this is condemned. 
Ethical values and restraints must apply to nations as well as to in-
1 
dividuals. The nationalistic country seeks power for itself and tries 
to · t~l.ke it from others whom it hates--or at least disregards. With 
2 
this bent to imperialism, 11nationalism is already potential war." 
Berdyaev recognized that nationalism as will to power over others dif-
fers from patriotism. He defined the latter as love for and loyalty 
3 
to one's native land. 
Opposing nationalism, he favored internationalism, but not an ab-
stract internationalism nor a monolithic world empire. As he writes: 
We may conceive of three ideas, a world empire (the Ro-
man Empire • • • , NapoleiCP. 1 s Empire), a multi tude of 
sovereign nations struggling for equilibrium, and a 
world federation of free nations surrendering their 
sovereignty and accepting the authority of a world-or-
ganization. We should strive only for this last, but 
this will mean radical changes ••• both spiritual 
and social.4 
(9) The use of force. Berdyaev opposed the use of physical, psy-
chological, or other force, feeling this would be detrimental to per-
sonal freedom. Use of force of any kind is use of violence, and "vio-
lence implies an attitude towards man which treats him as an object 
and not as a subject. Violence exercised by means of ••• force is 
5 
murderous. 11 
1. SF, PP• 164-165. 
2. Ibid., p. 166. Cf . ~&N, PP• 80-81 and RSRC, PP• 152-154. 
3. SF, . p. 167. 
4. RSRC, p. 85. Cf. DR, p. 265 and Spinka, NBCF, PP• 172-173. 
5. TNE, P• 3. 
• 
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(i) War and pacifism. Berdyaev finds the roots of war in na-
tionalism and capitalism, which exalt national power and money over 
persons, creating conflicts between individuals and groups. These con-
1 
flicts grow larger and larger and eventually break out as wars. War 
is possible only against an object or objects, not a subject or subjects. 
Because the enemy is not seen as a subject, inhuman treatment of him 
2 
is condoned. With this kind of ''bestialism, 11 "~baric instincts are 
filtered through the prism of civilization, and •.• have a pathologi-
3 
cal character. 11 "Might makes right" becomes the ruling, though false, 
4 
ethic. 
Vfar is evil, but it is a secondary evil caused by man's spiritual 
failure, the primary evil. It is less evil than is man's acceptance of 
5 
slavery and spurning of freedom. Thus pacifism is inadequate and un-
realistic as an alternative to war. It works rationalistically and on 
6 
the surface of life and history, attacking result rather than cause, 
and failing to note that war has its own fatal dialectic by which it 
will be eliminated. Pacifism may also be a way out for those seeking 
7 
an escape or a front for cowardice. Some pacifism, e.g. Tolstoy's, 
which is based on withdrawal and quietism, does not appreciate man 1 s 
8 
creative potential. 
1. DH, PP• 98-102 and RSRC, PP• 155-156. 
2. SF, p. 162 and DH, PP• 106-109. 
3 • FMMVf, P• 20. 
4. DH, P• 102. 
5. DH, p. 108 and Spink a, NBCF, P• 170. 
6. DM, P• 202 and Clarke, ITB, pp. 72; 146-147. 
7. SF, p. 161. 
8. DH, P• 103. 
•• 
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(ii) Revolution. Revolution is the use of force by fanatics 
who are more devoted to ideals-or more often to "one great idea"-
1 
than to livi~ persons. The revolutionary is intolerant as he seeks 
to get rid of evil (which he usually finds entirely outside himself) 
and to revenge his anger. He is so blinded by fear and hate that he 
fails to deal With persons as persons. In terror born of fear, he 
tries to become a tyrant, or if he fears this responsibility, he bows 
2 
to tyranny. 
Extremely negative in method, revolution often destroys without 
3 4 
rebuilding. This m~ lead to reaction~ counter-revolution. Thus , 
an old tyranny may be replaced by a new one. 
6 
revolutionary himself may become evil. 
In opposing evil, the 
7 
Revolutions more often end in determinism than in freedom. "Free-
dom 11 may be the cry of tJ1e revolutionary, but true freedom cannot be 
realized by revolution. 
No revolutions ever have loved freedom. • • • In revolu-
tions netr social strata are thrown up to the surface, 
strata which had not before been permitted any activity 
and which had been oppressed, and in the fight for their 
new posigion in society, they cannot displ~ a love of 
freedom. 
There is a paradoxical joining of the rational and the irrational 
1. DM, PP• 170-171. 
2. SF, PP• 193-196. Cf. MH, P• 199. 
3. MCA, pp. 280-281; DM, p. 209; RSRC, P• 168; and Spinka NBCF, pp. 51-53. 
4. RSRC, p. 164 and Dukhovny krizis inteligentsii, PP• 84-85, cited by 
Spinka, NBCF, p. 39. Cf. "The Russian Revolution," pp. 129-132. 
5. SFL p. 190 and DM, P• 211. 
6. I.iSfid', pp; S3::..84 and FS) pp. 186-187. 
7. DR, PP• 222-223 and SF, P• 200. 
8. SF, p. 17. 
•• 
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in revolution. There is first the idea that the complete rationaliza-
tion of life is possible, but then irrational force is employed to 
achieve th~s rationalization. Finally, the irrational forces seem 
1 
to take control from those who were o~iginally in control of them. 
Berdyaev feels that the French Revolution was more inspired by ration-
2 
alism than was the Russian, but he does speak of Lenin as an "extreme 
rationalist" and calls communism an attempt to rationalize all of so-
3 
cial life. 
The great evil in revolution is its neglect of the spiritual be-
cause of its limited basis upon politics or class struggle. As Ber-
dyaev writes, 
Purely political revolutions were repugnant to me not 
o~y in virtue of the means which they use for the at-
tainment of their ends, but, ••• in virtue of their 
• • • tendency to betr~ the spirit.4 
There may indeed be a need for a kind of revolution, but it is "the 
5 
revolution of the human person rather than of the • • • masses. 11 Revo-
lution limited to the external material sphere is not enough. The need 
is for a "personalist revolution, 11 much more radical in its nature than 
6 
the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 which Berdyaev experienced. A social 
revolution need not by its nature deny spiritual values, although in 
fact Berdyaev believes that every one which has occurred has done this. 
1. 
2 • 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
"The Russian Revolution," pp. 124, 127; DM, PP• 210-211; "The Religion 
of Communism," p. 62; ORC, p. 129; SF, p. 192; RSRC, p. 176; TR, p. 87. 
DR, P• 154. 
ORC, p. 129. 
DR, p. 109. Cf. CCV¥, particularly pp. 11-12 and 17 for comments on 
the "class character" of revolutions. 
DR, p. 109. 
Ibid., pp. 136-137 and DM, p. 109 and SF, PP• 15, 191. 
"Spiritual Dualism and Daily Bread," p. 223. 
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It should be said that Berdyaev finds value even in the Russian 
Revolution, for it did wipe out some weaknesses and eVils. He par-
ticularly sees it as 11 a challenge to Christians and a reminder that 
1 
they have not made justice a fact of experience." Evils such as 
those attacked by the Russian Revolution must be attacked, but by a 
different method than violent political and social upheaval. 
(iii) Capital punishment. Berdyaev Views capital punishment 
as an unwarranted use of force inspired by fear and desire· for vengeance. 
He opposes it because, believing that man is not qualified to apply the 
ultimate punishment to other men, he also notes that all are involved 
in various kinds and degrees of evil. He denies "that it is permissable 
to execute a single innocent person for the sake of so-called safety 
2 
and well-being of the state." One may be uncompromising in moral judg-
ment of himself, but he must place the value of human life as such above 
3 
moral judgment when considering others. 
vi. Concrete freedom as the primary social value 
For Berdyaev, freedom is far more important than other social val:ues 
such as justice or equality. As he states, 
The idea of equality as such is • • • hollow and deri va-
tive. The primary matter is the idea of freedom, of the 
value of ever,y man as a person, even if he be a person 
in only a potential state. And all that equality means 
is that freedom and worth are secured for every human 
person, for all men, and that no single man s~all be 
treated as a thing or a mere means to an end. 
Freedom means more than "liberalism" or 11democracy11 which are strictly 
1. ORC, p. 132. Cf. 11 The Russian Revolution," P• 134. 
2. Coates, CHP, p. h2. · 
3. DM, pp. 111-113, 205-207; DR, P• 58 and RI, P• 152. 
4. BE, p. 227. Cf. "Fatality or Faith," p. 604; SF, P• 11 and TNE, p. v. 
• 
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political categories, for its most essential dimension is spiritual. 
Yet real freedom is not abstract, but must be tempered with truth, 
1 
love and justice, or it "will become empty, false, and meaningless." 
The following sections summarize the rich meanings of Berdyaev' s con-
cept pf freedom and its relationship to social philosophy. 
(1) Social and spiritual freedom. In Berdyaev 1s view, social 
freedom is derivative from man's spiritual life rather than from the 
formal freedom of a limited sphere such as economics. The "whole 
man 11 i .s to be free, since "true freedom of personality has a spiritual, 
rather than a social origin; it is defined by its being rooted in the 
2 
spiritual, rather than the ·social world." 
Freedom should increase in measure as it approaches 
spirit, and decrease as it approaches the material. 
The greatest freedom is that of spiritual life: the 
minimum is the freedom of material existence.3 
Man's best realization of freedom comes when he participates in both 
4 
spiritual and social worlds, without bowing completely to an external 
force of any kind in either realm. 
(2) Freedanmust be for all. Freedom, then, must be real for all 
persons in their "inner" and "outer" lives. Man is obligated to be 
free and to respect the freedoms of others, despite the difficulties 
which this may entail. Freedom does not mean lack of involvement with 
others or being let alone by them, but it is to be sought amid the diffi-
culties of community life. Neither does freedom mean freedom only for 
oneself nor does it allow the exertion of one's will to power over 
l. DM, P• 173 
2. m~w, P• 35. Cf. TR, P• 74. 
3. RSRC, p. 112. Cf. C01, P• 67. 
4. RSRC, pp. 85, 125. 
. 
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others, as the dictator or tyrant might exercise. 11He truly loves 
1 
freedom who affirms it for his fellows." 
Justice, by definition, means justice for all. Freedom for all 
is essential for the realization of justice in this sense. 
Without freedom there can be no justice: that would be 
justice in the abstract, unrelated to real people. Jus-
tice demands freedom for all men. I may lilni.t my own 
freedom out of consideration for others, but unless I 
do this freely, it has no value. • • • No social jus-
tice, in any form what~ver can demand denial of the 
freedom of conscience. 
(3) Man is free from the world yet involved in it. Man's freedom 
from control by the world does not imply his freedom from living and 
working in the world. Man's spiritual nature may bring conflict with 
the world, but it does not justify his separation fro~ it. 
A man of strongly expressed spirituality is by no means 
necessarily a man who has Wi thdra'Wtl from the world and 
· historical life. He is a man who dwells in the life of 
the world and history and is active in it, but he is 
free from its power and is engaged in transforming it.3 
Freedom from the exclusiveiy material world gives the possibility of 
4 
union of all of life with "one 1 s true center" which participates in 
5 
1'the world of the spirit." The free spirit then returns and "accepts 
both the natural and the social life, endows them with purpose, whole-
6 
ness, freedom and eternity." 
(4) World harmony versus individual freedom. Berdyaev is very 
clear in his comparative evaluations of human personality and of 
1. RSRC, P• 111. Cf. FMMW, P• 37 and TNE, P• 80. 
2. RSRC, pp. 98-99. 
3. DH, p. 131. Cf. TR, p. 83; 11 The New Middle Ages,n p. 106; RSRC, p. 182. 
4. MCA, p. 14. 
5. "Marx Versus Man, 11 p. 484. 
6. SR, P• 198. 
• 
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order, whether this be the world order of a Utopia or the limited order 
of an object or objectified existence. Personality is of greatest 
value and order is of merely instrumental value. The human subject 
is real; any object is symbolic. There is a 11lure 11 of order in any 
monolithic system, including collectivism, communism, etc., where man 
seeks integration through allegiance to some 11false hypostatization" 
1 
rather than through personal creativeness. This 11 cosmism in social 
life has ••• a spiritually reactionar,y character. It exalts the 
2 
idea of organism and the organic. 11 "The subjection of personality 
to society 
3 
or to an idea is an extension • • • of human sacri-
fice." 
In his excellent article comparing the concepts of conservatism, 
coerd_on, and creativity of John MacMurray and Berdyaev, Henry Nelson 
Wieman indicates their similarities of approach to this particular 
probl~~. Both reject the primacy given to order by the conservative 
and the revolutionary, each of whom would use coercion in order to 
bring others to his belief--("for their own good," of course). The con-
servat i ve wishes to preserve an old order to which all should be sub-
ject, while the revolutionary wishes to achieve a new order by forcing 
the will of a minority on the majority. Both MacMurray and Berdyaev 
recognize that in fulfilling itself, personality must break t hrough 
order and established pattern and be creative. 
Creativity is the unpr edictable and multiple spontaneity 
of interaction between the individual and his environment. 
1. SF, PP• 97-100 and SR, P• 66. 3. Ibid., P• 103. 
2. SF, p. 101. 
• 
• 
It is that way of life wherein no form or order 
remains fixated, but every organization undergoes trans-
formation in such a w~ as to yield fresh appreciations.l 
This creative way of living can be described in the 
folloWing words: Absolute commi ttment of the total self 
to the creative power of growth which opens the sensi-
tivity of heart and mind to the riches of value in each 
situation.2 
186 
World harmony, then, has no value of its own. Also, in Berdyaev' s 
interpretation, there is no possibility of realization (unless possibly 
at the expense of free personality) within history. It seems possible 
3 
only eschatologically. 
(5) Freedom and responsibility. Berdyaev often notes that free-
dom, far from spelling less responsibility for the person, is a call 
to responsibility as man recognizes his obligations as a creative be-
ing. Freedom is not a right to be claimed, but a duty to be worked 
upon and done. 
It is not the citizen but the man who enjoys absolute 
rights, in his capacity of a free spiritual being, and 
these rights cannot be separated from t heir correspond-
ing duties. The very freedom of a man is not a claim 
but an obligation, it gives less than it demands •••• 
Man must take up the burden of freedom as a young man 
takes up privileges and responsibilities When he comes 
of age.4 
Freedom as such is difficult-it is feared am shunned by many 
1. Henry Nelson Wieman, "Two Ways of Salvation: Berdyaev and Macmurray • 11 
Journal of Social Philoso , 4(1939), PP• 344-34.5. 
2. Ibid., p. 3 0. The entire article is extremely relevant to this 
section. Wieman names MacMurray's interesting "levels of creativity," 
vrl1ich include physical, biological, social, and personal creativity • 
Only on the level of personal creativity is there genuine and com-
plete fulfillment; the other three levels help to support and to give 
expression to personal creativity. Berdyaev uses the term "creativity" 
Without modifiers, considering only the last level as creative. 
3. BE, pp·. 147-148 • 
. 4. CCW, pp. 64-6.5. Cf. MCA, P• 1.59; FMMW, pp. 36-37; SF, p. 48; DR, 
p. 62; and RSRC, p. 106. 
·~ 
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who see that slavery to another's lead or immersion in some whole 
would be an easier way. Berdyaev writes that "in ••• fearful freedom 
1 
lies all the god-like dignity of man, and his dread responsibility.n 
vii. Personalistic socialism--Berdyaev's position smmnarized 
Summarizing his social philosophy, Berdyaev writes: 
I believe that the organization of material resources 
for the benefit of all and the curtailment of economic 
individual ism will make men not less but more aware of 
those final realities and values of human existence 
which are imperilled by communism and anti-communism 
alL~e. I am prepared to describe myself as a socialist, 
but my socialism is personalistic, not authoritarian: 
it precludes the primacy of society over the person, 
for it springs from a recognition of the supreme value 
of each individual human being made in the image of 
God and endowed With a free spirit.2 
While he was in France, Berdyaev found the "anti-communist front ••• 
3 
controlled by bourgeois capitalist interests." Refusing to discard 
the good of communism ·with the bad, he writes that rather than using 
the word 11socialism, 11 he 
preferred the word 'communism, ' and • • • would have 
stood for a religious and aristocratic communism (not 
in the social, but in the classic sense). But in view . 
of what life has done to t erminology, I prefer the 
word 'socialism. '4 
He felt that "personalism ••• demands t he socialization of economics, 
but c~nnot admit the socialization of spiritual life, which means the 
- 5 
death of the spirit, robbing man of his soul. 11 
Berdyaev calls Jp.s "personalistic socialism" or "Christian social-
l. MCA, p. 107. Cf. SF, p. h8 and BE, P• 216. 
2. DR, p . 241. 
3. SF, p. 17. 
4. RSRC, p . 67. 
5. 11Marx Versus Man, 11 P• 493. 
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1 
ism" "the social projection of personalism," It is based on the value 
of personality and its supremacy over the group rather than on such 
2 
11 externals 11 as economic or political equality or justice. The concept 
of "society" or 11group 11 is also ll1lportant in Berdyaev' s socialism. 
Persons, though each has supreme value in himself, can best live in 
the close community of sobornost, giving service to the whole ani find-
3 
ing communion and the possibility of self-realization in co~munity. 
As Berdyaev states, his 
pluralist socialism~ . • • unites the principle of person-
ality as the supreme value with the principle of a broth-
erly community of men. • • • It is necessary to make a 
distinction, which the communists do not make, between 
the realization of righteousness in the life of the com-
munity, presupposing ••• coercion, and the realization 
of the brotherhood of men, of their true co~ty or 
communion, presupposing the freedom of man. · 
1. SF, P• 17. 
2. DR, p. 242; SR, p. 171; "Marx Versus Man," P• 486; "The Crisis of 
Christianity, 11 p. 236; "Democracy, Socialism, and Theocracy, 11 p. 204. 
3. "Unity of Christendom in the Strife between East and West," P• 23 
and "The Crisis of Chri:::: tiani ty, 11 P• 235. 
4. ORC, P• 187. 
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CHAPTER V 
CRITICAL COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
l • . Critical Comments 
i. Berdyaev's conception of philosophy and philosophical style 
Berdyaev 1s conception of philosophy is completely different from 
that of the philosophical 11 system builder, 11 who, by careful outline 
and logical progression, works from point to point, erecting an inter-
nally 11 perfect 11 philosophy, totally self-consistent and complete in 
itself. F~s philosophy is li1stead open-ended, a response to each on-
coming situation, and based on his own intensely personal experience. 
Its wholeness is in its coherence rather than its logical consistency. 
This results in difficulties in r eading and interpreting Berdyaev's 
vm tings' for he frequently jmctaposes logically contradictory state-
ments so that he may, by emphasizing the contradictions and conflicts 
inherent in t he existential situation, express his meaning in t he most 
adequate way. Therefore, isolated statements j_n Berdyaevts vvriting 
cannot be t aken literally in every case, but must be considered in the 
light of his personalism and existentialism. These assert the basic 
reality and supreme value of each i ndividual person and the primacy 
of his existence and experience to his thought and action. All of the 
details of Berdyaev's ethics, philosophy of religion, metaphysics , so-
cial philosophy, etc., must be measured against t hese basic pramises 
Which are more stated attitudes t han mere 11first pr opositions. 11 Such 
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a philosophy as his must be treated as a whole, or at least seen in 
large concepts rather than in tiny details of "the letter. 11 Just as 
the seeker after knowledge nru.st be actively creative in order to know, 
according to Berdyaev, the interpreter of Berdyaev 1s -writings must be 
actively creative in his interpretation. Thus a great responsibility 
is placed upon t he interpreter, vwi1ile at the s ame time t he opP9rtuni-
ties for misinterpretation are increased. Accuracy must be aimed at 
creatively ; it is not wholly r ealizable as an achievable goal. Brief-
ly, while Berdyaev 1 s philosophical style l~s him open to criticisms 
of logical inconsistency and allows misunderstandings, one must recog-
nize ~~th him the secondary importance of logical consistency and the 
lesser value in passive mirroring of fact or statement as compared to 
the primary value of creative understanding. 
ii. ~~estions on Berdyaev 1s epistemology 
An example of Berdyaev's self-exposure to misunderstanding is in 
his epistemology where he states that "Like knows like • • • and • 
1 
to know anything in the vrorld is to have this in oneself . 11 How lit-
erally does he mean t:b..is "having in oneself"? Using the sal'Jle style of 
language, Berdyaev refers to man as a microcosm and to the cosmos as 
2 
existi ng vri thin man. Again, one must ask how literally this is t o 
be taken. rlhat does Berdyaev mean by the cosmos within man? Is this 
l i t erally 11 the Cosmos, 11 or can man know 11the Cosmos" becaus e of his 
ovm nature wb:i.. ch is itself "a cosmos!!? In one sense, there is a thin 
line between 11lli<:e knows like 11 understood as similarity (implying the 
1. ].TCA, p . 1.5.5 . 
2. Supra, p. 38. 
Cf. supra, p. 14, especially n. 6. 
Cf. MCA, PP• .57-60 and BE, P• 40. 
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need for a comnmn denominator between knower and knovvn in order for 
recognition to ta~e place) or as identification of the !mower and the 
knovm. It seems t hat undifferentiated identification precludes the 
possibility of distinguishing between the process of the lrn.ovmr • s know-
ing and the nature of the known. If Berdyaev 1 s meaning of 11l:L~e knows 
like 11 is such identity, great problems arise. However, because he in-
sists on pluralism and the primacy of subject or person over object 
or universal, and because he uses the phrase 11kiilship between the 
1 
knower a...11d the known, 11 rather than "identification of the knower and 
the knmrm, 11 it seems safe to assume that Berclyaev rejects epistemolog-
ical monism, despite some unclear statements in his 'ivri tings. 
iii. Apophatic knowledge 
In claiming to be a 11negative 11 or 11 apophatic 11 theologian and phi-
2 
losopher, one whose lrn.owledge of God must be purely symbolic, Berdyaev 
sets himself a difficult task. As he himself would readily admit, in 
order to be completely consistent in such a situation, one would have 
3 
to keep silent altogether. However, as has been noted, he does not 
place the greatest value on complete consistency. After noting that 
one cannot know positively the nature of God, he shows the role of sym-
bol in giving some hints on this. .tmything which Berdyaev says about 
the nature of God, (e.g. God 1s limitation by the Uncreated Freedom, or 
God•s love for man and His yearning for man 1 s response and fellowship~ 
1. DM, p. 13 and SF, P• 10. Cf. supra, PP • 14-1.5. 
2. It is assumed in thisstudy that these terms are s,ynonymous for Ber-
dyaev. Cf. supra, pp. 52-.54. 
3. Supra, p . 42. 
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must be understood as knowledge through symbol rather than as know-
ledge based on logical identification. The adequacy of the symbol de-
termines the degree of certainty and validity of the knowledge. Though 
it is in a way contradictorJ to say, as Berdyaev does, that one m~ 
assert God's existence vdthout positively asserting anything about 
His nature, Berdyaev 1s use of symbol is the best possible bridge over 
the gap between the 11lmowledge that11 God exists and 11 content of" such 
knowledge. 
Berdyaev carries this knovdng by negation into his discussions 
of the Ungrund or uncreated freedom, which he calls "inexplicable" 
1 
and 11 incapable of rationalization. 11 Again, he may be criticized for 
inconsistency when he has a great deal to say about the "inexplicable, 11 
but again it must be pointed out that the Ungrund is more a syrQbol 
2 
than a concept. . Described as a 11hungry • baseless will, 11 the 
Ungrund could be understood as a 11 Cosmic Id. 11 The non-moral character-
istics of both the psychic Id and the Ungrund, both of which are de-
scribed as energy without moral aim or concern, make them complementary 
symbols, each knovm the better because of its comparison ·with the other. 
iv. Berdyaev's discussion of Kant 
Berdyaev criticizes Kant's interpretation of the noumenal, stating 
t~~t by cutting it off as completely as he does from the phenomenal, 
3. 
he objectifies it. · Vmile it may be true that Kant appears to know a 
great deal about the supposedly unknowable noumenon, it is questionable 
1. Supra, P• 72. Cf. SR, p. 115 and DR, P• 288. 
2. Supra, P• 73. 
3. Supra, p . 18. Cf. SS, p. 37 ~nd FS, p . 56. 
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that this supposed 11knowledge 11 is to be taken completely literally or 
that this "knowl edge" necessarily approaches what Berdyaev calls nob-
jectification. 11 110b,jectification 11 seems t o be an unjustified forcing 
of existential expa~iences and/or realities into limited or static 
categories. "Symbolizing," on the other hand, is a justified catego-
rizing of existential erperiences and/or r ealities, according to Ber-
1 
dyaev . Berqyaev does not consider carefully whether Kant ' s treatment 
of the noumenon would be nearer objectification or symbolization; how-
ever, it seems that Kant's noumenon is more adequately labeled "symbol" 
2 
than 11object. 11 
Another problem i n Berdyaev 1s interpretation of Kant is in his 
3 
criticism of Kant ' s moral law as "non-personal" and 11 autonomous . 11 
According to Berdyaev, Kant 1 s ethical system ignores the ind.i vidual 
person because it is based on man's moral and rational nature vnhich 
doe~ not vary from one person to another. Yet in his formulations of 
the categor ical imperative, Kant does not undervalue or ignore the in-
dividual person, but in considering man "not merely as a means" and 
"as a member of a kingdom of ends, 11 actually bases the categorical im-
perati ve on the primacy of the person and not on the primacy of an i m-
personal universal moral law. Kant 1 s moral law is an instrumental 
value which at best operates for the good of all persons . Berdyaev's 
- 4 
characterization of the eategorical imperative as "dead" is typical 
1. SuEr a, PP• 1.5-17. 
2. SuEr a, p . 18 . 
3. DM, P• 81. Cf. suEr a, P• 19. L. Supra, p. 20. 
• 
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of: his isolated statements. It does not reflect a careful or complete 
evaluation of the categorical imperative as presented by Kant. Ber-
dyaev would probably agree that the potential interpretations of the 
categorical imperative are far from 11dead. 11 
Vfuile the person is primary in Berdyaev 1 s philosophy, he does 
state that t here must be respect for Universal Truth . Whil e the cul-
mination of r.Qs ethical system is the stage where man practices 11 the 
ethics of creativeness," Berdyaev begins his ethics on the level of 
11the ethics of law. 11 He notes this level as necessary but not suffi-
1 
cient for an adequate ethical system. In this there seems to be 
another point of concurrence, if not of complete agreement, vli th Kant. 
For both Kant and Berdyaev, the moral act of the person is of 
greater importance than the goal which is the aim of any action. Havr-
ever, neither philosopher is wholly unconcerned vli.th the goal, particu-
larly as it effects persons.- For both, freedom and personal creativity 
are essential f or a meaningful moral act . Perhaps Berdyaev does em-
phasize creativity as such to a greater degree than does Kant, but the 
difference is more one of degree than of kind as each outlines his 
ethics. 
v. Tllne, eternity, and apocalypse 
Berdyaev' s paradoxical treatment of the natures of time and eter-
nity and of their relationship to each other raises interesting ques-
tions. PQS differentiations between historical and existential time 
seem to indicate t hat time has meaning and is capable of being 11 typed11 
l . Supra, pp . 28 , 87-88, and 147. 
• 
195 
as to its nature only as it is experienced by a person. The identi-
1 
fication of existential time and eternity indicates that the person 
may "experience" eternity. Yet by its very nature, existential time 
(and thus also eternity) cannot be kno-wn and described fully in the 
11ordinary11 sense, but vmuld have to be knovm largely . through apophatics 
and described symbolically . 
I~oking further into this problem, it is noted that Berdyaev says 
that history must come to an end because an endless temporal series 
would be meaningless and because the "final, integral realization of 
2 
personality" cannot be achieved "within time." Yet he is not entire-
ly clear in V1is discussion, as he states that the end of history vdll 
3 
occur "neither entirely i'dthin nor entirely beyond historical time." 
Since time must be knovm in the experience of the subject, Berdyaev 
is apparently not referring here to the traditional eschatological 
view of the end of history. .AJ.:so, it seems that time and history are 
not identical in his thought. In a sense, time, vvhich exists in the 
experience of t he subject, ends vdth death, .while history , the field 
for the experience of all men, does not so end. It is obvious that 
LTl cer tain epochs of history s pecific cultures and cinlizations have 
fallen and will fall because they have failed in various ways. Yet 
when Berdyaev claillls that history as a whole must end because 11 i t is 
4 
incapable of resolving the problem of personality vfithin its limits, 11 
1 . Supra, ppl 109-110. 
2. Supra, p . 112, especially n. 2. 
3. BE, p . 231. Cf. supra, p . 113. 
4. DR, p. 294. Cf. supra, p . 112. 
•• 
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he not only confuses his own distinction between time and history, but 
he approaches the questionable position of saying t hat because some-
thing ought to be it must and will be. (History ought to provide for 
the "realization of personality," but since it cannot do this by con-
tinuing, it will end.) Here Ber dyaev seems to fall into t he trap of 
accepting a form of the "progress myth, 11 i"Jhich he claims to oppose and 
1 
repudiate . 
vi. 1'he idea of equality 
Berdyaev 's analysis of the concept of equality is i nteres t i ng and 
helpfuL In his thought, persons have 11 absolute value 11 on the spirit-
ual-personal level, but on t he social level, ·with its more limited 
sphere and possibilities of expression, persons are often said to have 
"equal value. 11 Yet as Berdya.ev points out, "equality" is a bare and 
meaningless concept unless it has specific· reference or content. For 
example, formal political equality may engender certain serious types 
of inequality. I. e ., if every man is given equally free rein in in-
dividual economic affairs, some will undoubtedly become exploiters and 
some will be exploited. In another example, an equal amount of educa-
tion f or all and equal opportunity for each to have as much education 
as he needs to develop his greatest potential are t wo very di fferent 
situations. Each gives its ovm kind of equality. Berdyaev ' s evalua-
tion of aristocratism would indicate that for him t he second alterna-
tive would provide the more significant kind of equality. If one agrees 
vT.ith him in t his and sets out to achieve it in real life, the problem 
1. ~~' P• 138. 
• 
• 
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arises as to how one picks out t he person who really has more talent 
and therefore the right t o more attention educationally . Further, 
even if those vd t h most ability could be discerned and given a chance 
at more education t han most others, how much should t his be presented 
as an opportunity and how much should it place an obligation upon the 
person to follow a certai n career? In other words, if everything in 
a certain category can be learned about a person and corresponding 
opportunities given, how much freedom is possible or desirable? If 
one agrees -vr.i. t h Berclyaev t hat freedom is a higher value than any kind 
of equality , must not the line between freedom and persuasion or com-
pulsion be dravm far from the place wh ere it would be dravm if equality 
were the prima~J value? Berqyaev 1 s position is plain as he calls in-
equality 11the justificati on of • . • human personality itself, the 
1 
source of all creative movement, 11 W'.nile "equality as such is ••• 
2 
hollow and derivative." Freedom must always be the primary considera-
tion. 
vii. elat ionships between Russia aad the West 
Berdyaev 1 s deep concern 1v.ith t he relationship between Russia and 
t he West is as important and timely a part of his thinking now as it 
was when he was writing. Du.ring his lifetime, Russia and t he Yfest were 
related through fear, as they seem to be to even a greater degree today. 
Berdyaev's viTitings point to the solution of this tension as a synthesis 
of the best of the t-vro cultures, briefly summarized in the terms of so-
3 
cial philoso phy as "social democracy. 11 His faith in and understanding 
1. Supra, PP• 146-147. 
3. Supra, PP• 99, 150. 
2. Supra, p. 182. 
• 
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of both Russia and the West were unique because of his life's experi-
ences. Had he addressed more of his thinking and writing to the ques-
tion of their relationship, the results would certainly have been in-
teresting and creative. However, though· he notes the need for and 
a little about the nature of a poss ible synthesis bet·w·een the t wo op-
posing camps, he gives very few specific ideas on how the existing 
fear and suspicion of each side for the other may be overcome. His 
later books, especially Towards a New Epoch and The Realm of t he Spirit 
and the Realm of Caesar, indicate that this problem weighed heavily on 
his mind, but perhaps because he saw his life's work to be the raising 
of questions rather than t heir answering, or perhaps because he ran 
out of time, Berdyaev did not •vrite much on the specific details of 
solution of this one. 
viii. Berdyaev 1s discussion of pacifism 
Berdyaev 1s rejection of pacifism seems to lack his customary con-
sideration of the basic values of his personalistic philosophy . The 
point of this present criticism of his discussion is not to argue for 
or against pacifism. It is merely to point out that, in stating that 
war will be eliminated by its own self-consuming dialectic, Berdyaev 
seems to overlook the possibility l~ich existed in his time and the 
probability which exists in our time that in eliminating itself through 
its own dialectic, war may also deprive all persons of life itself. In 
Berdyae~'s argument, as it has been assembled from scattered references 
from his works, the basic personal value of man is given second place 
and a kind of impersonal dialectic is apparently placed ~n greater 
esteem and crecnted with greater power. In arguments against pacifism, 
• 
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Berdyaev also seems to condemn all pacifists because of the inadequate 
motives of some. 
2. Conclusions 
i. Berdyaev 1 s philosophical style 
Ber~yaev 1 s philosophy is more his intellectual and emotional re-
sponse to his immediate surroundings than a coolly reasoned system. 
It reflects his intense concern with man's problems in relationship 
to ~s physical, political, intellectual, emotional, spiritual, and 
other enVironments. His writing seems to be a spontaneous outpouring 
of ideas, often presented in such a way that contradictory statements 
are juxtaposed. &uch a style of >vriting makes interpretation diffi-
cult and requires the reader and interpreter to approach Berdyaev's 
' 
philosophy creatively and to consider each isolated fragment as a 
part of an "existentially cohesive" rather than "logically consistent" 
whole. Certain questions of interpretation arise in Berdyaev 1s epis-
temology, his concept of apophatic lmovrledge in theology and sociology, 
and r~s interpretations of other philosophers, for example, Kant, be-
cause of his style. 
ii. The three basic concepts in Berdyaev 1s philosophy as interdependent 
(l) Freedom. Though he recognizes and takes for granted "tradi-
tional rational freedom 11 (as expressed by Kant 1 s and Hegel's concepts), 
freedom, as Berdyaev most frequently uses the term denotes an uncreated, 
chaotic, irrational, and primordial freedom, comparable to Tillich 1s 
abyss, Boehme's Ungrund, or the Greek /ill fv. 
• 
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(2) God. God cannot be positively known by 11rea.Bon 11 as generally 
understood, but must be "negatively" or 11 apophaticallyu knmm as un-
like anything within man's natural experience. Vfuatever religious 
knowledge, including knowledge about the nature of God, man states, 
he must state symbolically. Speaking symbolically, Berdyaev says 
t hat God is spiritual in nature, and Creator of the Cosmos. He is 
omnipotent in relation to His creation, but limited by the uncreated 
freedom vmich He did not create. 
(3) Man. Man is a complex being-combination of the spiritual, 
psychic, and the natural. He is related to God, other persons, and 
the uncreated freedom. At his best he is crea.tive . For Berdyaev, 
creativity implies personally willed eff ort freely s pringing from 
man 1 s self. Man may be creative in many phases of life a..'rld philosophy, 
including apprehension of truth, social relations, ethics, art, etc. 
iii . Berdyaev 1s philosophy as an elaboration of t wo attitudes towards 
1 r eality 
(1) Personalism. Persons alone are intrinsic values. .All other 
values are values for persons. Persons cannot live fully as isolated 
indivj.duals, but depend on community, or as the Russian expression 
puts i~ sobornost, for full self-realization. As a person, man seeks 
co~nunity on the deep est level, as distinct from co-operation or com-
munication which he seeks on the "lower" economic or scientific levels • 
As persons, God and man 11yearn11 for fellowship with one another. 
(2) Existentialism. Berdyaev 1s existentialism is evident in his 
metaphysics, ~ich he outlines particularly well in The Beginning and 
the End. Here he describes himself as one 'Whose philosophy is subjec-
201 
tive, spiritually based, concerned w:i.th freedom, dualistically plural-
istic, creatively dynamic, and eschatologioa+, rather t han objective, 
naturalistic, deterministic, monistic, statically ontological, or evo-
lutionary. Freedom and existence, rather than objective Being or Sub-
stance, are primary to his philosophy. 
iv. Social philosophy 
(1 ) Berdyaev 1s philosophy of history and concepts of time and eter-
nity. Berdyaev' s philosophy of history is very important in his posi-
tion st ated as a whole, but in this study it is considered as a part of 
and background for his social philosophy. According to Berdyaev, man 
lives involved in three kinds of time--cosmic, historical, and existen-
tial. As man experiences existential time, he in a sense experiences 
eternity and is somehow related to it. The presence and value of dis-
continuity in time as "ordinary" (probably historical) time is 11 inter-
rupted11 by man 1 s 11existential experience" of "living in the fullness 
of the moment" leads Berdyaev to call his philosophy of history 11 escha-
tological." Because of the problem of communicating such ideas, there 
seems to be a paradox in the relationship between time and eternity , 
yet it is only as they are related in the creative life that life in 
historical time has meaning for the spiritual person. 
(2) Berdyaev 1s critical discussions in social philosophy. Though 
Berdyaev does not elaborate a systematic social philosophy as such, as 
one closely involved with his social and political environment, he is 
very concerned with social issues and often comments on social philos-
ophy. Though he is usually negatively critical in his discussions of 
existing social forms, he finds some acceptable points in the social 
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philosophies whose total positions he does not accept. 
(i) Cormnunism. Most of Berd.yaev 1 s analysis of social nhilos-
op:b.y deals with com.ilrunism, vvi th l"ihich he had mos t experience. He 
likes its concern for the exploited ~ (not the exploited class, for 
he consj_ders the class to be an "unreal whole" while its me.11bers are 
11 real persons 11 ). He accepts communism's criticisms of complacent 
Christianity and the evils of capitalism such as exploitation and 
materialism . He also approves co:mrnunism 1 s economic planning. But he 
finds its totalitarianism degrading to man because it suppresses his 
personality and creativeness. It also disregards man's spiritual 
dimension while controlling his whole life, which it views as derived 
from a~d confined t o a narrow physical plane. 
(ii) The concept of equality. Berdyaev 1s discussions of vari-
ous terms and concepts of social philosophy are stimulating. For exam-
ple, speru(i ng of equality as an often-prized social ideal, he notes 
t he need for specific definition of its scope and content. Generally 
he concludes that social and political equality are lesser values and 
must give precedence to such larger values as the creative potential 
of the "spiritual aristocrat." 
(iii) Russia and t he ~Test. Berdyaev is concerned with the re-
lationship be~reen Russia and the West, noting the basic fear and ten-
sion between them and the need for a synthesis wherein the best social 
ideals of each might become ingredients for a superior social philos-
opby to any presently being practiced. He labels this synthesis 
11 social democracy , 11 but does not spell out its details, nor i ndicate 
how its establishment might be begun and carried out. 
• 
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(3) Berdyaev's social philosophy • . Berdyaev's oYm social philos-
ophy grows naturally from his personalism and existentialism. He la-
bels it "personalistic socialism," but he does not develop it in de-
tail, partly because he feels that a truly 11existential 11 social phi-
losophy cannot be preconceived but has · to be expressed as a spontane-
' ous creative response to the existing situation. He does state that 
,. basic physical needs, prerequisites to man 1 s life, should be provided 
throu@1 economic planning (i.e. some type of socialism), but believ-
ing in the values of a mixed economy, ·he insists that this must not 
be a doctrinaire socialism. l;lan as free, creative, and spiritual per-
son is the primary value for whom social organizations. and philosopPies 
exist; therefore, they must ·be fitted to his changing needs rather 
than he to their doctrinaire formulations .• 
• 
• 
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ABSTRACT 
Ber~yaev lived his turbulent life intensely involved in his L~­
mediate political and intellectual environment. M~y of his writings 
are "tracts for the times, 11 addressed to the problems of this environ-
ment , often hastily vvritten with great emot ion. Even in the more sys-
tematic works such as The Destiny of lilian, Slavery and Freedom, and The 
Beginning and the End, t here is an element of urgency and directness 
often not present in philoso phical v~itings. 
Berqyaev is a personalistic existentialist, and calls his philos-
ophy s"Llbjective, spiritually based, concerned ·with freed.om, dualistic-
ally pl-uralist, creatively dynamic and eschatological. It is not an 
objective, naturalistic, deterministic, monistic, statically ontologi-
cal or evolutionary philosophy. As an existentialist, he distinguishes 
between factual scientific truths and Truth, the dynamic principle 
which is actual only as it is perceived by the creative subject. 
Though he is concerned t hat man seek and recognize "universal Truth, 11 
he interprets Truth as having significance only as it is knovvn, i.e. 
11 subjectively. 11 11 Knowing 11 for Eerdyaev is not a mere reflection of 
given data; it depends on man 's creative application of his faculties 
to each situation. Inasmuch as he has an "ontolog'f, 11 his philosophy 
is based on Freedom rather than on Being. As a personalist, he believes 
t hat man, the llmeetin..g point of the natural and spiri tua.l, 11 is a primary 
reality and value. Created in the image of God, man participates in 
Freedom as does God. In his freedom, man is to create spiritual values 
• 
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and to make a creative response to God. Man best works in his freedom 
not as an isolated individual, but in sobornost (altogetherness) or 
~-
coinmunity, i.e., in relationship to God or in fellowship with other 
men. 
Berqyaev's primrurJ concern, social and philosophical, is freedom. 
Freedom for him is not the abstract freedom from all restraints,nor is 
• 
i t a mere psychological state; it is an attribute, goal, and responsi-
bility of man as personality. Though he recognizes the existence and 
importance of freedom in the traditional senses of freedom given man 
by God and rational freedom wit:b..in limits (e.g. as defined by Kant and 
Hegel), Berdyaev emphasizes freedom as uncrea.ted, non-rational, prior 
to being, and containing all conceivable possibilities of both good 
and evil. In this concept he acknowledges his indebtedness to Boehme's 
concept of the Ungrund. Both God and man must contend with this un-
created freedom, working with it ·where they can, and accepting its lim-
itations where they must. 
Berdyaev does not expound his social philosophy systematically, 
but references to it and elements of it permeate nearly all of his wYrit-
ings, inasmuch as they reflect his concerned response to his social and 
political surrou..TJ.dings,. His social philoso phy is derived from his exis-
tentialism, personalism, and creative ethics. He treats his ethical 
eystem largely in one book, The Destiny of Man. In this outline of his 
ethics, he goes beyond the ethics of law and ethics of redemption to 
theethics of creativeness, in "''lhich freedom plays the primary part. He 
also sets his social philosophy in te1~s of his philosophy of history. 
History, which i ncludes interaction of God, man, and fate, must culmi-
• 
·-
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nate eschatologically in order to have meaning. ~~, vmo lives in 
relationship to historical time, is also related to cosmic time in 
which natural cycles occur and existential time in wPich spiritual 
creativity takes place. It is as he lives in existential time, ex-
periencing the "fullness of the moment," that man experiences the es-
chatological. :b,or Berdyaev, eschatology does not signify the "end of 
this age" and. the transference of man into a "new heavenly age" in 
the traditional sense, nor will man be moved into the "new age 11 of an 
earthly Utopia realized by purely social means. Both of these con-
cepts of 11the age beyond time" Berdyaev finds to be traditionally 11ob-
jectivized,11 11static, 11 and 11non-creative; 11 thus he rejects them in 
favor of a creatively realized "existential apocalypse." 
Much of Berdyaev 1 s writing on social philosophy consists of crit-
icism of existing forms of social organization, particularly of com-
munism, with "Which he had most direct experience. Measuring t heir 
theoretical and practical concern with man as a free, creative, and 
spiritual person, he notes the shortcomings of all forms of organicism 
and individualism, citing particularly their degree of failure to treat 
man as a person as they either bury h~ in the collective, isolate him 
from co~~union vvith others, or fail to consider him as more than a 
physical, economic or political being. He accepts certain elements 
of existing social theories, such as socialism's economic planning, 
aristocratism's allowance for the maximum development of the best, 
anarchism's lack of compulsion, and democracy's concern for all men. 
F.is ovm social philosophy, a type of organic pluralism, he calls 
"per sonalistic socialism." Thoug.."IJ. he considers many specific social 
212 
issues such as the family in society, the organization of society, class 
and the classless society, t he guild organization of society, culture 
and civilization, technization, economics, property ownership , the mean-
i ng of work, religion as a social force, love as a. social force, nation-
alism and internationalism, war and pacifism, revolution, and capital 
punisJ::ment, he does not outline in detail a "positive program" of social 
organization. Rather than make a blueprint for a Utopia, Berdyaev re-
cognizes that the nature of the true personalistic and existential com-
munity (which in itself allows maximum freedom and potential f or per-
sonal development to its members) precludes its specific preconception. 
He does say, however, that man's basic physical needs are essential to 
life i tself, and therefore to the r ealization of creativity and freedom; 
thus allowance must be made for the provision of these to all men. 
Having received bread, hmvever, all men are to participate creatively 
and responsibly in freedom, bringing it to bear on the worl d situation 
by -,•.rhich they should not be caught or overpowered. The primary goals 
of life are personal and spiritual, and social life is merely to pro-
vide the atmosphere and possibility for their realization. 
